Evaluating the performance of managed funds: The cases of equity, ethical funds and Islamic index by Hassan, Abul
Durham E-Theses
Evaluating the performance of managed funds: The
cases of equity, ethical funds and Islamic index
Hassan, Abul
How to cite:
Hassan, Abul (2005) Evaluating the performance of managed funds: The cases of equity, ethical funds and
Islamic index, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2731/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
EVALUATING THE PERFORMANCE OF 
MANAGED FUNDS: THE CASES OF EQUITY, 
EHTICAL FUNDS AND ISLAMIC INDEX 
A c o p y r i g h t o f th i s thesis rests 
w i t h the a u t h o r . N o q u o t a t i o n 
f r o m i t s h o u l d be p u b l i s h e d 
w i t h o u t h is p r i o r w r i t t e n consent 
a n d i n f o r m a t i o n d e r i v e d f r o m i t 
s h o u l d be a c k n o w l e d g e d . 
By 
Abul Hassan 
THESIS 
Durham, UK in partial fulfilment of the requirements for Degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy in Finance 
Department of Economics and Finance 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, FINANCE AND BUSINESS 
UNIVERSITY OF оиБШАм, ик 
June, 2005 
EC Ж 
Abstract 
Managed funds have become a popular investment t oo l and possess a lot o f 
advantages. However , i n spite o f their popular i ty , most past research findings on the 
evaluat ion o f per formance have suggested that managed funds were unable to do 
s ign i f icant ly better than a large unmanaged por t fo l io . The a im o f th is thesis is to 
evaluate emp i r i ca l l y the per formance o f managed funds. The funds chosen are; U K 
equi ty, ethical un i t trasts and US-based D o w Jones Is lamic index -an index o f Is lamic 
ethical funds por t fo l io . 
W e examine the per fonnance o f U K equi ty un i t trasts w h i c h invest i n U K 
equit ies, us ing m o n t h l y samples over the 1986 to 2001 t ime per iod . The study 
compares the return o f these un i t trusts w i t h a three-factor mode l w h i c h takes into 
account their exposure to market , value and size risk. A f t e r con t ro l l i ng the risk 
factors, i t is found that managers under -per fonn the market . Cont rary to the no t ion 
that smal l company shares o f fer abundant "beat the marke t " opportuni t ies, w e find 
that smal l company trusts are the wors t performers. The per formance persistence o f 
un i t trusts is also examined and it is found that good per formance does not persist. 
There are investors w h o out o f their concern regarding adverse changes i n our 
envi ronment , concerns for jus t ice , and because o f their oppos i t ion to the arms race, 
decl ine to purchase the securities o f such enterprises that engage i n wha t are termed 
unethical or soc ia l ly i rresponsible act iv i t ies. Such act ivi t ies usual ly inc lude, but are 
not necessari ly l im i ted to , the p roduc t ion o f armaments, a lcohol and tobacco; 
engaging in act iv i t ies that degrade the env i ronment ; and engaging i n act iv i t ies that 
treat people un fa i r l y . Dec l i n ing to invest in the securities o f епЇефгі8Є5 that engage in 
unethical practices is not on l y a f o r m o f social protest, but can also have the effect o f 
d im in i sh ing the demand for a company's securities. A d imin ishment o f demand may 
then have an adverse f inancia l impact on a company. Th is m a y prove to be a crucia l 
factor i n in f luenc ing companies to change and become more socia l ly responsible. The 
quest ion therefore arises: has the investment per formance o f ethical investors suffered 
i n compar ison to those w h o are not so responsible? T o answer the above, a study has 
been done w h i c h encompasses 35 U K ethical un i t trusts w h i c h cover the per iod o f 
seven years toough 1996. The รณdy presents a comprehensive evaluat ion o f managed 
funds per formance b y emp loy ing var ious single to mu l t i fac to r benchmark models. 
The added value o f in t roduc ing extra variables such as size, book to market , 
m o m e n t u m and a bond index is explored b y evaluat ing the per formance using 
condi t iona l i n fo rmat ion and compar ing the investment per formance o f U K etMcal uni t 
trasts w i t h un i t trusts w h i c h are not ethical. A f t e r con t ro l l i ng for style t i l ts and 
a l l ow ing fo r t ime var ia t ion i n betas and expected reณm， the results show that there is 
no s igni f icant d i f ference i n per formance between U K ethical un i t trust and their 
convent ional peers. W i t h i n an uncondi t ional sett ing s M B , H M L and m o m e n ณ m 
factors are best able to expla in ethical un i t trast retums. Therefore, uncondi t ional 
models pe r fo rm m u c h better than their condi t ional peers. 
Is lamic ethical investors apply bo th Is lamic ethical and financial cr i ter ia when 
evaluat ing investments i n order to ensure that the securit ies selected are consistent 
w i t h their value system and bel iefs. Us ing mon th l y reณras for the per iod start ing from 
January 1996 to December 2003， the รณdy is conducted to see the potent ia l impact 
that Is lamic ethical restr ict ions may have on investment per formance b y compar ing 
the performance characteristics o f a d ivers i f ied por t fo l io o f Is lamic screened stocks 
( D o w Jones Is lamic index) w i t h convent ional benchmark po r t fo l i o ( D o w Jones Index-
Amer icas) . Cont rary to expectations, our f ind ings indicate that appl icat ion o f Is lamic 
ethical screens do not necessari ly have an adverse impact on investment performance. 
Results actual ly show that expected reณms o f Is lamic screened por t fo l ios are h igher 
than the expected retums o f convent ional por t fo l ios . 
11 
"Read in the name of your Lord Who creates, creates man from a clot. Read, for your 
Lord is most Generous; [it is He] Who teaches by means of the Pen, teaches nian 
what he does not Խօพ. " (The Clot 96:1) 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 M o t i v a t i o n 
The academic studies since the 1960 i n the us have found that muณa l funds 
(s imi lar to the un i t trusts in U K ) do not systematical ly ou tper fo rm the benchmark i n 
general case (Jensen, 1968; Treynor , 1965; รһафе, 1966, M a l k i e l , 1995; Gruber, 
1996; Dav is , 2001) . МиШаІ funds have become one o f the largest financial 
intermediar ies i n the leading w o r l d economies, current ly con t ro l l ing about 7 t r i l l i on 
dol lars i n assets i n the us and over 3 t r i l l i on Euros in assets in Europe ( Investment 
Company Inst i tute, 2002) . Current ly , investors can choose from thousands o f funds 
o f fe r ing a w i d e range o f investment prof i les , from re la t ive ly safe short- term debt 
instruments to re la t ive ly risky stocks and derivat ives. 
A c c o r d i n g to statistics c i ted i n the U n i t Trast Yearbook 2003, there were more 
than £271bn invested i n the un i t trusts/managed fund industry i n the U K . D u r i n g the 
per iod 1995 to 2002, there was a rap id expansion o f the U K uni t trusts w h i c h carr ied 
total funds from £112.8 bn i n the year 1995, £131.9 b n i n 1996, £157.6 b n i n 1997， 
£182.8bn i n 1998, £253.8bn i n 1999, £260.9bn i n 2000, £235.8bn i n 2001 and 
£260.7bn i n the year 2002. A n interest ing fact is that about 10% o f i n f l ows in to these 
funds are invested in ethical uni t trusts w h i c h are act ive ly managed ( U n i t Trust 
Yearbook 2003) . 
I n U K , the Eth ica l b ivestment Research Services (EHUS) research shows that 
the est imated va lue o f ethical ftinds grew from £81.5 m i l l i o n to £1285.05 m i l l i o n 
between years 1995 and 2002, and the number o f ethical un i t trasts rose from 37 to 
62. The demand fo r securities i n w h i c h investors can exercise thei r mora l 
responsib i l i ty is met w i t h a supply b y f inancia l intermediaries - creat ing specialised 
ethical uni t trust, ethical pension fund, ecological funds etc; w h i c h o f fe r standardised 
investment packages w i t h regards to г е Ш т , te rm, currency, risk. E th ica l funds are 
therefore a response to that demand. I n some cases, the responsible investors make 
their decisions between a m i n i m u m (not invest ing i n c lear ly i m m o r a l companies) and 
a broad range o f increasingly extensive opportuni t ies, from financing companies 
w h i c h stand out for their ethical , soc ia l ly aware or responsible conduct to t r y i ng to 
in f luence compar i i es' management so that they cease to act i m m o r a l l y and improve 
their ethical qua l i t y (Smi th , 1996). 
Is lamic ethical funds, w h i c h prov ide most o f the services o f act ive ly managed 
funds and match the D o w Jones Is lamic G loba l Marke t Index ( D J I M ) and F T S E 
Is lamic G loba l Index, have attracted a good amount o f investment i n the European 
and Amer i can market . D u r i n g the late 1990ร Is lamic ethical funds rode on the 
technology b o o m . I n 1996, for example, there were twenty-n ine Is lamic fiinds on the 
market w i t h $US800 m i l l i o n i n assets. However , b y early 2000 the number o f funds 
had g r o w n to n inety-e ight w i t h approx imate ly $US5 b i l l i o n i n assets. A s at December 
2 0 0 1 , there were over one hundred Is lamic equi ty funds w i t h thei r to ta l assets 
estimated at rough ly us$ 5.3 b i l l i o n (Fai laka, 2002). 
з 
There are several possible explanations as to w h y ind iv idua l investors 
cont inue to b u y act ive ly managed uni t trasts, ethical un i t trusts and Is lamic ethical 
funds even though such funds m a y have lower re tums than index ftmds. 
F i rs t ly , the lure in to active management may be strong because the potent ia l 
p ro f i t from act ive strategies is enormous. Th is cou ld be expla ined better b y the Robert 
Mer ton ' ร example. ' Consider an investor w h o had £1,000 o n January 1， 1930. I f 
he/she had put i t i n 30 days commerc ia l paper and ro l led over a l l proceeds, he w o u l d 
have had £3,600 on December 3 1 , 1981, after 52 years. I f he had put i t i n the F T S E 
index (a passive po r t fo l i o ) , and invested a l l d iv idends, after 52 years, he w o u l d have 
had £67,500. However , supposing the investor had perfect ins ight about the market 
and was able to te l l ( w i t h certainty) w h i c h w o u l d pe r fo rm better, the F T S E index or 
30 days commerc ia l paper and he act ive ly shi f ted al l his money in to the better 
predicted one, then, beg inn ing w i t h £1,000 and after be ing act ive ly managed for 52 
years, he w o u l d have gained several thousands o f pounds. The extra r e ณ m is not a 
risk p rem ium; i t is because o f superior analysis. I t is this enomiouร extra return that 
lures investors to seek those 'super ior ' managers. Investors express a consistent be l ie f 
that some managers have those sk i l ls and the market can select them as t ime goes by. 
Th is also dr ives the un i t trusts, ethical fund or Is lamic fund companies to adopt act ive 
management strategies i n the hope o f real is ing persistent, abnormal ly h i gh re tums. 
Secondly, i f securi ty markets are not as e f f ic ient as researchers bel ieve, there 
are some por t fo l i o managers w h o may be able to produce stakes o f abnormal retums. 
This example is cited in the textbook. Investment, by Bõdiê, Kane and Márčus(2002) 
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There is also considerable academic evidence that asset means and variances are to 
some extent predictable (Shanken, 1990; Person and Harvey; 1991) 
Thirdly, the unit trasts and Islamic ethical funds allow investors including 
those w i th limited wealth to hold a diversified portfolio o f financial securities at a low 
cost. These managed fund shares are easy to buy through an intermediary or directly, 
via telephone or internet. 
Fourthly, shareholders can transfer money between funds within the same 
family at low cost. In addition, they do not run l iquidity risk, since they can sell their 
units at Net Asset Value (NAV) at any time. 
Fifthly, the investment strategy of a managed fund is developed by financial 
professionals, who are able to select the right stocks at the right time. Thus, unit trusts 
and Islamic etMcal funds claim to be especially attractive for small investors who do 
not have sufficient resources to fol low a sound investment strategy at low cost. 
Given the tremendous size o f the managed ñind industry, it is crucial for the 
regulatory agencies to ensure that the ftinds invest the money o f their unit-holder/ 
shareholders efficiently, since even a basis point difference in fund returns implies 
almost a bi l l ion dollar gain or loss for investors. The role o f the academic researchers 
are to check the validity o f the claims referred to above. It has been demonstrated that 
investing in unit trasts and ethical fonds may not necessarily be optimal for 
consumers. It has been shown that active funds, on average, do not earn positive 
performance adjusted for risk (Graber, 1996). Even though some funds seem to have 
superior risk adjusted performance, there are many funds that consistently 
ип0ефегГогт their benchmarks (Carhart, 1997; Kosowski et al, 2000). However, 
most muณal funds wi th consistently poor performance in the us, are not punished by 
ñmd holders/shareholders through the withdrawal o f their money, which may be due 
to various institutional and psychological factors (Gruber, 1996; Sirri and Tufano, 
1998). Whilst there has been comparatively very little empirical work carried out on 
the financial performance o f the U K equity unit trasts because the data is not easily 
available and question therefore remains unanswered here. 
On the other hand, the main problem wi th defining ethical investing is that the 
parameters or restrictions that apply are individual measures. There is no common 
threshold that applies evenly across all asset classes. Certain organisations allow 
companies that manufacture weapons in their portfolios, others do not. Religious 
organisations have certain screening restrictions, while endowments and foundations 
have a series o f others. For example, under Islamic guidelines money managers are 
restricted from buying the stock o f companies that receive more than 15% o f their 
revenue from interest; as a result, conventional banks and finance companies are 
basically excluded from this investable universe. Many Christian organizations 
restrict the purchase o f companies that engage in one or more o f the fol lowing lines o f 
business: tobacco, alcohol, weapons, and contraceptive devices. 
The screening restrictions most often considered by ethical investors may be 
broken into two categories; 1) negative, which involves the search for companies that 
violate one or more o f the restrictions, and 2) positive, which involves the search for 
companies that contribute in some way to society. 
The negative restrictions are designed to eliminate companies from the 
investable universe, while positive restrictions are designed to add companies to it. 
The greatest area o f controversy about ethical or Islamic screened portfolios centre on 
their performance results. Proponents o f an ethical or Islamic based investment policy 
must address performance, first generally and then specifically, in the context o f the 
institution's asset allocation decisions and monitoring o f its portfolio managers. 
Any discussion o f a change in investment strategy must include an 
examination o f the relative financial performance of the vehicles under consideration. 
Ethical and Islamic based investing are no exception to that rule, bideed, ethical 
investing has endured some bad press on performance, and proponents must anticipate 
questions based on it. 
The Modem Portfolio Theory holds that, in general, diversification reduces 
risk and maximizes long-term геШтร. Anything that limits an investor's ability to 
diversify therefore increases investment risks unnecessarily. For example, eliminating 
tobacco company securities w i l l l imit a manager's ability to diversify into an industry 
that may outperform the rest o f the stock market. This argument ignores the fact that 
one hires a manager because he or she is good at narrowing the ШІУЄГ8Є o f investable 
options. In this matter, modem portfolio theory proves to be just a theory and as wi th 
any theories, exceptions can be found in practice. 
Some studies have indicated that investors applying ethical criteria need not 
expect to lose anything vis a vis the broad market indexes. Kinder, Lydenberg, and 
Domini (1997) report that the longest-running benchmark o f socially responsible 
(ethical) ftxnd performance, the 400-member Domini Social Index (DSI), has higher 
Sharpe and Treynor scores than the s&p 500 for the six years prior to Apr i l 30, 1997. 
This is not the first time such a disparity has appeared - Grossman and Sharpe (1986) 
also sought to explain the nominal outperformance o f South Africa-free portfolios for 
the 1960-1983 time period. Freeman and Winchester (1994) find that by simply 
removing socially responsible investment stocks from the (State o f Connecticut), 
investable universe would have increased uncompensated risk by more than 2.0%, but 
they note that adjustment strategies could offset this problem "substantially." 
Many รณdi es find that ethically screened portfolios tend to have smaller 
average capitalisations, higher price-to-book ratios, higher P/E ratios, and more 
favorable "excellence" ratios than their unscreened counterparts (Davidson et al, 
1995; Rivol i , 1995). Money managers who have handled both ethically screened and 
unscreened accounts for many years report that over the time, the performance o f 
these accounts do not differ materially. Hamilton, Jo, and Statman (1993) find no 
difference in retums between screened and unscreened mutual fiinds. Kurtz (1997) 
finds no significant performance differences for a group o f growth managers. I f these 
observations are accurate then either ethical screens have not harmed investment 
performance or diversification costs have been offset by information effects. 
The performance of the Domini 400 and the results o f the รณdies discussed 
above shift the burden o f proof to critics to show that there are indeed "costs" to social 
screening. Thus far, there appears to be little evidence that ethical screening 
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necessarily results in negative return. The affirmative case for screened portfolios has 
not yet been proven. Time and a ful l market cycle may determine the "cost" question. 
But, the ultimate questions remain unresolved: do the companies that pass the ethical 
screening and are described as a good performer, is a better portfolio than an 
unscreened universe? 
1.2 Scope of the Study 
Although muณal fund performance in the us is wel l documented in the finance 
literature, studies on the U K equity, ethical unit trusts are not well explained. In this 
รณdy, we evaluate the performance o f managed funds. This รณdy notes that some o f 
the fol lowing areas are lacking in research. A ful l understanding o f unit trusts and 
Islamic funds is very important to provide information to policymakers and investors 
in order to expand and increase efficiency in the capital market. 
(1) Most o f the studies on performance evaluation o f money managers 
performance say that the managers are not able to outperform markets in any 
meaningful sense. They do not claim to uncover specific types o f market 
failure as do the 'anomalies' literaณre o f the 1980ร and the behavioural 
finance literature at present time. Rather, money manager รณdies ask 
whether there are market failures, regardless o f the type, that is 
systematically exploitable. In our opinion, the conclusion o f the literature to 
date is negatively resounding. Nearly all the รณdies thus far confine 
themselves to managers' efforts to outperform the us equity markets. 
Among them are those by Davis(2001), Carhart(1997), Malkiel(1995). On 
the hand, study in this area in the U K is lacking. This study w i l l close the 
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gap in the areas discussed above by examining the performance o f all the 
U K equity unit trusts that concentrate their investment in the UK. 
(2) The investment based on ethical or socially responsible criteria appeals to 
many investors, the general perception is that it most l ikely reduces portfolio 
performance. The financial theory argues that ethical investing w i l l under 
perform over the long term because ethical portfolios are subsets o f the 
market portfolio, which lack sufficient diversification (Anderson, 1996). 
Further questions raised are that selecting stocks according to ethical 
screening can be an expensive practice that may ultimately have a negative 
impact on net return. Therefore, lhe general perception has been that ethical 
portfolios are l ikely to under-perform their conventional peers. Declining to 
invest in the securities o f unethical епіефгізєз is not only a form o f social 
protest, but can also have the effect of diminishing the demand for a 
company's securities which may have an adverse financial impact on a 
company. This may be a factor in influencing companies to change and to 
become more socially responsible. The question arises: Is an investor who 
declines to purchase the securities o f епїефгізез deemed to be socially 
irresponsible at a disadvantage versus investors who have no such 
restrictions? In other words, did the investment performance o f ethical 
investors suffer in comparison to those who are not so responsible? 
(3) General methods o f risk-adjusted performance evaluation employ 
unconditional mean-variable criteria together w i th the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM). Funds have been compared to efficient portfolios from the 
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unconditional mean-variance frontier. Wi th respect to performance 
evaluation, most o f the studies on ethical funds only deal wi th two models, 
or at the most three different performance models. There are larger number 
o f managed iUnd performance models which create confiision for both 
academics and practitioners. This leads us to ask what model is to be used 
for performance measurement. The search for suitable model to measure the 
ethical fund performance and employment o f additional factors, such as 
S M B , H M L , momentum and to use the conditional information appears to 
be more logical and comprehensive. 
(4) Islamic ethical investors represent a unique ethical investment market. As at 
2003, the Islamic banking industry held total assets o f approximately $250 
bi l l ion, which is expanding, rapidly wi th an estimated annual growth rate o f 
15-20% (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2004). Islamic investors are concerned wi th a 
very different set o f ethical criteria from other ethical investors but the issues 
arising out o f screening are similar. A large portion of the Islamic 
community has been excluded from stock market investments due to 
religious prohibitions on certain business activities and riba (interest). The 
issue o f what to do wi th տ ս փ Խ տ funds and how to provide financial security 
for the future has plagued those determined to comply with religious 
injunctions. A major breakthrough occurred wi th religious ralings on equity 
investments and the establishment o f Islamic ethical funds in the 1970ร. 
However, the performance o f these funds has been mixed and investors have 
lacked a suitable benchmark wi th which to assess performance. The Dow 
Jones Islamic Market index launched in 1999 and marketed by the Dow 
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Jones & Company at last provides the Islamic community wi th an acceptable 
universe o f stocks to invest in and a benchmark against which performance 
can be measured. Most academic รณdies on ethical fund performance have 
until now looked into the average performance o f ethical funds (Mal l in, 
Saadouni and Briston ,1995) as a group against the unreรฬcted benchmark 
portfolios (Statman, 2000; Luther and Matatko, 1994), ignoring any effect 
screening might have. The reason for this is obvious - a lack o f 
comprehensive data and information on the exact approach followed by the 
fiinds. The screeners deviated more clearly from conventional funds wi th 
respect to investment style. The influence o f screening on performance 
provides a first hand observation for Islamic ethical investors. Despite the 
increasing attention given by practitioners to Islamically ethical screened 
investments, there is scant academic research. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The question o f why investors choose to invest in actively managed funds 
such as unit trusts, ethical unit trusts and Islamic ethical fimds is beyond the scope o f 
this research. Nor are we trying to initiate the debate about the legitimacy o f ethical 
and Islamic investing. The main objective o f this thesis is to investigate empirically 
the performance o f equity, ethical unit trusts and Islamic index. In order to address 
this matter, the thesis is focused on the fol lowing research questions: 
Do U K equity unit trust Fund Managers outperform the market? 
Does fiind performance persist? 
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Do portfolio o f small stocks outperform the market? 
(Above research questions are in the chapter 3) 
Has the investment performance o f the U K ethical unit trasts suffered in comparison 
to those which are not so ethical? 
Which model is suitable for managed funds performance evaluation and what is 
statistical significance o f adding more factors such as size, book-to-market, and 
т о т е п Ш т and bond index? 
What is the economic importance o f more elaborate model specifications? 
(Above questions are addressed in chapter 4) 
What are the actual relative retums o f Islamic etMcal portfolio and conventional 
portfolio and impact on Islamic ethical screen on investment performance? 
(Above research question is addressed in the chapter 5) 
1.4 Overview of the Thesis 
The thesis proceeds as fol low: 
Chapter 2 o f this thesis presents an overview o f the main topics explored in the 
literature on managed funds. The largest stand o f this ІіІегаШге is devoted to the 
evaluation o f managed fund (mutual fund or unit trast) performance. Since the fund 
expected retums are affected by their risk exposures, the analysis is usually based on 
risk-adjusted performance measures. We discuss a number o f studies that measure the 
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average performance o f managed funds and examine factors explaining the 
differences in performance across fiinds. Another strand o f the literature investigates 
the behaviour o f managed fund investors, analyzing the impact o f past performance 
and factors related to the transaction cost on money flows to funds. Since managerial 
compensation is usually linked to the fund size, the observed flow performance 
relationship may provide adverse incentives to managers. We also discuss various 
performance evaluation models in both their unconditional and conditional versions. 
Chapter 3 describes in details the U K unit trasts, their broad characteristics and the 
broad settings in which they operate wi th in the UK. We evaluate the performance o f a 
sample o f the U K equity unit trasts for the period 1986-2001 that concentrate their 
investments in U K equities by employing the single factor с А Р М model. I t compares 
the retums o f these unit trusts wi th a three-factor model which takes into account their 
exposure to market, value and size risk. 
Chapter 4 provides a background o f the concept o f ethical or socially responsible 
investing. It poses questions in the theoretical context o f investor'ร ethical screening 
o f compani es, defines ethical funds and explores the issues o f ethical investment. The 
volume o f the U K ethical unit trusts and performance o f ethical unit trusts is discussed 
as wel l . We also analyse the behaviour o f investors and their moral responsibility 
based on the traditional theory o f responsibility within the framework o f co-operation. 
Furthermore, we examine the statistical significance o f adding more factors to the 
single factor model and focus on the economic importance o f more elaborate model 
specifications in respect to perfonnance evolution with a sample o f the U K ethical 
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unit trusts for the period 1996-2003. We then comparé their performance with that o f 
the U K non-ethical unit trusts. 
Chapter 5 examines the performance o f Dow Jones Islamic Market index (DJIM) for 
the period o f 1996-2003, using both unconditional and conditional models to provide 
an insight into the effect o f Islamic ethical screens as wel l as using lagged information 
variables in the analysis o f performance. The traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) has a number o f well-known weaknesses - one o f which is that it assumes 
the risk (beta), to be stationary over time. A more accurate assessment of the expected 
return can be obtained by relaxing this constraint using the conditional asset-pricing 
model to estimate the Jensen's alpha. It compares the performance characteristics o f 
Islamic screened index (Dow Jones Islamic market index) wi th the perfomance 
characteristics unrestricted index (Dow Jones hidex Americas) to observe relative 
reณras o f Islamic ethical and conventional portfolio. 
Chapter 6 provides a summary o f results, conclusions and suggestions for areas o f 
further investigation. 
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Chapter 2 
Literatoe Review 
2.1 Background to the Academic Literatore 
The academic literaณre on the measurement o f managed fund performance 
stretches back over 40 years. The development o f the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model(CAPM)^ from modem portfolio theory(MPT)^ created a method o f measuring 
managed fund performance on at the basis o f at least two dimensions: risk and 
expected return. Modem portfolio theory(MPT) is built on the assumption that 
rational investors need information about the expected return and risk o f their 
potential investments before they can make informed choices. This suggests that 
return and risk must be included in any performance measurement. 
The literature on mutual funds has also contributed to the development o f 
various portfolio performance measures. Moreover, unit trusts" or тиШаІ ftmds have 
also been used in studies on the strong form o f efficiency and the stock pricing ability 
o f fund managers. The first question in any discussion o f performance is: can 
managed funds add value in the sense of 'beating the market'? Early studies o f 
] Sharpe (1964), Lmter(1965), Treynor(1965) 
^Markowitz(1952) 
4 The UK unit trusts are similar to the us open-ended mutual fonds 
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managed funds (mutual fiinds/unit trasts, index fonds, hedge funds, country funds 
etc.) focused on this issue. These รณdies were conducted to test the Efficient Markets 
Theory. They also assist investors to decide whether it is better to invest in an actively 
managed fund or an index fund. Recently more attention has been focussed on 
whether past performance o f individual funds can be used as a guide to their fixture 
performance. Can investors successfully use measures o f past performance as a 
decision tool for ftmd selection? This issue is also referred to as 'performance 
persistence'. This Chapter reviews the literature on the main topic and related issues. 
In particular, it covers the literaณre on: models o f stock return, mutual fund 
performance with reference to survivorship bias, performance persistence, style 
performance and modem portfolio theory techniques. 
2.2 Stock Return Models 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) relies on the mean-variance 
efficiency o f the market portfolio, which implies that: (i) the expected return on a 
stock is a positive linear function o f its market beta; and ( і і ) the market betas o f stocks 
are adequate for explaining the cross-sectional variation in their expected геШтร. 
Jenson's α, which measures empirically the deviation o f a portfolio from the CAPM's 
securities market line, and helps one to obtain this portfolio's risk adjusted return, has 
been a standard in measuring fund performance since early 1970'ร. However, 
persisting questions pertaining as to whether the CAPM can be estimated empirically 
have put a question mark over the use o f Jensen's α as wel l (Roll , 1977). Banz (1981) 
found that market equity (a stock'ร market price per share times its number o f shares 
outstanding) has explanatory power for the cross-sectional variation in average stock 
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returns. Average retums on small stocks are too high, while those on large stocks are 
too low, given their beta estimates. Another anomaly relates to the role o f book-to-
market equity in explaining the cross-section o f average stock retums. Rosenberg, 
Reid, and Lanstein (1985), for example, reported that average retums on the บ . ร 
stocks are positively related to the ratio o f a firm's book value o f common equity to 
its market value. 
Fama and Fench (1992) evaluated the joint roles o f market beta, size, price 
earning ratio, leverage, and book-to-market equity in the cross-sectional variation in 
average retums on NYSE, A M E X , and NASDAQ stocks for the 1963-1990 period. 
Using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression approach, they 
observed ， among other things, that: (i) market beta does not seem to play a role in the 
cross-sectional variation in average stock returns; and ( і і) size and book-to-market 
equity to absorb the apparent roles o f leverage and earnings-price ration. K i m (1995) 
observed that Fama and French's (1992) study is subject to the errors in variables 
(EIV) problem arising, in this case, from estimation betas. The EIV problem has the 
effect o f underestimating the coefficient o f the beta variable in the Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) regression while overestimating the coefficients o f the other variables. K i m 
(1995) suggested a correction for the E IV problem and shows that, after the 
correction, the market beta explains a good deal o f the cross-sectional variation in 
stock return, although the size variable continues to play a significant role. K i m did 
not examine the role o f book-to-market equity. 
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In their study, Fama and French (1993) recognised that, although size and 
book-to-market equity can explain the variation in average геШтร across stocks, they 
cannot explain the large difference between average reณms on stocks and those on 
Treasury bi l ls; a stock market portfolio is needed to explain the difference. Because, 
i f stocks are priced rationally, variables that are related to average stock retums must 
proxy for common risk factors in stock геШтร. Fama and French employed a time-
series regression approach to determine how wel l геШтร on stocks are explained by 
геШтร on a proxy for the market portfolio of stocks and two mimicking portfolios for 
risk factors related to size and book- to- market equity, respectively. To form the 
mimicking portfolios for risk factors related to size and book-to-market equity, six 
value-weighted portfolios are created from ranking NYSE, A M E X , and N A S D A Q 
stocks on the basis o f size and book-to-market equity. Stocks larger (smaller) than the 
median NYSE stock are placed into the big (small) group. Ranked on the basis o f 
book-to-market equity, stocks are divided into three groups: the lowest 30%, the 
middle 40 % and the highest 30 %. The intersection o f the two size groups and the 
three book-to-market equity groups yield six portfolios: ร/L, ร /M, ร/H, B/L, B/M and 
B/H. For example, the ร /L portfolio contains the stocks in the small size group that 
have low book-to-market ratios, and B/H portfolio consists o f the stocks in the big 
size group that have high book-to-market ratios. These portfolios are reformed on an 
annual basis over the 1963-1991 sample period. 
The mimicking portfolio for the risk factor related to size is the small minus 
big (SMB) portfolio whose return is the difference between the simple average o f the 
retums on the three small-stock portfolios ( S/L， ร /M and ร/H) and the simple average 
o f the retums on the three big-stock portfolios (B/L, B/M and B/H). Because its two 
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components have about the same weighted-average book-to-market equity, the small 
minus big (SMB) portfolio is essentially factor related to book-to-market equity. The 
mimicking portfolio for the risk factor related to book-to-market equity is the high 
minus low (HML) portfolio whose return is the difference between the simple average 
o f the retums on the two high- book- to-market equity portfolios ( ร / Ή and BİR) and 
the simple average o f the reณms on the two low-book-to market equity portfolios 
(ร /L and B/L). Fama and French's proxy for the market portfolio is the value-
weighted portfolio o f the stocks in the six (6) size and book-to-market equity stratified 
portfolios, plus the negative book-to-market equity stocks excluded from the six 
portfolios. Twenty five(25) portfolios are constructed from the intersection o f the five 
size and five book-to-market equity quintile portfolios. Their excess retums serve as 
the dependent variables in the fol lowing time series regressions: 
Where і = 1， 2，,3， 25, Ri (է ) ֊ RF( է) is the excess reณm on the /th portfolio, 
Км(ї)-Кр(ї) is the excess return on the p roxy for the market por t fo l io , and RsMB(t) and 
R-HML(t) are the reณms on the mimicking portfolios for the risk factors related to size 
and book-to-market equity, respectively. In order to investigate the additional 
explanatory power due to the mimicking portfolios, Fama and Fench also run time ― 
series regressions wi th the return on the proxy for the market portfolio as the only 
explanatory variable. 
The R 2 values o f the one-factor regressions are between 0.61 and 0.92 with 
only two o f them being greater than 0.90. The three-factor regressions show R 2 
values between 0.83 and 0.97, wi th 21 o f them being greater than 0.90. Thus adding 
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the returns on the s MB and HML portfolios to the regression results in large increases 
in R2 values. This is especially true with the five portfolios in the smallest-size 
quintile: their R2 values increase from between 0.61 and 0.70 to between 0.94 and 
0.97. The results of Fama and French factor show that size and book-to-market 
equity are empirically important in explaining stock retums. 
Fama and French (1996) demonstrated that their three-factor model captures 
many of the widely documented patters in stock retximร. For example, the model 
accounts for the long-term return reversal documented by Debondt and Thaler (1987). 
Although a number of authors have argued that size and book-to-market equity cannot 
be ІПЇЄФГЄЇЄ(І as risk factors in the traditional sense ,^ no one seems to question their 
empirical importance in explaining stock retums. The issue of whether the value and 
size premiums are caused by risk of inefficiency may not be resolved to everyone's 
satisfaction. The argument of both sides were strong. For investors, there are two 
crucial points to remember. Firstly, factors based on value and size have explained 
much of the common variation in the us stock retums for the past three quarters of a 
century. Secondly, value and size premiums have been observed in several other 
countries, with the value premium are being observed in many developed countries 
that have been รณdied. While these observations are consistent with a risk based 
story, they do not prove anything. Nevertheless, something very fundamental would 
have to change in the financial markets in order for these premiums to disappear. 
Furthermore, the геШтร observed in the us market during 1999 show that 'value 
minus growth' is not low risk strategy. 
See, for example, Berk ( 1995) and Kirby ( 1998). 
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The inability of the Fama-French three factor model to explain stock price 
momentum is a problem for the model's proponents. However, the problem may not 
be all that serious. Considering the following facts: 
• Pure momentum strategies involve very high turnover. Consequently, 
transaction costs and taxes can significantly erode т о т е п Ш т profits. 
• Most of the return to the 'winner minus loser' momenüun portfolio is due to 
the poor performance of the losers. So, in order to capture the bulk of the 
momentum effect, short positions are necessary. This is not feasible for some 
investors. 
• The momentum effect is stronger among small cap stocks, which tend to be 
less liquid. Trying to implement a high turnover strategy with small cap stocks 
is unrealistic. 
The research into stock price behaviour and asset pricing continue and a number 
of interesting results have surfaced recently. Perez-Quiros and Timmermaan (2000) 
provided evidence that small fims have high average retums because they are more 
affected by tight credit market conditions. Small firms do not have the same access to 
domestic and international bond markets that are enjoyed by large firms. Since the 
availability of credit is tied to economic conditions, so that a credit contraction 
typically occurs near a recession, small firms would be very sensitive to systematic 
variation in credit market conditions. Thus, the high retums to small firms might be 
compensation for the high sensitivity to a credit related risk factor. 
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Elton, Gruber, Agarwal and Mann (2001) reported that there is a potentially 
important link between the equity and fixed income markets. I f certain risk factors are 
pervasive enough to explain common variation in stock reณms, it is reasonable to 
expect that these same risk factors would be at work in the bond market as well. Elton 
et al (2001) provided evidence that SMB and HML do just that. Their research 
isolates the portion of a bond'ร return that is due to changing risk premiums, and they 
showed that this part of the bond's return is strongly related to SMB and HML. Not 
only does this result support the risk based story, but also it suggests some interesting 
avenues for future research in fixed income portfolio management. 
An interesting study conducted by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), showed that 
consumption oriented с АРМ that allows expected геШтร to vary over time provides 
a nice cross sectional explanation of equity returns. They used the ratio of aggregate 
consumption to wealth as a "conditioning variables" to model the evaluation of 
expected retums over time. The relation between the consumption/ wealth ratio and 
expected retums is straightforward. I f investors expected retums to be high in the 
future, they would be more likely to raise their consumption level relative to their 
level of wealth. Therefore, an increase in the consumption/ wealth ratio would signal 
high expected reณms. Lattau and Ludvigson also found that the variation in retums 
that was picked up by Fama and French three factor models appears to be related to 
the changing risk premium from the consumption с АРМ. 
In a รณdy, Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) provided evidence that sensitivity to 
market wide shifts in liquidity might be a risk factor which could be priced. Stocks 
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that are highly sensitive to shifts in market liquidity (they have liquidity beta) have 
high average retums. This liquidity factor appears to be distinct SMB and HML, 
suggesting an independent source of risk. However, it appears that liquidity betas are 
highly unstable, and there is substantial variation in the corresponding premium. 
While it is too early to conclude that there is a systematic liquidity factor in stock 
retums, more research is sure to be forthcoming in this area. 
An indication of the acceptance of the three factor model is the frequency with 
which it is not used as a benchmark for performance measurement. For example, 
Carhart (1997) and Davis (2001) employed the Fama and French model in studies of 
the US mutual fund performance. 
2.3 Mutual Fund/Unit Trust Performance 
The review of the literature in respect of mutual ftinds/unit trasts performance 
wil l proceed in two segments: we wil l begin with the us literature and then wil l 
looked at the UK studies. 
2.3-1 Performance Evaluation 
The evaluation of mutual fund performance has long been a topic of 
considerable interest to financial economists. A variety of evaluation techniques have 
been developed and implemented. There is greatly varying evidence that mutual 
funds have tended to both outperform and ทndcrperform passive benchmark portfolios 
before as well as after management expenses. Of the few รณdies that suggest the 
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contrary, most, i f not all, would change their conclusions when survivorship bias and I 
or correct adjustment for risk are taken into account. For example, Jensen (1968) 
รณdied the risk-adjusted performance of 115 腿ณal funds during the period 1945-
1964. Using the С АРМ model as the performance measurement model he found that, 
after management expenses, the performance of the funds was inferior to the 
performance of the s & р 500 index, while their pre-expense геШтร scatter randomly 
about the market line. 
In contrast, Ippolito (1989) presented a study o f mutual fimd performance as a 
test o f the efficiency of the muณal fund industry. The underlying idea was 
Grossman's (1976) view of efficiency that informed investors earn a sufficient 
amount to just compensate for the cost o f trading and infonnation gathering. The 
question asked by Ippolito was whether a random selection of mutual funds has 
yielded a risk-adjusted return equal to that available to investors in a virtually costless 
index ftind. 
Like Jensen (1968), Ippolito employed the с АРМ model to measure mutual 
fund performance and the s & р 500 index as a proxy for the market portfolio. 
Examining a sample of 128 funds over the 20-years period from 1965 to 1984, he 
found that the funds on average, significantly outperform the market on an after-
expense basis. The reported average risk-adjusted return has a magnitude of 0.83% 
per year and a t-statistic o f 4.01. Ippolito (1989) estimated that this risk-adjusted 
return is just enough to offset the load charges that characterise the majority o f the 
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funds in the sample and concluded that the mutual fund industry was in a condition 
that characterised efficient markets in the presence of costly information. 
Ippolito (1989) also examined the role of ณmover in mutual fund performance 
to obtain additional evidence regarding the efficiency of the тиШаІ fund industry. He 
found that тиШаІ fund performance (net of expenses) was weakly positively related 
to turnover. This implies that higher turnover is not associated with lower after-
expense performance, which is consistent with the notion that тиШаІ funds invest 
money efficiently. Thus Ippolito's results and conclusions are contrary to those 
reached in previous รณdies and lend strong support to the Grossman view of market 
efficiency. 
However, Elton, Graber, Das, and Hlávka (1993) showed that Ippolito's 
results were primarily due to the performance of noท-ร & р 500 stocks relative to the 
S & Р 500 index in Ippolito's sample period (1965-1984). Re-examining Ippolito's 
sample, they found that once the impact of holding non- s & р 500 stocks on mutual 
fund performance was explicitly accounted for, the results change and became 
identical to those found in previous รณdies. 
The common stocks that compose the s & р 500 index were selected to 
guarantee broad industry representation. However, within each industry the larger 
firms were generally selected, and the weight placed on each stock in the index was 
proportional to the total market value of the firm's equity. As a result, the s & р 500 
index was primarily composed of, and affected by, large firms. Thus, to see the effect 
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of holding noท-ร & Р 500 stocks, Elton, Gruber, Das, and Hlávka (1993) examined 
the performance o f a small stock index, in particular, the value-weighted index of the 
lowest quintile o f the stocks listed on the NYSE, relative to s & р 500 index. They 
foxmd that the small stock index has a Jensen measure of 10.06 % per year over the 
Ippolito sample period. This means that holding non-S & P500 stocks in тиШаІ 
funds would cause positive performance relative to the s & р 500 index over the 
Ippolito period even i f fund managers were not informed investors. Elton, Gruber, 
Das and Hlávka (1993) also examined the effect o f holding bonds on the performance 
of mutual funds and found that it was relatively small over the Ippolito's sample 
period. 
To correct for the impact o f holding non-S & р 500 assets, Elton, Graber, Das 
and Hlávka suggested the fol lowing three-index model to measure тиШаІ fund 
performance: 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 2-2) 
In this model, R M is the return on the s & р 500 index, Rs is the return on a non-S & 
Р 500 stock index that has been made orthogonal to the s & р 500 index, and R D is 
the reณm on a bond index that has been made orthogonal to both the s & р 500 index 
and the non-S & Р 500 stock index. 
The researchers used, as a proxy for the non-S & р 500 stock, the small stock 
index mentioned above, wi th the effect o f the s & р 500 stocks removed. For the 
bond index, they used a portfolio consisting of 80 % intermediate government bonds 
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and 20 % long-term corporate bonds, with the effect of the other two indexes 
removed. Measuring the performance of the fimds in the Ippolito's sample using the 
three-index model, they obtained an average alpha óf -1.59% per year, with a t-
statistic of -2.35. Alternatively, they used the value-weighted index of all NYSE 
stocks as a proxy for the non- s & р 500 stock index and found that the ñinds have an 
average alpha of -0.88% per year with a t-statistic of -1.46. These results do not 
support Ippolito's view that mutual fund managers are informed investors. 
Elton, Graber, Das and Hlávka (1993) also examined the effect of ณmover on 
the performance of mutual fimds over the Ippolito's sample period. They show that, 
after adjusting for the effect of non- s & р assets using the three-index measurement 
model, the relationship between performance and turnover is negative and significant 
at the 5% level. They concluded that mutual fund managers did not earn enough 
excess return to compensate for the full cost of increased turnover, a conclusion that is 
contrary to Ippolito's รณdy. 
Grinblatt and Titman (1989) รณdied тиШаІ fund performance through an 
analysis of quarterly portfolio holdings. Prior studies of mutual fund performance 
have examined the actual retums realised by investors and mostly found negative 
performance for the average fund. This, Grinblatt and Titman(1989) argued, is not 
surprising from an economic perspective: i f mutual fiind managers have superior 
investment talent, they may be able to сарШге the rents from their talent in the form of 
higher fees or perquisites obtained through higher expenses. I f this is the case, then 
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we can expect to observe positive abnormal performance by mutual funds only by 
examining their gross or pre-expense retums. 
Utilising quarterly holding data, Grinblatt and Titman(1989) calculated 
hypothetical retums for the equity portion of the portfolios of mutual funds assuming 
a buy and hold strategy for each quarter. These hypothetical retums do not have 
management expenses and transaction costs subtracted from them and are taken as 
estimates of mutual fiind gross retims. The estimated gross геШтร less the Treasury 
bill retums are regressed on the excess retums on a benchmark portfolio, called the P8 
benchmark, to estimate the pre-expense performance of mutual funds. The P8 
benchmark is formed on the basis of firm size, dividend yield, and past retums. It is 
designed to mitigate small firm size and high dividend yield biases. 
Studying a sample of 274 funds in the 1974-1984 period, Grinblatt and Titman 
(1989) found that the average fund had a slightly positive pre-expense performance of 
1.44% per year. This performance was less than the annual management expenses 
and transaction costs of the average fiind, which were estimated as 2.40%. However, 
it ณmed out that the average performance of aggressive-growth funds was 
significantly positive, with a magniณde of 3.24% per year and a t-statistic of 3.07. 
Grinblatt and Titman(1989) made this as the evidence that superior investment talent 
exists within the group of aggressive-growth fund managers. 
Nevertheless, Grinblatt and Titman'ร results and conclusions were subject to 
some criticisms, as the authors themselves acknowledged in a later paper [Daniel, 
29 
Grinblatt, Titman, and Weimers (1997)]. Among other things, the пшпЬег of the 
funds studied was relatively small, and the benchmark used may not fiiUy account for 
return anomalies, such as size and book-to-market effects, which were shown by 
Fama and French (1992, 1993) to be empirically important in explaining common 
stock reณms. 
Malkiel (1995) examined the performance of 279 equity mutual funds with 
continuous records through the 10 years period 1982-1991. With expense rate data, 
he was able to measure the performance both net of expenses and with all expenses 
(not including load charges) added back. As he reported, when measured by a two-
index model, the funds have an average negative performance not only after expenses 
but before expenses as well. The two benchmarks used in the two-index measurement 
model are the s & р 500 index of large stocks and the พilhire 500 index that includes 
a large number of small stocks. Considering that the sample examined consists of 
only the better performing funds that have met the test of survivorship, Malkiel(1995) 
concluded that general equity mutual funds have not been able to outperform the 
broad stock market averages even before expenses. 
2.3-lA. Persistence of Mutual Fund Manager's Performance 
While the efficient market hypothesis implies that past performance is no 
guide to future performance after adjusting for risk or other pricing factors, in practice 
money managers are selected and judged primarily on their performance track record. 
In the academic literature, controversy about the persistence of a mutual fund 
зо 
manager's performance has continued^. Grinblatt and Titman (1992) observed muณal 
fund return predictability over long horizons of five to ten years. Hendricks, Patel and 
Zeckhauser (1993) and Goetzman and Ibboston (1994) found evidence consistent with 
the repeat-winner hypothesis over short-term horizons o f one to three years. 
Lakonishok, รMeifer, and Vishny (1992) also provided some evidence on persistence 
for pension ftind manager'ร performance over horizons o f two to three years, even 
though the managers did not beat a passive investment strategy. However, Jensen 
(1968) found little evidences that good performance follows past good performance. 
Brown, Goetzman, Ibbotson, and Ross (1992) argued that results o f persistence would 
appear spuriously in samples limited to surviving mutual funds. Their argument was 
that to choose high-risk strategies and sm^ive in the first half o f the sample period 
was likely to lead to above average retums. I f these funds continued their high risk 
strategy and continued to survive, they were also l ikely to achieve above normal 
retums in the second half o f the sample. Therefore, only using a sample of surviving 
funds bias results towards finding performance persistence. The degree of this bias, 
amongst other factors, depends on the fraction of managers that drop out o f the 
sample and whether their characteristics differ systematically from surviving 
managers. But Brown and Goetzman (1995) found that the persistence phenomenon 
was dependent upon the time period of study and concluded that it was due to 
common management strategies. Whereas Maltóel (1995) documented that the 
persistence phenomenon may not be robust since the strong persistence that 
characterised the 1970ร failed to exist during the 1980ร. 
6 There is less controversy on average fund performance. Most studies find that after expenses, mutual 
fiind managers on average under perform a combination of passive portfolios of similar risk (see Jensen 
(1968), Lehman and Modest (1987), Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Connor and Korajczyk (1991), 
Sharpe (1992), Elton, Graber, Das, and Hlávka (1993), Carhart (1997), MaUciel (1995), and Graber 
(1996). 
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2.3-lB style Performance 
Although these studies employed a single market benchmark or multiple 
portfolio benchmarks to evaluate equity fund performance, they failed to іпсофогаїе 
the concept of style to justify the fund's performance^. A fund manager is said to 
adopt an 'investment style' i f he or she identifies a set of securities with certain 
characteristics for potential inclusion in the portfolio. Fund managers with similar 
investment philosophies or styles wil l , on average, perform more like each other than 
like the overall market or like managers with different styles. Because these 
managers share similar portfolio characteristics and factor exposures that are priced or 
rewarded in the market, similarities in performance are to be expected. Therefore, a 
style benchmark, which more closely embodies the stock universe in which the 
manager invests and yields more information about the manager'ร skill, is more 
relevant than a market benchmark to separate out manager skill from manager 
universe group behaviour. I f investors select managers on the basis of historical 
performance versus a broad market benchmark, they may unknowingly hire a 
manager whose current peak performance may be due solely to a style category that 
has lagged. That is why a benchmark that takes investment style into account should 
be important in equity fund performance evaluation. Furthermore, without controlling 
fund styles, fund performance persistence test is sensitive to a style cycle. For 
example, the strong reversal in Malkiel'ร ( 1995)-performance persistence test in 1987 
7 Although the p8 portfolio benchmark employed by Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1992) and Hendricks, 
Patel andZeckhauser (1993) is close to the style benchmark, these eight portfolios are not mutually 
exclusive. Therefore, it is impossible to differentiate equity fimd style based on the factor loading on 
these portfolio factors. 
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and 1988 were mainly due to a reversal in the style cycle^. While industry 
terminology for domestic equity styles varies somewhat, there were at least two 
unambiguous style dimensions: size and value-growth. 
In the literature on mutual fund performance evaluation, only the twelve asset 
classes used in รһафе (1992)^ the four indices used in Elton, Gruber, and Blake 
(1996) and Graber (1996), and the four factors used in Carhart (1997) were associated 
with the style benchmark. Using the same four index model, Elton, Gruber, and 
Blake (1996) and Graber (1996) reached similar conclusions that past risk-adjusted 
performance was predictive of future risk-adjusted performance in both 1-year and 3 
year horizons. Using an equity fiind sample, which was free of survivor bias, Carhart 
(1997) found that short-term persistence in equity mutual fund геШтร can be 
explained by common factors in stock reณms and investment costs^^. It seems that 
performance persistence was supported more when a style benchmark was 
incorporated in the analysis. 
Chen ( 1996) shows that the estimated style from either the risk pricing model 
proposed by Fama and French ( 1993,1996) or the asset allocation model proposed by 
MaUdel presents two-way tables of ranked ftmds* total retums in the performance persistence test in 
his Table V. The winners in his table in 1987 who were equity funds enļ)hasising on large cap stocks 
and growth stocks tended to be the losers in 1988 because large cap stocks and growth stocks did 
poorly in 1988. It is also seen that the strong reversal in the style of size and growth-value from 1988 
to 1989 causes fund performance persistence reversibly in his results. 
9 Sharpe (1992) uses twelve asset classes to classify muณal ftmd styles (not only emphasismg domestic 
equity styles) 
10 Although Carhart (1997) argues that the results from post-formation returns on portfolios of muณal 
ñinds sorted on lagged one-year return do not support t¿e existence of skilled fund managers. This 
procedure is suffered from a problem that the sensitivity of the portfolio of top-performing funds to 
four common factors is unstable since the characteristics of the top-performing funds change 
significantly over time. 
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รһафе (1992) is as good as the value-weighted rank from the holding characteristic 
model in describing fund style. These two well-known return-based approaches 
which incorporate the concept of a style benchmark may be adopted to evaluate fund 
performance and to address whether performance persistence can still be observed 
among extreme performers. This issue' ' is important because extreme performers 
have much larger noise in retums and usually attract much more attention from 
investors than other agents. Results from these two quite different approaches are 
compared to check robustness. 
2.3-1 С Portfolio Holding Approach 
When fund portfolio holdings are observable, performance measures adjusted 
for the holdings' characteristics can be developed. Since this holdings-based 
approach does not require a model to describe the funds' expected reณms and this 
does not suffer from problems related to parameter estimation, it is a more powerful 
approach than a return-based approach. Grinblatt and Titman (1994)'^ first utilised 
the holdings-based approach to measure performance but they failed to account for 
геШт anomalies such as the size and book-to-market effect. In a paper documented 
by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1996) showed that aggressive growth 
funds exhibit the ability to select stocks. To adjust fund performance for risk, they did 
not use асШаІ fund retums but used hypothetical retums computed based on quarterly 
holdings. However, fund portfolio holdings were usually observed on a quarterly 
" Several studies (such as Grinblatt and Titaian (1992), Carhart (1994), Elton et al. (1996), and Graber 
(1996) show that the difference in retums across mutual funds are persistent and much of the 
differences are concentrated in the bottom performing funds. However, the evidence shown by these 
studies is that mutual fìinds "on average" persist their performance. 
՚2 Although Grinblatt and Titman ( 1989) also utilise fund portfolio holdings data, they only use them 
to generate funds' gross retximร. Therefore, it is hot a holdings-based approach. 
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basis and ณmover ratios were unknown within the quarter. In addition, the non­
equity proportion held by an equity fund was not shown in the observed portfolio 
holdings. The difference between actual геШтร and the hypothetical геШтร 
generated from the portfolio holdings may not be trivial. Therefore, caveats emerge 
about any inferences made. 
2.3-lD Conditional Information Variables and other Approaches 
Person and Schadt (1996) argued that the traditional approaches to 
performance measurement are unconditional, which means that they use historical 
average retums to estimate expected performance. For example, an alpha may be 
calculated as the historical average return of a fimd in excess of a beta-adjusted 
historical average for a benchmark portfolio. Sometimes, the beta is simply assumed 
to be equal to 1.0. Unconditional measures do not account for the fact that risk and 
expected returns can vary with the state of the economy. In particular, traditional 
performance measures ignore the evidence that expected reUmiร in the stock market 
are higher at the beginning of an economic recovery, when dividend yields are high 
and interest rates are low. I f the market exposure of a managed portfolio varies 
predictably with the business cycle but the manager does not have superior 
forecasting ability, a traditional approach to performance measurement wil l confuse 
the common variation between fund risk and expected market retums with truly 
superior information and abnormal performance. Therefore, in recent times, interest in 
performance evaluation has been renewed with the emergence of two branches of 
research. The first development is the use of efficient benchmark portfolios. The 
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second development is the use of conditional information variables'^ in the test of 
asset pricing theories. 
A small group of 'star' fimd managers earned superior risk-adjusted 
performance in the past, this may be due to luck. It is natural to expect that some 
funds out of thousands in the тиШаІ fund universe outperform market indexes simply 
by chance. Using a sample of the us equity ftmds in 1975-1994, Kosowski et 
al(2000) employed a bootstrap technique to simulate the distribution of the 
extreme(maximum and minimum) performance measures across fimds. Using various 
unconditional and conditional multi-factor model to measure performance, they 
demonstrated that the performance of the best and worst ftmds was not a result of 
sampling variability. To illustrate this point, 41 funds had a risk-adjusted return of at 
least 1% in 1995, while only 15 funds were expected to achieve this level by chance. 
This finding provided strong evidence of differential stock picking skill among fund 
managers and supports the value of the active managed fimd management. In their 
รณdi es, Antóniou, Barr and Priestly (1998); Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) employed 
the conditional с АРМ- to capture the potential sources of time-varying expected 
return. Lettau and Ludvigson ( 2001) observed that the conditional с АРМ could hold 
perfectly means conditional alphas are equal to zero. 
Zheng(1999) used a different approach tracking the flow of investors' funds 
into muณal fimds to examine whether investors can successfully discriminate between 
the relative performance of funds. He examined two basic issues. The first issue was 
՚3 Conditional performance evaluation approach using lagged default risk, slope term structure, 
dividend yield and 1 month us Treasury bil l rates as the conditional information. 
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whether investors were smart before the event or did they move their investment 
money into funds which would perform well or not. The second issue was whether 
there was information in tracking this flow o f fluids and the issue o f whether it could 
be used to make abnormal reณras? The sample which he used is made up o f a 
comprehensive data set o f open-ended тиШа І fiind data running from 1961-1993 
including defunct funds. This included both load and un-load (entry fees and no entry 
fees) ftmds. On average he had a sample of 478 funds in existence each month wi th a 
minimum of 281 funds and a maximum of 1,196 funds. He concluded that aggregate 
newly invested money in equity mutual funds is able to forecast short-term future 
fund performance, in that fonds that receive more money subsequently perform better 
than funds which lose money. For the whole sample, there is not statistical evidence 
that fol lowing the money flows w i l l produce a strategy that w i l l beat the market index, 
but there is evidence for money flows into small funds. However, this smart money 
phenomenon appears to be short-lived in that the performance ranking of positive and 
negative portfolios reverses after 30 months. 
2.3-2 The UK Studies on Managed Funds 
In this sub-section we w i l l review some o f the more recent work on the topic 
o f the U K managed funds. Most o f the U K unit trusts' รณdies were related to 
persistence performance and risk-adjusted performance evaluation. Fletcher (1995) 
evaluated the performance o f 101 U K unit trusts wi th growth, general growth or 
income objectives as detailed in the Unit Trast Year Book for 1980. He considered 
five portfolios based on a ranking o f five year risk adjusted perfonnance windows. He 
then repeated this examining a two-year perfonnance window. Survivorship bias was 
partly allowed for by the continuation o f funds teough name changes or changes in 
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management groups, though mergers were treated as terminations. Fletcher (1995) did 
not report any evidence o f persistence of performance. In his subsequent paper 
Fletcher (1997) examined 85 U K unit trusts wi th a u s investment orientation between 
1985 and 1996 and also reported no evidence o f performance persistence. 
In another study, Quigley and Sinquefield (1998) examined the performance 
evaluation o f the U K equity unit trasts. They used a similar approach by constructing 
portfolios, ranked by deciles, on the basis o f relative performance in a given year. 
They then compared the performance o f each of these portfolios in the next year. 
They picked up a large sample taken from the Micropal database o f all equity U K unit 
trasts that were in existence between 1978 and 1997, a total o f 752 funds. The unit 
trasts sample they included which were classified as having objectives o f growth and 
income, growth, equity income or smaller companies. They constructed tests o f 
performance persistence both before and after adjusting for risk. A variety o f market 
and factor-based risk adjustments were then applied which wipe out any positive 
gains but lead to the conclusion that only poor performance persists. 
Lunde, Blake and Timmerman (1998) used the sample o f risk-adjusted 
retums to create portfolios o f reณms over three year periods using a large data set o f 
2,300 U K unit trusts obtained from Micropal data. They constructed performance 
measures based on bid prices and net income without any adjustment for expenses. 
They made analysis o f inter-quartile fund performance over three-year periods. 
Repeated analysis o f inter-quartile performance revealed whether the members o f the 
top quartile remain in that quartile and so on, as applied in the cases o f members o f 
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the other three quartiles. The results o f their study found evidence o f perfomiance 
persistence would be revealed via inter-quartile transition probabilities in excess of 
0.25; which was a probability for the top and bottom quartiles o f 0.355 and 0.332, 
figures which were consistent wi th the existence o f performance persistence. In a 
subsequent รณdy, Blake and Timmerman (1998) built on their previously mentioned 
study by analysing persistence at a greater level o f disagregation. They analysed 
performance from 1972-1995 in a sample that included 973 dead and 1,402 surviving 
funds. Their database was comprehensive and covered domestic equities, international 
equities, bonds, property and commodities. They reported under-performance o f about 
1.8 % per annum for the average U K equity fund after risk-adjustment. They also 
found evidence o f performance persistence and suggested that survivor-bias accounts 
for about 0.8% per year in their sample. Their analysis o f ftind births and deaths 
suggested a brief period o f out-performance during the first year o f a fund's operation 
and market under-perform o f -3.3% in the final year o f a fimd's life. 
The Wood Mackenzie Company (1999) applied a technique o f estimating 
inter-quartile transition probabilities across five year windows for a sample o f the U K 
income and growth fimds and found no evidence o f performance prediction, but did 
report evidence o f the top quartiles' performance persisting in the next year. Similarly 
Al len and Tan (1999) reported some evidence o f persistence o f performance in a 
sample of 131 U K funds for the period 1989 to 1995. Their study employed a U K 
sample data set o f weekly reณms from all equity mutual fimds existing each year and 
available on the DataStream International database. They analysed the relative 
performance o f the fimds and determine whether a good past-performance is 
indicative to any degree of the portfolio's subsequent performance. Unlike previous 
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studies which compared funds' performance wi th a benchmark (FTSE 100 or some 
other benchmark index), in this study Al len and Tan (1999) examined the persistence 
in performance in the short and long run based on four major empirical tests. These 
are contingency table analysis o f winners and losers and Chi squared tests on these 
tables, ordinary least squares regression analysis o f с А Р М risk-adjusted excess 
retums, and Spearman Rank Correlation Co-efficient analysis o f successive period 
performance ranking. Overall they found that both raw and risk-adj usted retums 
exhibited evidence o f persistence in the long run but not in the very short run. They 
also explored the relationship between performance and volati l i ty by dividing funds 
into two groups: high and low variance. The performance in both o f these groups 
exhibited repeat winner patterns suggesting that superior performance was not 
conditioned purely by risky investment strategies. Some o f Al len and Tan's (1999) 
contingency table results for raw retums are presented below in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Two-Way Tables of Ranked Fund Raw Returns Over Successive 
One-Year Intervals 
Combined Results in Successive Periods 1991-1995 
Winners Losers 
bi i t ial Winners 
Initial Losers 
185 143 
(56.4%) (43.6%) 
140 187 
(42.8%) (57.2%) 
(Source: Al len and Tan, 1999) 
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The holding periods were for one year and a winner/loser was defined in terms 
o f the median performance in the sample each year. The Table 2.1 summaries the 
results over a succession o f periods. 
The wimer-winner indicates the number o f the above median funds in the year 
that were also above median fiinds in the fol lowing year. Loser-winner, Winner-loser, 
and Loser-loser were defined similarly. The percentage o f period 1 winners and losers 
that became period 2 winners and losers can be seen the parentheses. The combined 
summary results from Al len and Tan(1999), for risk-adjusted returns are shown in 
Table 2.2 below: 
Table 2.2: Two-way Tables of Ranked Fund Raw Alphas Over Successive 
One-Year Intervals 
Combined Results in Successive Periods 
Winners Losers 
Init ial Winners 189 131 
(59.1%) (40.9%) 
butial Losers 129 191 
(40.3%) (59.7%) 
(Sources: Al len and Tan, 1999) ~ — • = = _ 
Jensen's (1968) risk-adjusted performance evaluation method was employed to 
evaluate the U K unit trust performance. In the regression a significant positive alpha 
value giving consistent positive residuals would imply that manager was superior. 
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These results suggested that winners tend to remain winners and losers remain losers, 
at least when winning or losing is defined relative to the median performance. 
Wood Mackenzie Company (2002) also made some interesting comments on 
persistence performance whether it exists or not. They reported that they have carried 
out a number o f studies in this area, and that in short, the answer is ' i t depends': 
(1) The time frame being considered. They have previously analysed the U K A l l 
Compani es sector for persistence in unit trust performance. In the 1999 report 
they found no evidence o f significant persistence looking at five-year time 
frames. In the 2000 report they provided "evidence o f shorter-term persistence 
wi th a defined top quartile o f trusts in any one year continuing to out-perform 
a group in the subsequent year."(page 14) 
(2) The sector. They found no substantive evidence o f longer-term persistence in 
the ' A l l Companies' sector, but have published research which would indicate 
greater consistency within the ' U K small cap' sector. Furthermore, in a study 
o f the U K pension fund performance undertaken in the ทlid-1990, they found 
that "evidence appears to be: stronger over medium term periods (3-5 years) 
than over periods in excess o f 5-years. 
• The evidence o f consistency o f performance is stronger when retums 
are adjusted for risk rather than when absolute return data is analysed. 
• Further, statistically significant results are consistently found for the 
Q4Q4 cell in their matrix analysis which means bottom quartile fimds 
would have a tendency to remain bottom quartile." (page 14) 
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(3) The time periods. The results differ according to different periods. It seems to 
them to be impossible to tell when a period o f persistency w i l l be apparent and 
when it w i l l not. Wood Mackenzie Company (2002) further caution and said 
that: "short term persistence (good or bad) is to be expected. In large part it is 
nothing more than a particular trust'ร investment style or approach being in (or 
out) o f favour dependent on the phase o f the economic cycle. It follows that 
many trasts' performances go through cycles: periods o f out-performance are 
followed by periods o f unàcrperíomimcQ. This is what investment consultants 
are referring to when noting the lack of consistency in money manager track 
records. A failure to recognise these cycles can lead investors (whether retail 
or institutional) to buy a managers' at the top o f its cycle or sell at the bottom. 
This is not a recipe for successful investment." (page 15) 
The problems wi th trying to fol low such a strategy are the systematic 
identification o f ' top' and 'bottom' and the costs o f switching. Sometimes, managers 
might be victims o f their own short-term success in that their 'successful' investment 
approach which may be effected adversely by the inf low o f substantial amounts o f 
new money 'chasing' this performance. As assets grow, the quality o f the portfolio 
and case o f transaction may fal l , impairing performance. They concluded that the 
kind o f long-term consistent out-performance that may indicate ski l l though economic 
cycles are, by and large, simply not available. 
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In view o f the above review, in respect o f performance persistence รณdies on unit 
trusts, we may say that there is fairly consistent evidence o f performance persistence 
which suggests that past performance would be useful information to fund investors. 
2.4 Modern Portfolio Theory Techniques 
Modem portfolio theory dates from Markowitz's (1952) pioneering article. 
Since then, a variety o f approaches based on modem portfolio theory have been 
developed wi th the intention o f helping investors, especially institutional investors, in 
order to use security analysis to improve portfolio performance. One such approach is 
that o f Treynor and Black (1973). Their approach assxuned that unconstrained short 
selling was allowed and that returns on securities are generated by the fol lowing 
С А Р М based process: 
Ri i Ò - R , կ)=", + Д [RM Կ ) - RF Կ)] + ど, (О (2-3) 
Where R, (է) - RF ( է) is the excess return on security і for і = 1, 2,3,---,N, Км(1)-Кғ(1) 
is the excess return on the market, and ε is an error term with an expected value of 
zero and a variance o f σ^ε. Given estimates o f a, β and σ^ε for N risky securities, 
the investment problem Treynor and Black(1973) tried to solve is how to form a 
portfolio, p， in which money is optimally allocated among the market portfolio, the 
risk-free asset, and the N risky securities. In other words, they tried to solve the 
fol lowing optimisation problem: Minimise 
σ'ρ = {พ^ พ,β^Υσ\ พ խ կ ~ - —— ( 2 시 
subject to 
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E{Rp ) = Σ ^^/«/ = Κ + Σ w, (1 - 離F +(^Μ+Σ Wißi )E{R^ ) ( 2-5) 
พ M -( 2 -6 ) 
where E ( Rp) and cr 2/? are the expected return and return variance o f the overall 
portfolio, respectively, E (RM) and ст^маге the expected reณm and return variance o f 
the market portfolio, respectively, Wp is the weight in the risk-free asset, WM is the 
weight in the market portfolio, and Wi is the weight in risky security i. Solving the 
optimisation problem yields the fol lowing optimal weights: 
w V =[WiR,)-R,] 
[E{R^)֊R,] 
tí σ 2 이 
ๅշ Ν ノ-
• + 
σ M 
Σ 
/=1 σε: 
(2-7) 
and 
cc; 
M + 
-(2-8) 
for i= 1,2,....,N. In Equations (2-6) and (2-7) ， E(Rp) is an exogenous target. 
The overall optimal portfolio for the investor can be thought o f as consisting o f 
investments in the risk-free asset, the passive market portfolio, and the active portfolio 
o f the N risky securities. The optimal proportion o f money to be invested in the active 
portfolio is: 
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พ; ={EiR,)-R,} 
Σ 
cr 2w M <т2£; 
(2-9) 
Normalising the weights given in equation (2-8) by dividing them by equation (2-9) 
results in 
ひ , 
(2-10) 
for i= 1,2, ，N. These are the weights o f the active portfolio in the N risky 
securities. Interestingly they are independent o f E (Rp). Therefore, the larger the 
abnormal return o f a security (a) is, or the more certain the investor is o f its abnormal 
return (that is, the smaller σ 2 ど,, is), the greater the investment in that security should 
be. Furthennore, the investor should take a long or short position in a security, 
depending on whether its abnormal return is positive or negative. The Treynor and 
Black(1973) approach to portfolio construction can be viewed as a two-step process. 
The first step involved using the estimates o f α and σ 2 £·, for the N risky securities to 
form the active portfolio according the equation (2-9). The second step involved 
using equations (2-5), (2-6) and (2-8) to determine the optimal proportions o f money 
to invest in the risk-free asset, the passive market portfolio, and the active portfolio, 
given a certain level o f expected return on the overall portfolio. 
Elton, Gruber, and Padberg (1976) developed a C A ť M based approach to 
optionally forming a portfolio of N risky securities. They considered both the case 
where unlimited short sales were allowed and the case where short sales were 
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disallowed. When unlimited short sales were allowed, the optimal weighting 
problem, as presented by the authors, was to find a set o f พ1,พշ, , \ կ to maximise 
(2-11) 
where 
E(R,)-R,=f^w^E(Ķ)֊R,] 
and 
-(2-12) 
σ> = 
ϊ=1 ϊ=1 7=1： 7> i 1=1 
-(2-13) 
By imposing the restriction that the portfolio weights sum up to one, it was shown that 
the optimal fraction o f the portfolio in stock і is equal to 
[ а д ) ֊ / г ^ ] - С о Д . 
w і = • 
Σ 
і=1 
[EiĶ)-R,]֊C,fi, 
σ'ε, 
-(2-14) 
where 
\ + σ\Σ ダ ' 
-(2-15) 
σ Є: 
The term Co depends on the population o f the securities being considered and can be 
calculated before the search for the optimal portfolio begins. Equation (2-14) then 
allows the investor to determine the optimal proportion o f money to place in each 
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security in terms o f the characteristics that are unique to that security. In general, 
พ°i can be positive or negative, and correspondingly the investor should take a long 
or short position in security i. To solve the portfolio problem for the case where short 
sales are not allowed, Elton, Graber, and Padberg(1976) introduced the constraints 
that พ¡ > О for і = 1,2, ,Ν. Employing the Kułm-Tucker conditions, they obtained 
the optimal weights for the subset, k, o f the securities that make up the optimal 
portfolio as follows: 
σ ε, 
พ , = · 
E{Rj)֊Rr 
ßj 
C' 
§ σ 2 £ ゾ 
-C' 
(2-16) 
where jek and 
C' = 
Λ Σ ere; 
1 + 
jťk σ^ε: 
֊(2-17) 
C' is unique and serves as the cut-off rate. Elton, Gruber, and Padberg (1976) 
provided a proof that i f a security wi th a particular ratio o f [Ε(Κ)-Κρ]/β is included in 
the optimal portfolio, then all securities wi th a higher ratio would also be included. On 
the other hand, i f a security wi th a particular ratio o f [E(R )-Κρ]/β was excluded, then 
all securities wi th a lower ratio would also be excluded. Therefore, all securities 
whose excess reณrn to beta ratios were above the cut-off rate were selected and all 
whose ratios were below were rejected. 
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Elton, Gruber, and Padberg (1976) illustrated a three-step process o f forming 
the optimal portfolio. The first step was to rank the N securities by their excess return 
to beta ratios from the highest to the lowest. The higher the excess retums to beta ratio 
of a security was, the more desirable that security was to the investor. The second 
step was to detemiine the cut-off rate, c ' , and the securities to be included in the 
optimal portfolio. To do this, the investor proceeded to calculate the values o f a 
variable Ck as i f the first ranked security was in the optimal portfolio ( k= l ) , then the 
first and second ranked securities were in the optimal portfolio (k=2), then the first, 
second, and third ranked securities were in the optimal portfolio (k=3), and so forth, 
using equation (2-17). These values were candidates for c'. The investor knew that 
the optimum Ck, that was, c* had been found when all the securities used in the 
calculation o f Ck had excess return to beta ratios above Ck and all the securities not 
used to calculate Ck had excess return to beta ratios below Ck. The third set was 
simply to use equation (15) to compute the weights o f the optimal portfolio. Some o f 
the advantages o f Elton, Gruber, and Padberg'ร approach are: 
(i) Its decision criterion for a security to be included in the optimal portfolio has 
an intuitive іпЇефгеЇаІіоп and is easily understood; 
(i i) It allows the portfolio manager to quickly and easily see the impact on the 
optimal portfolio o f the introduction o f any new security into the decision set; 
and 
( i i i ) It makes clear to the portfolio manager what characteristics o f a security are 
desirable. 
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Elton, Gruber and Padberg (1979), extended their portfolio optimisation 
approach to the case where reณms on securities are generated by a multi-index model, 
which is proposed to capture industry effects on stock reณms. They solved the 
optimal weighting problem when unlimited short sales are allowed using essentially 
the same procedure as they use for the case o f a single-index return-generating model. 
I f short sales are not allowed, no algorithm can be found for exactly solving the 
optimal weighting problem under the assumption o f multi-index return-generating 
process. To obtain a solution, Elton, Graber, and Padberg further assume that a 
market security exists wi th zero residual risk, and they require that the investor holds 
part o f his wealth in that security. As they pointed out, the introduction o f such a 
market security introduces an internal inconsistency and the solution is at best an 
approximation. However, they do not necessarily share the view that it is a useful 
approximation. For our purposes in this research, it is not very useful because it 
requires an actively managed тиШа І ftind to constantly maintain an investment in the 
market portfolio. 
2.5. Conclusion 
The empirical evidence shows that mutual fimds/unit trasts either under-
perform or outperform benchmarks on a risk adjusted basis. However, although 
тиШа І ftmds performance is wel l documented in the finance literature, it is not well 
explained. Previous studies simply interpret either out-performance or under-
performance as evidence o f superior or inferior stock picking ability respectively, on 
the part of mutual fiind managers. This іпіефгеїаііоп is not based on any analysis o f 
тиШа І fund portfolio holdings and compositions. The performance o f a stock 
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portfolio depends on not only what stocks are in the portfolio, but also how the money 
is allocated across the stocks picked. Portfolio construction, given a set o f selected 
stocks, can have an important impact on portfolio performance, biferior portfolio 
construction can lead to portfolio inefficiency and ultimately inferior portfolio 
performance. On the other hand the superior portfolio construction can lead to 
portfolio efficiency and ultimately outperformance. Therefore, to explain mutual fund 
performance, it is important to utilise portfolio-holding data to examine тиШа І fund 
portfolio efficiency. Many recent studies utilised portfolio holdings data to construct 
new performance measures for тиШа І funds. 
The majority o f these รณdies looked at the us fimds whilst a small number have 
examined the U K unit trusts. Although these studies address some common topics 
such as mutual fund performance wi th reference to survivorship bias, performance 
persistence, and style performance. 
Good past performance seems to be, at best, a weak and unreliable predictor of 
future good performance over the medium to long term. About half the studies found 
no correlation at all between good past and good future performance. Where 
persistence was found, this was more frequently in the shorter-term (one to two years) 
than in the longer term. The longer term comparison may be more relevant to the 
typical periods over which consumers hold managed ftmds. Where persistence was 
found, the Out performance' margin tended to be small. Where studies found 
persistence, some specifically reported that frequent swapping to best performing 
fimds would not be an effective strategy, due to the cost o f swapping. There are 
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plausible explanations for these conclusions about the low persistence o f past 
performance. 
The methods which work best in one set o f market conditions may not work 
best at other times. For example, value and growth style managers tend to 
excel at different times. However, it is hard for a consumer to predict the 
l ikely market conditions over the next few years. One o f the problems wi th 
many o f these studies is that they might not track a manager though a ful l 
cycle o f market conditions. 
Fund managers constantly strive to match the performance o f competitors. I f 
one firm is outperforming its peers, others w i l l try to copy its methods and/or 
headhunt its staff. I f it attracts a large inf low o f funds it is l ikely to be diff icult 
to place these funds and maintain relative performance, i f it is an active as 
opposed to a passive fimd. 
The future return on investments is extremely hard to predict, so a significant 
part o f a fund's performance (compared to its peers) may be random luck. 
The findings are consistent wi th other research that shows that it is hard for 
fiind managers to consistently outperform the relevant benchmark. 
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Chapter З 
Performance Evaluation of UK Equity Unit 
Trusts 
3.1 Introduction 
Investors indicate that the performance of managed funds should be the 
primary factor in choosing a fund and that fund managers are likely to provide 
historical records of the funds in their pursuit of investors selecting a fiind. 
Researchers, on the other hand, have been trying to document that the performance 
measures of тиШаІ fimds are correlated between periods. Early studies such as Jensen 
(1968) rejected the persistence in muณal fiind performance. Some others have found 
evidence that certain fund managers have skills in managing their portfolios and that 
the winners this year may still be the winners next year(Goetzmann, 1995; Malkiel, 
1995). Yet, in the academic literaณre, there is controversy about the persistence of a 
unit trast''' or mutual fund manager'ร performance.Grinblatt and Titman (1992) 
observed that mutual fund or unit trast return predictability can be seen over long 
horizons of five to ten years. Hendricks, Patel & Zeckhauser (1993) and Goetzmann 
& Ibbotson (1994) found evidence consistent with the repeat-winner hypothesis over 
short-term horizons of one to three years. Similarly, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vshny 
(1992) provided some evidence on persistence on the performance of pension fund 
A U K Unit trust is an equivalent o f a us open-ended mutual fiind. 
'5 There is less controversy on average fund performance. Most studies find that after expenses, unit 
trast or mutual ftxnd managers on average underperforms a combination o f passive portfolios o f similar 
risk (see Jensen, 1968; 1987; Grmblatt & Ti tman and 1989 Malk ie l , 1995)' 
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managers over horizons of two to three years, even though the managers do not have a 
passive investment strategy; and Brown, Goetzmann, Ibboston, and Ross (1992) 
demonstrated that the relationship between volatility and the геШтร induced by 
survivorship can imply the appearance of predictability. 
On the other hand, however, Jensen (1968) found little evidence that good 
performance follows past good performance while Brown and Goetzmam (1995) 
found that the persistence phenomenon was dependent upon the time period of study 
and concluded that it was due to common management strategies. Malkiel (1995) 
concluded that the persistence phenomenon may not be robust since the strong 
persistence that characterised the 1970ร failed to exist during the 1980ร. 
As to how performance is assessed, fund managers are often judged by their 
performance relative to a pre-specified benchmark, usually a broadly diversified index 
with the same style or the median ftmd manager with the same style. The assessment 
then affects individual compensation 一 although a fund manager'ร compensation is 
typically determined as a percentage of the assets under management which is highly 
dependent on the manager'ร relative performance. Because a unit trast with high 
relative performance receives increased new investments in the fund, these additional 
contributions provide, in turn, increased compensation to the fund managers. A fund's 
performance then affects its growth. Ippolito(1992) found that the relationship 
between fund growth and performance is significantly positive. Graber (1996) and 
Davis (1999) show that investors do act on past relative performance in allocating 
money to unit trasts (mutual funds). Therefore, rational money managers attempting 
to maximise their expected compensation may revise the composition of their 
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portfolios depending on their relative perfònnance during the assessment period. 
Thus the รณdies of fund manager performance are the bottom line test of market 
efficiency. They do not claim to uncover specific types of market failure as do the 
'anomalies' literaณre of the 1980ร and the behavioural finance literaณre that is 
presently conunon. However, fund manager รณdies ask whether there are market 
failures, regardless of type, that are systematically exploitable. There is relatively little 
academic research in this area on UK equity unit trasts. 
The majority of the รณdies carried out thus far confine themselves to the fund 
managers' efforts to outperform the United States equity markets. There are very few 
studies of the UK market. 16 This study, however, tries to close that gap by examining 
the performance of the UK equity unit trusts that concentrate their investment in the 
UK. It also deals with two popular claims by fund managers that fund managers can 
out perform markets and that this is especially so in the case of small stocks. In order 
to close the gap and deal with these claims, this study wi l l endeavour to answer three 
questions; 
(1) Do the UK equity unit trasts' fiind managers outperform the market? 
(2) Does performance persist? 
(3) Do small stocks outperform? 
3.2 What is a Unit Trust and how does it Work? 
As per the definition given in the Unit Trast Year Book 2002, a unit trust is a 
fund of stock market investments divided into equal portions called 'units'. The price 
16 There are differences in time period coverage and methodology. Please see Blake and T immemian 
(1998) , A l len and Tan (1999) and Quigley and Sinquefield (2000). 
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of units is calculated regularly (mostly every day) by the managers, rather than being 
determined purely by supply and demand in the market, as is the case with shares. 
Two prices are quoted for unit trasts 一 the higher (offer) price being the price the 
investor pays to buy units, and the lower (bid) price being the price he or she wi l l 
receive for units sold back to the managers. Unit trast managers are the only people 
allowed to make a market in unit trust units, and they should be prepared to buy units 
from, and sell units to, the public at any time, although in the event of very rapid 
market movements special regulations apply. 
The price of units in any unit trast is governed by the value of the underlying 
securities in the fund - the price can fluctuate with movements of the market sector in 
which the fimd is invested. Therefore, the value of an investor'ร holding in a unit 
trast, like an investment in shares, can go down as well as up. This means that a unit 
trast is a risky investment, although the possibility of strong capital growth also 
means it is likely to outperform a building society or bank deposit investment over a 
period of five to ten years. 
Unit trasts are investment vehicles that provide a means of participation in the 
stock market for people who have neither the time, nor the money, nor perhaps the 
expertise, to successfully undertake direct investment in equities (Unit Trast Year 
Book 1991). They also provide a route into specialist and overseas markets where 
direct investment often demands both more time and more knowledge than an 
investor or his/her financial adviser may possess. A large number of investors pool 
their money in order to obtain a spread of professionally managed Stock Exchange 
investments. They could not get such a good spread individually because dealing 
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costs would make it uneconomical to buy a large number of small holdings. The 
investor in a unit trust takes less of arisk than a direct equity investor, because a wide 
range of holdings reduces the effect that any one stock can have on the overall 
performance of an equity portfolio. Professional management has two main benefits; 
it provides specialist investment expertise which should ensure greater success than 
the inexperienced investor could achieve on his/her own and it reduces the 
administrative burden of investment. 
3.2.1 The Regulatory Structure 
Unit trasts are governed by the Financial Service Act (FSA) 1986, which regulates 
many types of investments and whose primary aim is to improve investor protection. 
The Act set up a self-regulatory structure with a system of Self-Regulatory 
Organisations (SROs), each responsible for a separate aspect of the financial services 
industry. The strucณre is overseen by the Securities and bivestments Board (SIB), 
which is ultimately answerable to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Basic 
elements of how the financial services industry should operate are laid down in the 
FSA.''' In order to operate by law within the financial services industry, all 
practitioners must be authorised by the correct SRO. The SROs of relevance to the 
unit trast industry are as follows; 
(1) Any practitioner may be directly authorised by the Security bivestment Board 
(Տա), although in practice most are registered with the SRO most closely 
concerned with the relevant aspect of the industry. Clearing banks, which are 
very large organisations and carry out many activities requiring authorisation, 
՚ 7 More detailed regulations appeared in the SIB rule book. Each o f the SROs also has a ni lebook 
which deals in greater detail st i l l on its own area o f the industry, and which must be at least as stringent 
as the rules laid down by the SIB. 
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are the sort of unit trast management group which may be authorised by the 
տա (Unit Trust Yearbook 1991). 
(2) Unit trasts must be registered with the bivestment Management Regulatory 
Organisation (IMRO) to cover their investment management activities. 
(3) Unit trust groups must be registered with the Life Assurance and Unit Trast 
Regulatory Organisation (LAUTRO) where their marketing and selling 
activities are concerned. 
(4) Most intermediaries dealing in the unit trusts are registered with the Financial 
Intermediaries, Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association (FIMBRA). 
(5) The Stockbrokers dealing in unit trusts are registered with the Securities 
Association (TSA). 
Unit trusts are themselves authorised by the տա. Some of the new regulations 
affecting the industry are contained in the DTI staณtory instruments and the DTI 
directly regulates investment and borrowing powers, though in practice the 
regulations are enforced by the IMRO. 
A unit trast is set up by a trast deed, which is an agreement between the trastees 
and the managers of the ftmd, and covers the main aspects of the running of the trast. 
The essential characteristics of the deed are that it lays down the rights and 
responsibilities of all concerned, as well as the investment objectives, provisions 
enabling new members to join, тах ітшп charges that can be made by the managers 
for administering the fund and provisions for calculating the buying and selling prices 
of units. The managers of the unit trast make the day to day investment decisions 
necessary for the ranning of the trust and deal in units with the public. 
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The trustee is an independent party whose job is to hold the actoal cash and 
securities belonging to the trast, and also to ensure that the managers are ranning the 
trast properly, in accordance with the trust deed. The trastee is usually a major bank 
or insurance company and it is the trustee who creates and cancels units. 
3.2.2 Restrictions of Investment 
Unit trast managers are allowed to invest in securities quoted on recognised 
Stock Exchanges including the Alternative Investment Market in London, the us and 
Tokyo Over the Counter Markets (TOCM) and the French Second Marche. Most of 
the funds invest mainly or wholly in the shares of companies (equities). Government 
stocks (gilts) are also used up to a maximum of 35% in equity trasts, although there 
are also trasts which invest wholly in gilts. Another specialised form of investment 
allowed by the new regulations is the use of options, filณres and forward currency 
contracts, which can be used to hedge the currency exposure of a unit trast investing 
shares. 
Certain other investment restrictions are included in the trust deed to ensure 
that each fund has a sufficiently diversified spread of risk. A unit trust may have up to 
four holdings each representing a maximum 10% of the fund. Al l other investments 
must be limited to 5% of the fund or less. In other words, a trast can effectively have 
a minimum of 16 holdings. Another restriction on the managers is that each trast 
must not hold more than 10% of the issued share capital of any company. But with 
management groups running a whole range of trasts it is not inconceivable that 
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between their trusts they together hold more than 10% of the share capital of one 
particular company (Unit Trust Year Book 2002). 
The main purpose of these rales is to ensure that the investments held in a 
fund's portfolio are easily realisable. This in turn enables the managers to buy and 
sell units at any time. 
3.2.3 Investment Management Association ( IMA) Sector'ร Definitions and 
Classifícation 
As of December 2001, there are 2000 investment funds. In order to identify 
funds with similar characteristics, they are categorised within a fimd classification 
system of over thirty sectors. The sector categories are broadly divided by the IMA 
into fimds that aim to provide an 'income' and those designed to provide 'growth'. 
Each sector is made up of funds investing in similar assets, the same stock market 
sectors or in the same geographical region (IMA offer documents 2002). 
Funds are classified in this way to make it easier to find those that meet the 
customers' investment objectives. This ensures that when comparing one fund with 
another, one is comparing funds with similar objectives or with similar underlying 
assets. 
(a) Funds Principally Targeting Income - Immediate Income 
UK Gilts 
Funds which invest at least 90% of their assets in UK Government securities (Gilts) 
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UK Index Linked Gilts 
Funds which invest at least 90% of their assets in UK index linked Government 
securities (Gilts). 
UK Corporate Bonds 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in Sterling-denominated (or hedged 
back to Sterling), Triple BBB (triple в plus rating) minus or above bonds as measured 
by either Standard & Poor or equivalent ― Moody'ร BAA Baa ( rating) or above. This 
excludes convertibles. 
UK Other Bonds 
Funds investing at least 80% of their assets in Sterling denominated (or hedged back 
to Sterling) and at least 20% of their assets in below BBB minus bonds as measured 
by Standard and Poor'ร or an equivalent standard. This includes convertibles and 
income producing preference shares. 
Global Bonds 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in fixed interest stocks. Al l funds 
which contain more than 80% fixed interest investments are to be classified under this 
heading regardless of the fact that they may have more than 80% in a particular 
geographic sector, unless that geographic area is the UK, when the fund should be 
classified under the relevant UK heading. 
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UK Equity & Bond Income 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in the UK, between 20% and 80% in 
UK fixed interest securities and between 20% and 80% in UK equities. These ñmds 
aim to have a yield of 120% or over of the FT Al l Share L·idex. 
(b) Funds Principally Targeting Income - Growing Income 
UK Equity Income 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in the UK equities and which aim to 
achieve a yield on the underlying portfolio in excess of 110% of the FTSE Al l share 
yield (net of tax). 
(c) Funds Principally Targeting Capital - Capital Growth/Total Return 
UK Zeros 
Funds investing at least 80% of their assets in Sterling denominated (or hedged back 
to Sterling), and at least 80% of their assets in zero dividend preference shares or 
equivalent instruments (i.e. not income producing). This excludes preference shares 
which produce an income. 
UK Al l Companies 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in UK equities which have a primary 
objective of achieving capital growth. 
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UK Smaller Companies 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in the UK equities of companies which 
form the bottom 10% by market capitalisation. 
Japan 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in Japanese equities. 
Japanese Smaller Companies 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in Japanese equities of companies 
which form the bottom 30% by market capitalisation. 
Asia Pacific including Japan 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in Asia Pacific equities, including a 
Japanese content. The Japanese content must make up less than 80% of all assets. 
Asia Paciflc excluding Japan 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in Asia Pacific equities and exclude 
Japanese equities. 
North America 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in North American equities. 
North American Smaller Companies 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in North American equities of 
companies which form the bottom 20% by market capitalisation. 
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Europe including the UK 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in European equities. They may 
include UK equities, but these must not exceed 80% of the ftind'ร assets. 
Europe excluding the UK 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in European equities and exclude UK 
securities. 
European Smaller Companies 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in European equities of companies 
which form the bottom 20% by market capitalisation in the European market. They 
may include UK equities, but these must not exceed 80% of the fund's assets. 
('Europe' includes all countries in the MSCI/FTSE pan European indices.) 
Cautious Managed 
Funds which offer investment in a range of assets, with the maximum equity exposure 
restricted to 60% of the Fund. There is no specific requirement to hold a mimmum % 
of non-UK equities. Assets must be at least 50% in Sterling/Euro and be in equities 
which are deemed to include convertibles. 
Balanced Managed 
Funds which offer investment in a range of assets, with the maximum equity exposure 
restricted to 85% of the fund. At least 10% must be held in non-UK equities. Assets 
must be at least 50% in Sterling/Euro and be in equities which are deemed to include 
convertibles. 
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Active Managed 
Funds which offer investment in a range of assets, with the manager being able to 
invest up to 100% in equities at their discretion. At least 10% must be held in non-
UK equities. There is no minimum Sterling/Euro balance and the equities are deemed 
to include convertibles. At any one time the asset allocation of these funds may hold 
a high proportion of non-equity assets such that the asset allocation would, by default, 
place the fiind in either the Balanced or Cautious sector. These fimds would remain in 
this sector on these occasions since it is the manager'ร stated intention to retain the 
right to invest up to 100% in equities. 
Global Growth 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in equities (but not more than 80% in 
UK assets) and which have the prime objective of achieving growth of capital. 
Global Emerging Markets 
Funds which invest 80% or more of their assets directly or indirectly in emerging 
markets as defined by MSCI/FTSE indices, without geographical restriction. Indirect 
investment e.g. China shares listed in Hong Kong, should not exceed 50% of the 
portfolio. 
(d) Funds Principally Targeting Capital Protection 
Money Market 
Funds which invest at least 95% of their assets in money market instruments (i.e. 
cash and near cash, such as bank deposits, certificates of deposit, very short term fixed 
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interest securities or floating rate notes). These funds may be either "money market 
funds" as defined by the տա or "securities funds" as long as they satisfy the criterion 
of concentrating on money market instruments. 
Protected/Guaranteed Funds 
Funds, other than money market funds, which principally aim to provide a return of a 
set amount of capital back to the investor (either explicitly guaranteed or via an 
investment strategy highly likely to achieve this objective) plus some market upside. 
(e) Specialist Sectors 
Funds that have an investment universe that is not accommodated by the mainstream 
sectors. Performance ranking of fiinds within the sector as a whole is inappropriate, 
given the diverse nature of its constituents. 
Technology and Telecommunications 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in technology and telecommunications 
sectors as defined by the major index providers. 
Personal Pensions 
Funds which are only available for use in a personal pension plan or FSAVC scheme. 
The arrangements for unit trast personal pension schemes require providers to set up 
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Figure 3.1ะ IMA Classifled Sector-wise UK fund classifícation system chart 
Al l Funds 
Income 
Funds 
Growth 
Funds Specialist Funds 
Immediate 
Income 
U K Gilts 
U K Index Linked 
Gilts 
U K equity & 
Bond mcome 
U K Other Bond 
Global Bonds 
Growing Income Capital Protection 
U K Equity 
Income 
Money Market 
Protected I 
Guaranteed Funds 
Capital 
Growth/Total 
Return 
U K A l l 
Companies 
U K Smaller 
Соіщ)апіе8 
Specialist 
Technology & 
Telecommunications 
Personal Pensions 
Japan 
Japanese Smaller 
Conpanies 
Asia Pacific 
Including Japan 
Asia Pacific 
Excluding Japan 
Nor th America 
Nor th American 
Smaller 
Companies 
Ешоре bicluding 
U K 
Europe Excluding 
U K 
European Smaller 
Con įan ieร 
Cautious Managed 
Balanced 
Managed 
Act ive Managed 
Global Growth 
Global Emerging 
Markets 
U K Zeros 
(Source IMA, 2002) 
67 
Table: 3.1 Total Fund Size of Al l Unit Trust Groups 
Year Total Fund Size of Al l 
Unit Trast Groups £m = 
1972 2647 
1973 2060 
1974 1310.8 
1975 2512.4 
1976 2543.0 
1977 3461.3 
1978 3873.4 
1979 3936.7 
1980 4968.0 
1981 5902.4 
1982 7768.0 
1983 11689.4 
1984 15099.0 
1985 20307.0 
1986 32131.0 
1987 36330 
1988 41574 
1989 58159 
1990 46342 
1991 55145 
1992 63877 
1993 95518 
1994 92116 
1995 112894 
1996 131905 
1997 157583 
1998 182881 
1999 253713 
2000 260970 
2001 235796 
(Sources: Unit Trast Year Books, 2002) 
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a separate personal pension un i t trast under an overal l tax sheltered umbre l la . These 
funds then i n tu rn invest i n the group 's equivalent mainstream trasts. I t m a y be 
ment ioned here that pension funds are not to be confused w i t h 'exempt ' funds w h i c h 
are flagged separately. F igure 3.1 describes the sector-wise un i t trusts w h i c h are 
understood c lear ly from the chart. 
Table 3.1 shows the size o f al l groups o f un i t trasts from 1972 to 2001 i n the 
U K . The great g lobal b u l l market fo r equit ies peaked early i n 2 0 0 1 . Sheer 
m o m e n t u m carr ied the U K investment funds indust ry t føough to the end o f 2 0 0 1 , w i t h 
an end peak £260,970 (as o n December 2000) m i l l i o n for un i t trast funds under 
management, according to the statistics publ ished b y the Investment Management 
Assoc iat ion and the U n i t Trast & Open Ended Investment Compan i es ( O E I C ) 
Yearbook 2002. The £260,970 m i l l i o n figure i n 2000 represented g row th o f less than 
3 percent from the end o f the 1999 level . 
The g row th o f uni t trusts dropped i n November 1993, f o l l o w i n g the o f f i c i a l 
abandonment o f apartheid. I n the U K as o f 2000 there were more than 511 un i t trasts 
w i t h a total value o f over £260,700 m i l l i o n , w h i c h is the highest recorded g rowth i n 
the U K un i t trusts industry. F igure 3.2 show the the g row th i n size o f a l l the group 
un i t trusts for the per iod 1972-2001. 
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Figure 3.2 Total Fund Size of Al l Unit Trust Groups 
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3.2.4 How are the Unit Trust Funds Managed? 
Each un i t trust fiind has been d i v ided into equal port ions or uni ts. A t any one 
t ime the fiind is d iv ided between a number o f un i t holders each ho ld ing a def in i te 
number o f uni ts. Each un i t represents the same propor t ion o f the value o f the shares 
he ld b y the trust. For example, i f un i t trast A w i t h hold ings w o r t h £20 m i l l i o n has 60 
m i l l i o n units i n issue each un i t w i l l be w o r t h 33.3p. I f demand rises for addi t ional 
uni ts, either from new uni t holders j o i n i n g or exist ing un i t holders w i sh ing to invest 
more money, the value o f the addi t ional money invested exact ly matches the increase 
i n the number o f units. The value o f the each un i t i n re lat ion to the tota l value o f the 
fund therefore remains unchanged. For example, i f demand rises for another 30,000 
uni ts i n Trast A , these must be sold at a pr ice w h i c h w i l l p rov ide a tota l amount o f 
cash suf f ic ient to add £10,000 w o r t h o f securities to the fund, after meet ing the 
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necessary b u y i n g expenses. I t f o l l ows that the addi t iona l uni ts must be so ld at the 
ru l i ng pr ice o f 33.3p plus a sum suf f ic ient to cover the necessary expenses. 
Bu t the process works i n reverse when ex is t ing un i t holders w i s h to sell their 
uni ts and the size o f the fund contracts; suf f ic ient securities i n the funds must be sold 
to p rov ide the cash sum that w i l l pay each un i t ho lder w i t h d r a w i n g from the fund for 
the f u l l value o f his/her uni ts. Th is is h o w the basic value o f the un i t is calculated i n 
order to be fair to bo th ex is t ing and i ncoming un i t holders ( I M A o f fe r documents, 
2000) . 
3.2.5 Reinvestment of Dividends 
The investor can choose whether or not to reinvest his/her income d is t r ibut ion, 
that is whether to take the d is t r ibut ion as income or to use i t to increase his/her 
ho ld ing . There are t w o d i f ferent methods b y w h i c h income m a y be reinvested. Some 
trusts s imp ly use the sum distr ibuted to b u y further uni ts, increasing the number o f 
uni ts the investor holds. The disadvantages o f th is are that an in i t ia l charge must be 
pa id on the new units and i t is hard to keep track o f smal l extra numbers o f uni ts. The 
other method is where the un i t trust is e f fec t ive ly spl i t in to a d is t r ibut ing fund and an 
accumulat ion fund. The d is t r ibut ion fund , as the name impl ies , distr ibutes a l l i ts 
income to investors. The accumulat ion fund, for those w h o wan t to reinvest income, 
has i ts pr ice adjusted when a d is t r ibut ion is made to ref lect the add i t ion o f the income. 
The pr ice o f the accumulat ion fund w i l l therefore be higher than that o f the 
d is t r ibut ion fimd. O f 273 dead uni t trusts dur ing the per iod f r o m 1986 to 2 0 0 1 , 193 
were accumulat ion uni ts and 80 were income uni ts. For the 470 l i ve uni t trusts, 373 
were accumulat ion uni ts and 90 were income units dur ing the per iod o f this study. 
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There is an advantage that no front-end charge is pa id on new units and that 
the number o f uni ts he ld remains the same. I t is easy to see w h i c h groups use w h i c h 
method o f reinvestment b y l ook ing at the prices as a trast w h i c h has t w o prices, w i l l 
have one label led ' A c c ' or Accumula ted units w h i c h indicates a separate 
accumulat ion fund. Reinvestment o f income does not exempt the investor from 
pay ing tax on the d is t r ibut ions, as he or she is deemed for tax purposes to have 
received his or her share o f the reinvested income. The managers w i l l send the un i t 
ho lder o f the deemed income upon w h i c h any tax w i l l have been lev ied (Un i t Trust 
Year B o o k , 2001). 
3.2.6 Charges and Taxation 
U n i t trast charging systems consist o f an in i t ia l charge and an annual 
management charge. The in i t ia l charge is inc luded in the pr ice at w h i c h managers 
w i l l sel l units to the pub l ic , and the annual charge is no rma l l y taken out o f the income 
o f the trust fund. There is no statutory l i m i t on un i t charges, a l though the trust deed 
i tse l f w i l l state the m a x i m u m levels that the managers are permi t ted to charge. A uni t 
trast is quoted on a b id and o f fer basis, wh i l s t the level and range o f charges is f r om 
5 % to 6 % for the in i t ia l charges and from 0.75% to 1.5% for the annual charges. A 
few g i l t fonds have lower charges than average - perhaps o n l y 3 % or 3 .5% in i t i a l l y -
because commissions on gi l ts are lower than those on equit ies. 
I n the U K , an investor ho ld i ng un i t trusts w i l l have t w o potent ia l areas o f tax 
l i ab i l i t y ; income tax and capi ta l ga in. Income tax is payable on the income received 
from the un i t trust i n the f o r m o f d is t r ibut ions. I f income is reinvested, whether 
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through the purchase o f new units or through accumulat ion uni ts , the tax l i ab i l i t y 
remains the same. Capi ta l gains tax may be payable i f a taxable ga in is made when 
units are sold. A company pay ing a d iv idend o f £1 w o u l d pay £0.2 i n taxes, the 
Advance Corporat ion Tax, and then distr ibute £0.8 to the un i t trast w i t h an 
accompany ing tax credit for the Advance Софога Ї іоп Tax pa id . The un i t trust pays 
this money as a d iv idend b y declar ing a gross d iv idend o f £1 and d is t r ibut ing £0.8 i n 
cash and £0.2 as tax credit. A taxable investor w o u l d report £1 d iv idend income and 
£0.2 taxes already paid. I n 1986 the Advance Corporat ion Tax rate was 3 3 % and 
gradual ly fe l l to 2 0 % . U n t i l Ju ly 1997, a U K tax-exempt investor such as a pension 
fixnd cou ld rec la im the tax credit as cash. Bu t i n the Budget o f Ju ly 1997, the ab i l i t y 
o f such investors to rec la im the tax credit was abol ished. 
ä.2.7 About the Equity Unit Trust 
Out o f the several above ment ioned Ш А def ined sectors o f the un i t trusts, w e 
focus on on l y those funds w h i c h are invested p r ima r i l y i n U K equi ty and w h i c h are 
classif ied a s ' 8 ; (1) U K Equ i t y and B o n d bicorne, (2) U K Equ i t y b icorne, (3) U K A l l 
Companies and (4) U K Smal ler Companies. Our study excludes a l l other non-equi ty 
f i inds, such as internat ional , sector specialist or balanced and fixed income uni t trast. 
W e have inc luded i n our sample o f study on l y those un i t trusts w h i c h invest at least 
8 0 % o f thei r assets i n U K equit ies w h i c h have a p r imary object ive o f achiev ing 
capi ta l g rowth . The statistics for the tota l number o f sector-wise l i ve U K equi ty uni t 
trusts, and the equi ty uni t trasts w h i c h were created or d ied between the per iod from 
January 1986 to December 2001 are g iven be low (Table nos: 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4). 
's Classification changed in 1997. Previously classified as: Growth and Income, Growth, Equity, 
Income and Smaller companies 
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Table 3.2: Number of UK Equity Unit trusts by sector 1986-2001 
Sector 1986 1991 1996 2001 
U K Equ i t y and B o n d Income 50 58 70 47 
U K Equ i t y Income 103 113 106 85 
U K A l l Companies 175 239 282 302 
U K Smal ler Compan i es 50 73 84 74 
A l l U K equi ty sector 386 488 542 508 
(Source: s & р Micropal ) 
Table 3.3: Birth of Unit Trusts by Sector 1986-2001 
Sector 1986-90 1991-95 1996-01 Tota l 
U K Equ i t y and B o n d Income 23 37 15 75 
U K Equ i t y Income 35 19 13 67 
U K A l l Companies 101 73 123 297 
U K Smal ler Compan i es 31 26 15 72 
A l l U K Equ i t y sector 190 155 166 511 
Source: s & p' M i c r o p a l 
Table 3.3 shows that over 150 un i t trusts have been created i n each o f the last 
four year ly per iods and that most o f the n e w l y created un i t trusts are i n the U K A l l 
Companies sector. 
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Table 3.4: Death of Unit Trusts by Sector 1986-2001 
Sector 1986-90 1991-95 1996-01 Tota l 
U K Equ i t y and B o n d bicorne 18 30 38 86 
U K Equ i t y bicorne 25 26 34 85 
U K A l l Companies 37 30 103 170 
U K Smal ler Compan i es 8 15 25 48 
A l l U K Equ i t y sector 88 101 200 389 
(Source: s & р Micropal ) 
Table 3.4 shows that 389 uni t trusts, about ha l f o f the sample, d ied dur ing the 
per iod o f the study w h i c h demonstrates the quest ion o f surv iva l o f the funds. 
3.3 Empirical M e t h o d 
Jensen's Alpha 
L i k e Treynor , Jensen (1968) re l ied on Sharpe (1964) , L in te r (1965) С А Р М to 
develop an estimate o f the extra return earned b y a fund. The Jensen measure has 
become the standard measure o f performance evaluat ion and has been appl ied 
extensively i n evaluat ing managed fund 's per fonnance. Performance is measured b y 
the Jensen'ร alpha, since superior ( in fer ior ) per fonnance w o u l d have consistent ly 
pos i t ive (negative) random error terms and w h i c h w o u l d be p icked up i n the intercept 
alpha. The empi r ica l speci f icat ion o f the mode l is as fo l l ows ; 
E(Rit)= ßiE(Rn„) (3-1) 
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where 
Rit= excess return on asset і i n the per iod է - net o f the risk free rate, 
Rmt= excess return on the benchmark asset, 
ßi = systematic risk for asset i , 
E = expectations operator 
Assuming rat ional expectations and ef f ic ient markets, the equat ion (3-1) can be 
wr i t ten as; 
Rit = ßiRmt + Є і (3-2) 
where 
Є І = forecast error w i t h mean o f zero, ( Е ( е і ) = 0 ) 
Jensen'ร measure o f per formance includes a constant i n equat ion (3-2) such that 
Ri,-Rft = a + ß i ( R ^ , - R f t ) + e i (3-3) 
Rit-Rft = excess return o f the por t fo l io ( i n our case the un i t t rast) , 
Rmt- R f t = excess return o f the benchmark ( i n our case the F T S E A l l Share Index) 
α = a constant that measures abnormal per formance, 
ßi = systematic risk o f the por t fo l io . 
The advantage o f Jensen's approach is that i t enables one to determine 
whether the per formance indicated b y the alpha is stat ist ical ly s igni f icant us ing t-tests. 
The nu l l hypothesis o f neutral per formance is that alpha is equal to zero. A posi t ive 
alpha is usual ly іп ієфге їес і as a measure o f superior per formance and a negat ive alpha 
as ref lect ing in fer ior per formance. However , i t may be noted that i n add i t ion to the 
conclus ion that investors received unant ic ipated retums over the sample per iod, a 
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non-zero estimate o f alpha cou ld be ind icat ive o f a misspeci f icat ion o f the С А Р М as а 
mode l o f the re tums generating process or market inef f ic iency. A n y inference about 
market e f f i c iency invo lves a j o i n t hypothesis (Fama, 1970). I f the mode l is m is -
speci f ied, then predicTable var ia t ion in the misspeci f icat ion can contaminate α and Єі. 
Fama - French Three Factor 
The need for a three factor/ mul t i fac tor asset-pricing mode l is der ived from 
recent l i teraณre on the cross-sectional var ia t ion o f stock retums. The single-factor 
assumes that a managed fund 's investment behaviour can be approx imated us ing a 
single market index. I t does not , however , ftilly account for ho ld ings i n smaller 
companies. For this reason, E l ton , Gruber, Das and H l á v k a (1993) proposed to add a 
smal l cap benchmark to the previous single-factor mode l . The land mark paper o f 
Fama and French (1992) found that beta has l i t t le or no ab i l i t y i n exp la in ing cross-
sectional var iat ions i n equi ty re tums, but that variables such as size and the book- to -
market value o f equi ty do have such abi l i t ies. I n a f o l l ow -up paper, Fama and French 
(1993) and Vuol teenaho (2002) m o v e d to a t ime series based test ing framework. 
Besides a va lue-weighted market p roxy , two addi t ional risk factors are used; size and 
book- to-market '^ . The Fama and French mode l reads; 
Ķ,-R^,=a + ß, -R^) + ß\SMB, + ß.HML, + ε, (3-4) 
R¡I 一 R^I = the excess re f tm i o f index at the t ime t, 
R„jt 一 Rfß = the excess return o f the benchmark at the t ime t, 
SMBt = the d i f ference i n геШгп between a Smal l Cap por t fo l io and a Large Cap 
por t fo l io at t ime է 
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HMLt = the di f ference i n return between a po r t fo l i o o f h igh-book- to market stocks 
and one o f l ow book to market stocks at t ime t. 
I n our study, the p r imary mode l o f per formance measurement is the Fama and 
French three factor mode l , w h i c h w e w i l l compare w i t h the с А Р М single factor 
mode l . Fama and French (1992, 1993) show that, a long w i t h a market factor, size and 
value (book- to-market ) factors help expla in bo th the temporal and cross-sectional 
var ia t ion i n stock retums. 
I n the above models , α is the regression intercept or alpha w h i c h estimates a 
po r t fo l i o ' s exposure to risk factors. I n equat ion (3) β measures the por t fo l io ' s 
exposure to a market factor с А Р М . I n equat ion (4) beta measures the por t fo l io ' s 
sensi t iv i ty to the market , S M B to a size factor and H M L to a value factor. A pos i t ive 
S M B says the po r t fo l i o has net exposwe to smal l stocks and a negative value 
indicates net exposure to large stocks. A posi t ive H M L indicates net exposure to 
value stocks and a negative value indicates net exposure to g row th stocks. 
3.4 The Data 
This study w i l l examine a l l the U K equi ty un i t trusts from the M i c r o p a l 
database that existed between January 1986 and December 2001 and w h i c h were 
authorised for sale. The subject o f a considerable number o f investment performance 
league Tables, the M i c r o p a l provides an interest ing group for comparat ive study 
wh i l s t the large number o f uni t trusts and var ie ty o f investment object ives o f fe r an 
՚ 9 Otten and Bams (2002) and Kothari & Warmer (1997) provide evidence on the applicability of this 
model. 
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oppor tun i ty for reducing the impact o f confoxmding variables. Part icular d i f f i cu l t ies i n 
per formance measurement arise from internat ional object ives as such object ives 
require a suitable internat ional benchmark por t fo l io to be specif ied for un i t trasts that 
invest a substantial p ropor t ion o f their fonds overseas. Th is p rob lem arises 
par t icu lar ly in the case o f per formance measurement o f U K un i t trasts. For this reason 
our sample includes on ly those un i t trasts that invest p r ima r i l y i n U K equit ies and are 
classi f ied b y the Investment Management Assoc ia t ion ( I M A ) as U K Equ i t y and B o n d 
Income, U K Equ i t y Income, U K A l l Companies and U K Smal ler Companies. I n 
order to qua l i f y as ' U K ' , a un i t trust must have at least 80 percent o f i ts investments i n 
the U K . 
3.4-1 Exclusion of Unauthorised and Other Unit Trusts 
I n our study w e have excluded unauthorised un i t trusts because w e have 
insuf f ic ient i n fo rmat ion to determine their investment object ives. Fur thermore, w e 
exc luded al l in ternat ional , sector special ist, and balance and fixed income uni t trasts. 
Acco rd i ng to M i c ropa l ' s record, their d iv idend data on dead uni t trasts are 
incomplete. Since w e w i l l w o r k w i t h the tota l re turn data o f the l i ve U K equi ty un i t 
trusts a complete set o f tota l re turn data is avai lable from 1986 w h i c h includes 
d iv idends and therefore w e start our sample per iod from January 1986. 
3.4-2 The Sample and the Sample Period 
Overa l l , i n our sample l ist there are 470 un i t trusts w h i c h were s t i l l a l ive at the 
end o f December 2001 and 276 o f them w h i c h had existed for some per iod between 
January 1986 and December 2001 were dead. A t the end o f the 2 0 0 1 , the aggregate 
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value o f the U K equi ty trasts w e รณdi ed was £12,471 m i l l i o n and at the end o f 2001 
the entire U K un i t t rasts ' value reached £235,796 m i l l i o n . 
3.4-3 Survivorship Bias Free Data 
W e employed bo th the l i ve and dead fiinds' m o n t h l y t ime series o f return data 
for a l l the U K equi ty un i t trasts covered b y this study, i n fo rmat ion w h i c h is avai lable 
from M ic ropa l . Therefore, our data base is surv ivorship bias free. Th is bias af f l ic ts 
near ly a l l commerc ia l databases o f un i t trast per formance, as mos t l y the poor 
pe r fonn ing fimds do not surv ive to the end o f the sample per iod and get dropped from 
the database even though they are investment opt ions wh i l e they exist. The 
oppor tun i ty set w h i c h investors face through t ime is the combined universe o f l i ve and 
dead fiinds. Th is universe has lower retums than the set o f su rv iv ing funds. Since our 
study is to evaluate the performance o f the un i t trasts, and not thei r investors, w e use 
retums gross o f the Advance Corporat ion Tax. 
3.4-4 Gross Return Data 
W e have stated that the money reณms o f each equi ty un i t trust are calculated 
from mon th l y o f fe r prices and div idends pa id b y the un i t trast i n the mon th that the 
d iv idend is declared ex-d iv idend. The o f fer pr ice o f the un i t trasts includes the load 
charge, brokerage fees and stamp duty. Therefore, our sample o f the un i t trasts can be 
v iewed approx imate ly as gross o f the load charge and t rad ing costs. 
3.4-5 Selection Criterion of the UK Equity Unit Trusts 
In respect o f select ion cr i ter ia o f the un i t trusts, w e used the m o n t h l y M o n e y 
Management Magaz ine o f Standard & Poor 'ร M i c r o p a l from 1986 and the U n i t Trast 
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Year B o o k 1987 and a l l the un i t trasts w i t h U K equi ty object ives have been selected. 
Us ing subsequent copies o f m o n t h l y M o n e y Management Magazines and U n i t Trust 
Year Books , n e w l y established un i t trasts were added to the sample i f they had U K 
Equ i t y object ives. The h is tory o f each trust was traced throughout the sample per iod 
and name changes and transfers o f un i t trusts were treated as a cont inuat ion o f the 
or ig ina l trust. I f the un i t trust was taken over and the investment object ive changed to 
n o n - U K equi ty object ives, then the retoms o f the trust were taken up to that point . 
3.4-6 Equally Weighted Portfolios 
For conduct ing d i f ferent tests, w e fo rmed for each m o n t h equal ly we ighted 
por t fo l ios o f un i t trusts, us ing sort ing and classi f icat ion rales appropriate to each test. 
Therefore w e fo rmed equal ly we ighted por t fo l ios for each mon th ' s un i t trast based o n 
the sector (sector-wise) bo th fo r l i ve and dead un i t trasts. 
W e have t r ied to make our sample surv ivor bias free b y inc lud ing each dead 
U K equi ty un i t trust th rough the last m o n t h i t reported a return. A por t fo l io that holds 
a un i t trust that dies, equal ly weights the remain ing un i t trusts. Th is is s imi lar to the 
method used b y Carhart (1997) . I f a un i t trust dies i n the mon th f o l l o w i n g the last 
reported return, then the r e t u m i n the mon th o f death is omi t ted . Therefore our 
sample is free from surv ivorsh ip bias. 
3.4-7 Excess Return 
The excess retums on un i t trasts are calculated b y deduct ing the m o n t h l y 
r e ณ m o f the un i t trust w i t h the risk-free rate (wh i ch is calculated f r o m one m o n t h U K 
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Т - B i l l ) . The U K 1-month T-Bİ11 data was downloaded from DataStream Internat ional 
database. 
3.4-8 Benchmark Specifícatíons 
T w o di f ferent benchmark specif icat ions were used to evaluate the U K equi ty 
un i t trusts. F i rs t ly , w e used the excess return F T S E A l l Share Price Index as the 
benchmark. The excess return o f the F T S E A l l Share Price was calculated b y 
subtract ing the risk free rate. Our second benchmark was based on the findings o f 
Fama & French (1993) w h i c h indicated that size and book to market rat io help to 
exp la in the cross-sectional patterns i n u s stock retums. Qu ig ley and Sinquef ie ld 
(2000) documented that s imi lar effects exist i n the U K . Fama & French 'ร three index 
benchmark specif icat ions, w h i c h inc lude the excess stock market returns and t w o self-
financing por t fo l ios , сарШге the size and book to market effects i n stock retums. 
The m o n t h l y sample o f total return (Rm) data o f the F T S E A l l Share Price for 
the per iod from 1986 to 2001 was downloaded from DataStream Internat ional . W e 
used the Fama & French three factor mode l (equat ion 3-4) to in fer the U K equi ty un i t 
t rusts ' per formance evaluat ion for the per iod from 1986 to 2 0 0 1 . I n their mode l , 
S M B stands for Smal l m inus B i g and H M L stands fo r H i g h minus L o w (meaning 
h i gh book value minus l o w book value) . W e obtained fac to r -m im ick ing por t fo l ios o f 
Fama-French U K factors for size ( S M B ) and book- to-market ( H M L ) from Stefan 
Nage l o f the L o n d o n Business School Share Price database^^. I n order to construct 
the U K vers ion o f Fama-French (1993) , Nage l used tota l return data o f the F T S E A l l 
Share Price index. S M B is a size factor w h i c h is measured b y the mon th l y retums o f 
' He has recently moved to Harvard Business School, us. 
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Table 3-5Aะ Summary Statistics of Live, Live and Dead Equity Unit Trusts, 
T-Bills, Market, SMB and HML , 1986-2001 
L i v e U K L i v e and T -B i l l s Ma rke t 
Equ i t y Dead U K 
U n i t Trast Equ i t y ( R m - R f ) 
U T 
S M B H M L 
M e a n Return 1.54 1.49 0.58 0.67 -0.02 0.21 
Standard 
Dev ia t ion 
Annua l 
Compounded 
К е Ш г п 
4.84 
18.48 
4.62 
17.88 
0.26 
6,96 
4.68 
8.04 
2.65 
-0.24 
2.26 
2.52 
Table 3-5B: Correlation of Regression Market, SMB and H M L 
Marke t S M B H M L 
Marke t 1.0 
S M B -0.31 1.0 
H M L -0.02 0.14 1.0 
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the Hoare Govet t Smal ler Companies Index ( total re turn, ex- investment trusts) minus 
the F T S E A l l Share index to ta l return. H M L is a value (book to market ) factor w h i c h 
is the retums o f top 3 0 % o f companies ranked b y book to market m inus the F T S E A l l 
Share pr ice index to ta l г е Ш т . 
3.5 Empirical Results 
Table 3 .5A and 3.5B show the summary statistics for l i ve gross U K equi ty 
un i t trusts, l i ve and dead U K equi ty un i t trust, 1-month treasury b i l l s , market (FTSE 
al l share index) , S M B and H M L . For the uni t trasts w e calculated for each mon th an 
equal ly we ighted average for t w o sets o f data; (1) l i ve gross o f tax returns o f a l l the 
equi ty uni t trasts that are s t i l l i n existence dur ing the per iod 1986 to 2001 and (2) the 
l i ve and dead gross o f tax re tums for al l the equi ty un i t trasts whether or not i n 
existence dur ing the per iod 1986 to 2 0 0 1 . 
The returns o f the l i ve un i t trusts and the l i ve and dead un i t trust are 18.24% 
and 17.88% per year respect ively. Acco rd ing to our estimates, the surv ivorship bias 
is 0 .6% per year. Th is is the di f ference between the annual ly compounded gross 
re tums o f the l i ve un i t trasts and the annual ly compounded gross re tums o f combined 
sets o f l i ve and dead un i t trusts. I t reveals from the results, h o w poo r l y the n o n -
surv iv ing un i t trasts per fo rm. I n contrast, according to Carhart 'ร (1997) estimate o f 
surv ivor bias, this is 1 % for u s equi ty mutua l funds, whereas i t is 1.4% i n M a l k i e l ' s 
(1995) study. 
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3.5.1 Sector-wise Performance 
Table 3.6A and 3.6B show the results of when the UK unit trasts are arranged 
according to the Investment Management Association (IMA) category. In the case of 
live and dead (L&D) , in the group-wise, equity income and small companies sectors, 
they exhibit the largest differences between the single factor and three factor models. 
In the case of equity income, it is the relatively high HML coefficient that causes the 
difference. In the small companies sector, the cause is the large SMB exposure of 1 in 
the Fama & French three factor regression. When we control for the size factor, the 
beta increases from 0.80 to 0.97 and the R2 goes up from 0.681 to 0.962. The small 
companies unit trusts live up to their name and concentrate on small company stocks 
and the three-factor alphas say that in no Ш А sector of unit trusts in aggregate are 
able to beat the market. However, the toee-factor model explains almost all the 
variance in the retums of this unit trust and is an improvement on the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM). 
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Table 3-6A: Summary Performance of с АРМ Single Factor Regression of 
Sector-wise UK Equity Unit Trust, 1986-2001 
( Regressions, based on monthly returns) 
IMA Live 
Sector /Live-
Dead 
Average Annual 
number Comp-
of Trasts ounded 
Retran 
Stand, α β t(ß-l) Adj. 
Devi. R2 
UK 
Equity 
and Bond 
UK Al l 
Comp. 
Live 86.9 17.6 
L&D 115.9 17.16 
Live 82.6 17.22 
L & D 114.9 16.46 
Equity Live 56.7 18.22 
bicorne 
L & D 82.1 17.52 
Smaller Live 35.6 17.34 
Comp. 
L & D 52.7 16.49 
12.00 0.00 0.80 
(0.04) 
11.89 -0.02 0.89 
12.29 -0.03 0.88 
(-0.29) 
12.11 -0.09 0.91 
12.99 0.08 0.85 
(0.79) 
12.76 0.03 0.84 
14.89 0.08 0.79 
(0.39) 
14.99 0.00 0.80 
(0.00) 
-9.63 0.968 
-10.55 0.957 
-5.89 0.929 
-5.31 0.932 
-8.53 0.911 
-9.22 0.910 
-5.95 0.667 
-5.69 0.681 
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Table 3-6B: Summary Performance of F-F Three Factor Regression 
wise U K Equity Unit Trusts, 1986-2001 
( Regressions based on monthly returns) 
M A Live 
Sector /Live-
Dead 
Average Annual Stand, 
number Comp- Devi, 
of Trusts ounded 
Retrun 
β t(ß-l) SMB HML Adj. 
UK Equity Live 
and Bond 
L&D 
UK All Live 
Comp. 
L & D 
Equity Live 
bicorne 
L & D 
Smaller Live 
Comp. 
86.9 17.6 12.00 
115.9 17.16 11.89 
82.6 17.22 12.29 
114.9 16.46 12.11 
56.7 18.22 12.99 
82.1 17.52 12.76 
35.6 17.34 14.89 
-0.04 0.92 
(-0.76) 
-0.06 0.91 
(-1·41) 
-0.05 0.97 
(-1.24) 
-8.07 
-9.13 
-2.84 
0.16 0.06 0.981 
(11.14) (4.16) 
-0.11 0.98 -1.71 
(-2.60) 
-O.Ol 0.91 -7.40 
(-0.11) 
-0.06 0.90 -8.44 
(0.88) 
0.00 0.95 -2.66 
(0.00) 
0.16 0.06 
(10.50) (4.60) 
0.36 0.04 
(18.49) (1.44) 
0.36 O.Ol 
(20.43) (0.44) 
0.40 0.22 
(13.40) (8.34) 
0.980 
0.966 
0.968 
0.956 
0.951 
L & D 52.7 16.49 14.99 -0.07 0.97 
(1-29) 
-1.97 
0.40 0.33 
(13.12) (8.66) 
1.00 -0.08 0.958 
(40.11) (-3.23) 
1.00 -0.09 0.962 
141.88) (-3.02) = 
Each month we calculated total returns of equally weight portfolios of the above categories of the UK 
unit trust grouped by Investment Management Association. Live fimd means those surviving during 
1986-2001 and Live and dead means those s^Մviving and those not surviving tìttough during 1986-2001 
Annual Compounded Return (ACR), Standard deviation is annual of each portfolio. Alpha is expressed 
as per cent excess return per month. R" are adjusted for degree of freedom. 
We test the t-statistics of ß-1 to measure to see how reliably β differs from 1 
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3.5-2 Performance of the Trusts Ranked by SMB and H M L Exposure 
There is a common claim that markets for small stocks are less efficient than 
those for large stocks. This proposition is tested directly by comparing the 
performance of small company unit trusts to that of large company unit trusts. We 
then make the same comparison for the value and growth unit trusts. 
We form the portfolios based on prior SMB exposure, in order to investigate 
the small stock argument. We rank all unit trusts each year based on their SMB 
exposure over the prior three year period. I f a unit trast starts within the three year 
period, we include it i f it has at least 30 months worth of retums. Based on these 
rankings, ten equally weighted portfolios were formed and each portfolio contained 
the same number of unit trusts. We held the ten portfolios for one year and then 
reformed them at the start of the next year. This produced a time series of portfolios 
of unit trasts. The top SMB portfolio wil l always contain the unit trust with the 
highest SMB exposure over the preceding 3-year period and the lowest SMB portfolio 
wil l always contain the unit trasts with the lowest SMB exposure over the preceding 
three year period. I f a unit trust in a portfolio drops out of the database over the 
following year, we include its return through the last month it reports. The return of 
the portfolio in the next month is equally weighted on the average of the remaining 
unit trasts. We used the data from the 1983 to 1985 period, and since we needed three 
years to generate the first rank, our series started in January 1986. 
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Table 3-7A: Portfolio of Unit Trust ( live and dead) from 1986 to 2001 based on 
prior three-years three factor model SMB loading in CAPM Single Factor 
Regression 
( Regressions are based on monthly returns) 
SMB Average Annual Stand. α β t(ß-l) Adj. 
decile number 
of Trusts 
Comp­
ounded 
Retran 
Devi. R 2 
High 30 15.38 15.55 -0.07 
(-0.47) 
0.08 -5.52 0.678 
2 30.2 15.56 14.38 -0.08 
(0.56) 
0.81 -6.28 0.749 
3 31.1 16.39 13.11 -0.06 
(-0.46) 
0.84 -6.75 0.843 
4 31 16.41 12.11 -0.07 
(-0.68) 
0.85 -7.97 0.889 
5 30.6 17.7 12.09 0.03 
(0.32) 
0.88 -7.68 0.922 
6 30.2 16.99 12.06 -0.03 
(-0.62) 
0.90 -6.78 0.933 
ᄀ 31 17.10 12.22 -0.04 
(-0.75) 
0.92 -7.06 0.946 
8 31.1 17.18 12.32 -0.03 
(-0.71) 
0.92 -7.46 0.958 
9 30.7 16.16 12.10 -0.11 
(-2.66) 
0.94 -6.39 0.969 
Low 31.2 17.01 11.88 -0.05 
(-1.35) 
0.93 -7.29 0.971 
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Table 3-7B ะ Portfolio of Unit Trust ( live and dead) from 1986 to 2001 based on 
prior three-years three factor model SMB loading in F-F Three Factor 
Regression 
( Regressions, based on monthly returns) 
SMB 
decile 
Average 
Number 
of Trusts 
Annual 
Comp­
ounded 
Retrun 
Stand. 
Devi. 
α β t(ß-l) SMB HML Adj. 
R2 
High 30 15.38 15.55 -0.16 0.97 -1.58 0.95 0.00 0.948 
(-2.38) (34.77) (0.09) 
2 30.2 15.56 14.38 -0.17 0.96 -3.59 0.84 0.00 0.951 
(-3.11) (40.21) (-0.01) 
3 31.1 16.39 13.11 -0.13 0.95 -4.18 0.57 0.08 0.951 
(-2.18) (26.33) (3.77) 
4 31 16.41 12.11 -0.13 0.93 -6.28 0.04 0.14 0.966 
(-2-44) (21.77) (5.32) 
5 30.6 17.7 12.09 -0.05 0.94 -5.54 0.03 0.12 0.961 
(-0.66) (14.72) (4.85) 
6 30.2 16.99 12.06 -0.08 0.95 -4.49 0.27 0.08 0.969 
(-1.72) (12.33) (4.03) 
7 31 17.10 12.22 0.07 0.95 -4.57 0.18 0.20 0.973 
(-1-82) (10.55) (5.10) 
8 31.1 17.18 12.32 0.06 0.95 -5.67 0.14 0.08 0.978 
(-1.70) (8.16) (5.01) 
9 30.7 16.16 12.10 -0.12 0.96 -4.56 0.09 0.05 0.976 
(-3.12) (4.68) (1.79) 
Low 31.2 17.01 11.88 -0.08 0.94 -6.38 0.04 0.02 0.973 
(-1.34) (1-58) (0.57) 
We rank unit trusts samples each year based on their three-factor SMB ехрозще over the prior toee-
year period. I f a unit trust starts wiithin the toee year period, it is included i f it has at least 30 months of 
returns. We form ten portfolios based on these rankings with the same number of unit trusts in each 
portfolio. Ten portfolios are held for one year and then reformed each year. A monthly total return 
series is estimated for each portfolio by calculating each month the average post tax-return of live and 
dead unit trusts. 
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In order to compare and evaluate the ten SMB portfolios, we used the three 
factor F-F model. The results are shown in Table 3-7B and a comparison of results 
with a single factor с АРМ are shown in Table 3-7 A. The degree of SMB exposure of 
these portfolios is in exactly the same order as the pre-formation ordering. The 
portfolio of the unit trusts with the highest prior three year SMB exposure produces 
the highest post-formation SMB exposure of 0.95 and the portfolio of the unit trasts 
produces the lowest post-formation SMB exposure of 0.03. The relative exposure to 
SMB over the three year period was a strong predictor of relative exposure in the 
following year and there is a widespread of SMB exposure among the unit trasts. The 
Fama-French (F-F) factor of excess retoms (alphas) of these portfolios shows us how 
well they perform (value) and the risks they assume but the small company portfolio 
have excess reณms ( alpha) that are reliably negative. 
A similar analysis is done to see how the 'value' managers perform. We 
ranked all the unit trusts for each year based on their HML exposure over the prior 
three year period and then we formed ten portfolios in exactly the same way as we did 
for the SMB ranking. Hence the top HML portfolios contained the unit trusts with the 
highest HML exposure over the preceding three year period and the lowest HML 
portfolio wil l always contain the unit trusts with the lowest HML exposure over the 
preceding three year period. The results are shown in Tables 3-8A and 3-8B. The 
Fama-French three factor model results show that there is some persistence in the 
relative exposure to HML in these portfolios but it is weak with a spread of only 0.22 
between the highest and lowest HML portfolios. This suggests that there are few UK 
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Table 3-8A: Portfolio of Unit Trust ( live and dead) from 1986 to 2001 based on 
prior three-years three factor model H M L loading in с АРМ single factor 
Regression 
( Regressions, based on monthly returns) 
HML Average Annual Stand. α β t(ß-l) Adj. 
decile number 
of Trusts 
Comp­
ounded 
Retran 
Devi. R 2 
High 30.7 17.16 12.44 0.00 
(0.03) 
0.84 -7.41 0.871 
2 31 17.17 12.49 -0.03 
(-0.28) 
0.87 -7.31 0.911 
3 31 16.89 12.38 -0.06 
(-0.79) 
0.88 -7.12 0.923 
4 30.7 16.99 12.28 -0.05 
(-0.56) 
0.89 -7.28 0.932 
31.1 16.92 12.36 -0.06 
(-0.88) 
0.89 -8.29 0.934 
6 31.1 17.03 12.06 -0.04 
(-0.45) 
0.88 -7.82 0.923 
7 31.2 16.33 11.66 -0.08 
(-1-32) 
0.90 -6.85 0.931 
8 31.2 16.08 12.01 0.90 -6.32 0.921 
9 30.5 15.89 12.11 薩 
4·!^ 
0.88 -6.17 0.889 
Low 31 15.99 12.67 -0.05 
(-0.39) 
0.84 -6.48 0.833 
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Table 3-8В: Portfolio of Unit Trust ( live and dead) from 1986 to 2001 based on 
prior three-years three factor model H M L loading in F-F three factor Regression 
(Regressions are based on monthly returns) 
HML 
decile 
Average 
Number 
of Trusts 
Annual 
Comp­
ounded 
Retrun 
Stand. 
Devi. 
α β t(ß-l) SMB HML Adj. 
High 30.7 17.16 12.44 -0.07 0.92 -5.53 0.39 0.22 0.949 
(-1.24) (17.44) (7.11) 
2 31 17.17 12.49 -0.07 0.93 -5.06 0.31 0.15 0.955 
(-1-28) (13.54) (5.59) 
3 31 16.89 12.38 -0.13 0.94 -5.01 0.32 0.14 0.961 
(-2.41) (17.05) (6.11) 
4 30.7 16.99 12.28 -0.08 0.95 -5.11 0.29 0.10 0.963 
(-1.89) (15.62) (4.41) 
5 31.1 16.92 12.36 -0.09 0.94 -6.12 0.25 0.07 0.971 
(-2.10) (14.45) (3.39) 
6 31.1 17.03 12.06 -0.08 0.95 -5.89 0.36 0.04 0.978 
(-1.77) (21.55) (1.66) 
7 31.2 16.33 11.66 -0.12 0.96 -4.46 0.32 0.03 0.969 
(-2.91) (18.12) (2.21) 
8 31.2 16.08 12.01 -0.13 0.97 -3.15 0.37 0.00 0.963 
(-2.92) (19.31) (-0.18) 
9 30.5 15.89 12.11 -0.13 0.97 -2.89 0.44 -0.04 0.961 
(-2.81) (23.12) (-1.11) 
Low 31 15.99 12.67 -0.11 0.96 -3.83 0.59 0.00 0.959 
(-1.72) (26.66) (-0.06) 
Each year we rank our sanชุ)le of all unit trusts based on three-factor HML exposure over the prior 
three-year period. 
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unit trusts that have a consistently high exposure to value stocks or a consistently high 
exposure to growth stocks. 
According to the Tables 3-7B and 3-8B, there is some inadvertent connection 
between the unconditional shorts on SMB and HML. The highest and lowest SMB 
portfolios have the lowest HMLs and the highest and lowest HML portfolios have the 
highest SMBs. In order to control for the interaction effects, we performed a joint 
sort. Starting with each year, we sorted the unit trusts on their prior three year SMB 
exposure into three equal groups. Within each SMB group, we sorted them on their 
HML exposure into three sub-groups by creating nine SMB/HML portfolios. We 
calculated the returns for these portfolios in the same way as before by reforming 
portfolios each year. The result of such analysis is been shown in Tables 3-9A and 3-
9B. The portfolios in each SMB group in Tables 3-9A and 3-9B aknost have the 
same SMB exposure. Within each SMB group, the spread in HML exposure is almost 
similar but about 66% of what it was in the unconditional HML sort. As per the 
evidence, there is a bit of a performance pattern in that the small-company unit trusts 
have significantly negative alphas in all three HML subgroups. I f there are inefficient 
small-company UK stocks, the unit trust managers, according to our results, do not 
exploit them. In the remaining two SMB groups, three of six alphas are reliably 
negative. In his รณdy, Davis (1999) performs a similar analysis of us mutual funds 
and finds that there is no evidence of оиїефегГогтапсе in any style or sector-wise 
group of тиШаІ funds. 
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ТаЫеЗ- 9А: Portfolio of Unit Trust ( live and dead) from 1986 to 2001 based on 
prior three-years three factor model SMB and H M L loading in CAPM single 
factor 
( Regressions, based on monthly returns) 
SMB HML Average Annual 
tritile tritile number Comp-
o f Trusts ounded 
Retrun 
Stand, α 
Devi. 
β t(ß-l) Adj. 
High 
Med 
High 
Med 
Low 
High 
Med 
Low High 
Med 
Low 
34.2 
34.5 
34.4 
34.5 
34.4 
Low 34.4 
34.6 
34.4 
35.5 
15.95 
15.36 
15.99 
17.12 
18.10 
16.35 
17.45 
16.89 
16.20 
14.11 
13.63 
14.01 
12.95 
11.80 
11.96 
12.33 
11.89 
12.01 
-0.07 
(-0.54) 
-0.10 
(-0.81) 
-0.05 
(-0.37) 
-0.04 
(-0.36) 
0.05 
(0.66) 
-0.08 
(-1.23) 
-0.02 
(-0.25) 
-0.06 
(-1.62) 
-0.13 
(-2-73) 
0.83 -6.53 0.791 
0.83 -6.60 0.795 
0.83 -5.91 0.753 
0.89 -7.26 0.927 
0.88 -8.23 0.944 
0.92 -6.13 0.941 
0.92 -7.87 0.950 
0.95 -7.33 0.970 
0.96 -5.83 0.969 
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Table 3-9В: Portfolio of Unit Trust ( live and dead) from 1986 to 2001 based on 
prior three-years three factor model SMB and H M L loading in F-F three factor 
( Regressions, based on monthly returns) 
SMB 
tritile 
HML 
tritile 
Average 
number 
of Trusts 
Annual 
Comp­
ounded 
Retrun 
Stand. 
Deฬ. 
α β t(ß-l) SMB HML Adj. Б 
High High 34.2 15.95 14.11 -0.16 0.96 -3.68 0.68 0.20 0.949 
(-2.36)* (27.30) (3.56) 
Med 34.5 15.36 13.63 -0.19 0.96 -4.18 0.74 0.03 0.958 
(-3.39)*** (34.99) (0.84) 
Low 34.4 15.99 14.01 -0.14 0.98 -2.39 0.82 -0.03 0.951 
(-2.20)* (34.72) (-0.39) 
Med High 34.5 17.12 12.95 -0.08 0.95 -5.28 0.29 0.18 0.965 
T-t (12.88) (7.28) 
Med 34.4 18.10 11.80 0.00 0.94 -6.74 0.28 0.10 0.973 
(-0.03) (13.67) (4.83) 
Low 34.4 16.35 11.96 -0.14 0.97 -3.26 0.32 0.05 0.965 
(-2.45)* (14.11) (1.99) 
Low High 34.6 17.45 12.33 -0.06 0.93 -6.25 0.12 0.14 0.970 
(-1.06) (6.23) (5.62) 
Med 34.4 16.89 11.89 -0.08 0.95 -5.70 0.08 0.06 0.981 
(-2.15)* (4.38) (2.83) 
Low 35.5 16.20 12.01 -0.11 0.96 -4.28 0.08 0.00 0.978 
(-2.92)** (3.88) (-0.24) 
We rank all unit trusts each year based on their three-factor SMB exposure over the prior toee-years 
period. I f a unit trust starts within the three-years period, it is included i f it has at least 30 months of 
return. Based on these rankings, we form three groups with the same number of unit trasts in each 
group. Within each group we rank all unit trusts according to their HML exposure over the same three-
years period and then form three HML based portfolios with each containing the same number of unit 
trusts. This produces nine SMB/HML portfolios. We hold them for one year and then repeat the 
formation process. A monthly total return series is estimated for each portfolio by calculating each 
month the average return of the live and dead unit trusts. 
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3.5-3 Performance Persistence 
In respect of analysis of performance persistence, the raw return may be observed. 
We formed ten portfolios of unit trasts each year based on the rank of their total 
retums over the previous year. The results are shown in Tables 3-1 OA and 3-lOB. It 
seems that there is a market persistence in retums over a one year period. The spread 
in annual performance between the best and worst one year return portfolios is 3.52%. 
These results might suggest a market failure and thus an easy beat-the-market 
strategy. However, this result happens for the following two causes; 
(1) The ณmover from the strategy is over 80% per year. The average bid/ offer 
spread is 5%. Therefore together these two would wipe out all gains even i f 
the pattern in Tables 3-1 OA and 3-1 OB repeats itself perfectly. 
(2) The F-F three factor alphas of the top two portfolios, while positive, are not 
statistically significant. The toee-factor regressions distinguish between 
performance due to market, size and also risk factors and that due to the 
manager'ร ability to generate retums above those, he or she wil l get for simple 
risk bearing. The reüims that result from risk bearing are in principle 
available from structured or index-like portfolios. The F-F three factor alphas 
imply that even the best of the funds did not earn retums above three kinds of 
strategies. In contrast, the negative alphas of the bottom four portfolios are all 
significant at the 5% level. 
This results of the study are similar to results of the รณdies of the samples of us 
тиШаІ funds done by Carhart (1997) and Malkiel (1995), which show that poor 
performance persists but good performance does not. 
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Table 3-1 OA: Portfolio of Unit Trust ( live and dead) from 1986 to 2001 based on 
prior one-year return single factor с АРМ Model 
( Regressions, on monthly returns) 
PRIYR Average Turn-
decile number over 
of Trasts 
Annual Stand. 
Comp- Devi, 
ounded 
Retran 
α β t(ß-l) Adj. 
R2 
High 
2 
З 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Low 
35.5 
35.4 
35.8 
35.4 
35.3 
35.3 
34.8 
35.1 
35.7 
34.4 
82.5 
88.0 
87.6 
87.6 
87.1 
90.5 
88.1 
89.2 
89.1 
82.6 
18.56 11.54 
18.05 
17.52 
17.51 
17.62 
17.61 
17.78 
17.49 
15.29 
15.04 
11.46 
11.51 
11.53 
11.51 
11.53 
11.90 
12.55 
12.52 
14.91 
0.09 
(0.59) 
0.05 
(0.42) 
-0.02 
(-0.12) 
-0.03 
(-0.26) 
-0.02 
(-0.16) 
-0.02 
(-0.17) 
-0.08 
(-0.99) 
-0.09 
(-0.97) 
-0.18 
(-1·59) 
-0.19 
(-1-32) 
0.91 
0.88 
0.90 
0.91 
0.91 
0.92 
0.89 
0.89 
0.89 
0.88 
-3.73 
-5.92 
-6.22 
-6.05 
-5.83 
-6.15 
-5.38 
-6.31 
-5.42 
-4.72 
0.835 
0.892 
0.932 
0.938 
0.937 
0.936 
0.933 
0.931 
0.895 
0.865 
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Table 3-1 OB: Portfolio of Unit Trust ( live and dead) from 1986 to 2001 based on 
prior one-year return three factor F-F Model 
( Regressions based on monthly returns) 
PRIYR 
decile 
Average 
number 
of Trusts 
Turn­
over 
Annual 
Comp­
ounded 
Retrun 
Stand. 
Devi. 
α β t(ß-l) SMB HML Adj. Б 
High 35.5 82.5 18.56 11.54 0.08 0.99 -0.71 0.59 -0.03 0.945 
(0.86) (20.05) (-0.56) 
2 35.4 88.0 18.05 11.46 0.03 0.94 -9.41 0.46 0.05 0.960 
(0.33) (18.55) (1.47) 
3 35.8 87.6 17.52 11.51 -0.05 0.95 -4.95 0.33 0.08 0.972 
(-0.77) (16.37) (3.19) 
4 35.4 87.6 17.51 11.53 -0.06 0.95 -4.61 0.29 0.07 0.974 
(-0.94) (14.99) (2.91) 
5 35,3 87.1 17.62 11.51 -0.06 0.95 -4.55 0.27 0.12 0.972 
(-0.95) (13.87) (4.91) 
6 35.3 90.5 17.61 11.53 -0.06 0.94 -4.97 0.27 0.12 0.971 
(-0.98) (12.99) (4.65) 
7 34.8 88.1 17.78 11.90 -0.13 0.96 -3.76 0.30 0.11 0.974 
(-2.29) (15.88) (4.81) 
8 35.1 89.2 17.49 12.55 -0.14 0.94 -5.02 0.34 0.09 0.965 
(-2.05) (14.87) (3.14) 
9 35.7 89.1 15.29 12.52 -0.19 0.95 -3.67 0.45 0.04 0.954 
(-2.77) (16.41) (0.95) 
Low 34.4 82.6 15.04 14.91 -0.21 0.96 -2.39 0.55 0.07 0.940 
(-2·58) (17.80) (1.78) 
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We examine persistence in risk-adjusted performance. As in earlier processes, we 
sorted the unit trasts on three year Fama-French (F-F) three factor alphas (PR3YA), 
then formed portfolios and computed reณms over the next 12 months. The process 
was then repeated each December. The three year period was from 1983 to 1985 and 
therefore, the monthly time series ran from 1986 to 2001. The results are shown in 
Tables 3-11A and 3-1 IB and similar to those in Tables 3-1 OA and 3-lOB which 
shows a clear persistence in both absolute and risk-adjusted retoms over a one year 
period. The spread in annual compounded retums between the top and bottom 
PR3YA portfolios is 2.97% and the spread in tføee-factor model alphas for these 
portfolios is 0.19% per month. Furthermore, as in Table 3-lOB, only the top two 
PR3YA portfolios have positive F-F three factor model alphas. The largest alpha for 
the highest prior alpha portfolio is only 5 basis points, 0.58 t-ratios, above zero. The 
other eight PR3YA portfolios have negative tfeee-factor alphas but among the three 
lowest portfolios, one is significant at 10% level and the remaining two are significant 
at a level of 5%. 
From the above results, we have some evidence of positive as well as negative 
persistence, both ОССШ in the high SMB group. There is not need to explain the 
negative persistence. In defence of market efficiency, the observed poor persistence, 
even i f it continues, is not exploitable. The bid/ offer spreads of the unit trusts are 
almost three times as large as the alphas in year one. Therefore, from a practical view 
point it is intriguing. One explanation may be that of Carhart (1997) who shows that 
the persistence of US тиШаІ funds occurs because of persistence in the underlying 
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Table 3-1 IA : Portfolio of Unit Trust ( live and dead) from 1986 to 2001 based on 
prior three-years return single factor с АРМ model alpha 
( Regressions, based on monthly returns) 
PR3YR Average Turn­ Annual Stand. α β t(ß-l) Adj. 
decile питЬет 
of Trasts 
over Comp­
ounded 
Retran 
Devi. R 2 
High 31.3 52 17.83 17.77 0.05 
(0.35) 
0.85 -5.52 0.835 
2 31.3 74 17.83 12.61 0.04 
(0.34) 
0.86 -7.11 0.910 
3 31.5 80 17.30 12.48 -0.03 
(-0.31) 
0.88 -6.31 0.932 
4 31.1 86 17.34 12.95 -0.05 
(-0.52) 
0.91 -5.25 0.949 
5 
30.0 86 17.46 12.66 -0.04 
(-0.38) 
0.91 -5.47 0.951 
6 31.2 84 17.72 12.95 
ᄉ
—
N
 
о 
d 
0.92 -5.82 0.951 
ᄀ 30.8 86 17.17 12.91 -0.05 
(-0.56) 
0.90 -5.43 0.940 
8 31.1 80 16.98 12.08 
р 
Ό
 
0.90 -5.38 0.931 
9 30.2 77 16.32 13.26 0.90 -4.75 0.913 
Low 30.3 53 14.86 13.84 -0.19 
(-1-58) 
0.88 -5.21 0.866 
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Table 3 - l lB : Portfolio of Unit Trust ( Uve and dead) from 1986 to 2001 based on 
prior three-years return three factor F-F model alpha 
( Regressions based on monthly returns) 
PR3YR 
decile 
Average 
number 
o f 
Trusts 
Turn­
over 
Annual 
Comp­
ounded 
Retrun 
Stand. 
Devi. 
α β t (ß- l ) SMB H M L Ad j . E 
High 31.3 52 17.83 17.77 0.05 0.96 -4.04 0.63 -0.04 0.966 
(0.58) (26.92) (-0.95) 
2 31.3 74 17.83 12.61 0.02 0.94 -6.56 0.42 0.03 0.974 
(0.21) (20.92) (1.05) 
3 31.5 80 17.30 12.48 -0.05 0.95 -5.07 0.34 0.07 0.975 
(-1-03) (16.84) (2.75) 
4 31.1 86 17.34 12.95 -0.08 0.96 -3.56 0.29 0.08 0.979 
(-1.42) (15.45) (3.48) 
5 30.0 86 17.46 12.66 ֊0.06 0.96 -3.78 0.28 0.06 0.981 
(-1.14) (15.98) (2-58) 
6 31.2 84 17.72 12.95 -0.05 0.96 -4.42 0.27 0.07 0.980 
(-0.84) (15.10) (3.66) 
7 30.8 86 17.17 12.91 -0.09 0.96 -3.78 0.31 0.08 0.974 
(-1.52) (14.22) (3.84) 
8 31.1 80 16.98 12.08 -0.11 0.96 -3.89 0.34 0.13 0.976 
(-!•97) (16.77) (5.22) 
9 30.2 77 16.32 13.26 -0.15 0.96 -2.80 0.36 0.10 0.966 
(-2.27) (16.11) (3.36) 
Low 30.3 53 14.86 13.84 -0.24 0.96 -3.51 0.52 0.11 0.961 
(-3.52) (20.48) (3.42) 
We rank all unit trusts of our sample each year based on their tiiree-factor alpha over the prior three-
year period. 
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stocks they buy. He also finds that when managers try to exploit this persistence 
effect by buying the previous year'ร winner stocks, they fail to generate higher 
absolute retums than managers who do not. Further research is needed to determine 
whether this explanation applies to UK unit trusts. 
3.6 Summary and Conclusion 
This empirical chapter has focused on the perfonnance evaluation of UK equity 
unit trasts to test; (1) that the managers of the unit trasts can out perform the market; 
(2) that the small stocks of unit trasts are less efficient than those of large stocks of 
unit trasts and (3) that the performance persistence of the UK equity unit trasts. Our 
sample consists of the Micropal database, covering monthly data from 1986 to 2001, 
which largely controlled for survivorship bias. The number of unit trusts is reported 
in this chapter on the live funds, live and dead funds and the whole sample whilst the 
spread of the survivorship bias was argued based on the gross геШтร of the funds. 
The examination of the UK unit trusts' performance reported that UK fund managers 
are unable to outperform once we have taken into account their exposure to market, 
value and risk. This study is analogous to most studies of us fund managers. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the notion that small company shares offer abundant 'beat 
the market' opportunism, we find that small company unit trasts are the worst 
performers.In this study, we employed the Fama-French three factor model to study 
the behaviour of the UK markets. For the UK market, the F-F three factor model has 
better explanatory power than the single factor с АРМ model, especially for the unit 
trasts that invest heavily in small companies. In respect of performance persistence, 
in our study we find only poor persistence performance. As others found for us 
тиШаІ ftinds, we found the same for those in the UK. 
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Chapter 4 
Performance Evaluation of Ethical Unit Trusts 
Part-l 
On the Perspective of the Ethical Funds in the UK: A Tool For 
Promoting Ethics in Finance 
4.1 Introduction: Conceptual Framework of Ethics, Business and Financial 
Ethics 
. ..ethical elements enter in some measme into every contract and without them, no market could 
fiinction. There is an element of trast in every transaction It is not adequate to argue that there are 
enforcement mechanisms, such as police and the coxirtร; these are themselves services bought and sold 
and it has to be asked why they wil l in fact do what they have contracted to do ( Arrow, 1973) 
The concepts of ethics are represented by the words 'good' and Ought' 
(Harvey, 1994). With 'good,' a distinction can be made between good as a means and 
good as an end. It is people who impose a standard upon nature and who in this way 
introduce morals into the natural world, in spite of the fact that people themselves are 
part of this world (Popper, 1966). It is known that most writing on ethics concentrates 
on the issues confronting the individual and then on the organisation of society. In Ά 
Short History of Ethics", Maclntyre (1966) states that ethics is essentially concerned 
with the distinction between what it is expedient for an individual to do and what it 
would be morally right to do. This distinction is illustrated with examples from 
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Ancient Greece by contrasting the pragmatic concept of 'good' in the simple tribal 
siณation (described by Homer, where it reflects the pragmatic behaviour expected of a 
tribal chief) and the abstract concept of 'the good' as an ideal removed from human 
contact as explained, albeit differently, by Plato and Aristotle^'. 
In "The Open Society and it Enemies", Popper (1966) states that so called 
Open society' is contrasted with the 'tribal society' where the conduct of human 
beings is circumscribed by superstition and a belief in magic. In the present world an 
open society recognises the difference between паШге and convention and accepts that 
laws governing society, mlike natural laws, are made by humans. The conventional 
laws are based on moral decisions that reflect the reaction of individuals or 
governments to facts, whether of the natural world or of social life. Most of the 
reactions are generally reflected in religious beliefs^^. It is observed that in our 
society, the way in which our lives are directed forms a part of the prescription made 
by religion. Maclntyre (1966) states that the adaptability of the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition can be found in many different forms of societies and govemment.^^ One can 
also identify aspects of this in the Islamic code of ethics, for example: "be honest and 
truthful, keep your word, do not lead a life of extravagance, use mutual consultation in 
business affairs, do not deal in fraud, do not bribe or deal justly."(Beckun,1996, page 
32). 
շւ This arguments drawn from the excellent reviewed by Robert Taylor "Putting Ethics into 
Investment," Business Ethics: A European Review, Vol. 10, Issue 1, 2001, pp.53 
22 Reference of Propper(1996) discussion were drawn from Robert Taylor ร "Putting Ethics into 
Investment," Business Ethics: A European Review, Vol. 10, Issue 1, 2001, pp.54 
2 3 Maclntyre, A (1966), "A Short History of Ethics," C h 9 , P l l l , London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
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Deontological theories emphasise the goals that motivate human actions. Kant 
(1785) states that the good deeds are all that matters and one's action should be 
judged by the underlying intentions. He further states that a person's intentions are 
probably unknown to an external observer. The predominance of these maxims 
suggests that individuals should follow duty based universal rules like the Golden 
Rules: 'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you' (Kant, 1785; p. 29). 
The virtue of ethics places much emphasis on character; it acknowledges that 
outcomes and actions cannot be dissociated from the actor. As argued by Aristotle in 
his 'Nicomanchean Ethics' (Jonathan, 199\ք՛^, virtuous people can take only good 
actions, so ethics is primarily about defining virtues. Virtue is that trait of character 
that allows the person to provide the appropriate response in a given context. In the 
Ancient Greek context, Aristotle listed some 12 virtues, including courage, 
temperance, right ambition, and modesty (Jonathan, 1991). The most important of 
these, high-mindedness, can be understood as a kind of self-respect. Philosophers' 
interest in Aristotle's view on ethics is rather recent, and spherical credit should be 
assigned to the work of Anscombe (1958), who points out that the quest of both 
utilitarian and deontological theorists for universal rules of action might be void, since 
no rule can be consistent with the huge variety of real life siณations. Several scholars 
argue that virtue ethics might provide the most suitable channel for anglicising ethical 
issues pertaining to business situations, as it is able to strike a subtle balance between 
determinism and human character (Solomon, 1992; Koehn 1995, Мифһу, 1999). 
2 4 Aristotle(1991) in B. Jonathan(ed), 'Nicomanchean Ethics', New York: Pantheon. 
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Dobson (1993) remarked, "ethics is concerned with the motivations for human 
behaviour. It is a fundamental motivation and cannot be diluted into a constraint on 
achieving some other objective. Whether or not a given individual is ethical cannot be 
determined by observing his/her actions, but only by observing his/her motivations for 
those actions. An individual who acts in a trastworthy manner but does so because 
this action supports an underlying objective of material gain is not an ethical 
individual."(p.57). 
The structure of society changed in modem times but ethical concqjts and 
categories have not changed. Many ethical concepts are still based on the conditions 
of the zero-sum games of the pre-modems. Most conceptions of ethics still require us 
to be moderate, to share, to redistribute, to sacrifice. This is evidenced in the call for 
altruism, for the priority of common good and the like. The pursuit of self-interest and 
individual advantages is often seen as something akin to an evil drive that needs to be 
termed. Human beings are weak and cannot tame themselves because of the demands 
of the competitive market. Thus the state is regarded as the right institution to enforce 
morality by taming the market. 
Furthermore, Dobson (1993) discusses elaborately about the role of ethics in the 
financial community. He states that contemporary financial economists observed 
"ethics" in the context of the objective of 'wealth minimisation' which means an 
investor would get less return i f they follow the ethical values in their investment 
objectives. In this matter, some economists fiirther think that ethics function primarily 
as a constraint on behaviour. But this view is both illogical and ambiguous. It is 
illogical because it may actually sanction unethical behaviour i f such behaviour can 
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be shown to lead to material gain. It is ambiguous because throughout the history of 
moral philosophy ethics has generally been viewed as a behavioural motivation, not as 
a constraint. I f a conception of ethics as the fimdamental objective in all human 
endeavours is disseminated in the financial community, there is real hope that ethics 
wil l be accepted as both logically consistent and desirable. 
Mitchell, Puxty and Sikka (1994) consider that ethical statements have 
actually acted to protect the accounting professions from sustained scrutiny. Far from 
providing a substantial and robust method of realising the ideals of indqjendence and 
integrity, the ethical aspects are little more than a smokescreen from the pursuit and 
protection of sectional interests. Consistently, Neimark (1995) suggests that the 
periodic identification and punishment of individuals and businesses whose actions 
have edged past the boundaries of acceptable business conduct, acณally allows the 
official discourse of business ethics to reassure that the system is working and that 
honesty balances rapaciously. 
Concerning the ethical fimction to co-ordinate and achieve the co-operation of 
corporate members, Neimark (1995) argues that the official discourse of business 
ethics by business executives and political leaders is invariably aimed at representing 
a positive affirmation of the processes of the system, rather than any genuine criticism 
of its activities. Neimark (1995) says, "It is a distraction and a means of defeating the 
cynicism and dissonance created by the growing tension between capitalism'ร growth 
and the broader visions we have for society"(p.82). In this way, the ethics of the 
system are never challenged. Loveli (1995) agrees with this sentiment and argues 
further that while ethical, codes are part of the moral atmosphere, in many respects 
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they are also a defensive strategy, necessary to assuage public fears. Thus, the official 
discourse acts to deflect attention from the culpability of capitalism itself and to 
deflect attention from contradictions and tensions. It would otherwise translate into 
social conflict and change by reducing the matter of business ethics to cases of 
individual comiption. The morality in this way portrayed is that honesty actually 
works. 
The main aim of this study is to focus on the importance of the establishment 
of the UK ethical funds in general and the UK ethical unit trusts in particular, to 
analyse the criteria of choosing stocks and reflecting on the decisions of both 
investors and fund managers. The layout of Part - I of this study is as follows: 
In section 4.2-1, we wil l give a brief historical background of the ethical 
investment together with the antecedents to the ethical investment and issues of 
ethical funds. Section 4.2-2, discuses the growth of the UK ethical fimds. Section 4.2-
3 examines the investor'ร attitude to ethically sensitive issues. Section 4.2-4 discusses 
the active engagement of investors and focuses on the dimensions of investor 
behaviour. Section 4.2-5 discusses the investor'ร moral responsibility based on the 
traditional theory of responsibility within the framework of co-operation. This is 
followed by an overview of the solutions offered by the ethical funds and main 
problems that arise in promoting and managing the ethical fiinds. 
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4.2 Historical Background of Ethical Investment 
4.2-1 Ethical Investment- A Brief History 
Some philanthropic and reforming capitalists in the 19th century, mostly 
influenced by their religious beliefs, wanted to ensure that the people and employees 
of the compani es had better working conditions, good accommodation and education 
(Taylor, 2001). The roots of ethical investing or socially responsible investing (SRI) 
can be traced to the Quakers during the seventeenth century. Among their values was 
a refusal to profit from war or slave trading (Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini, 1993). 
The Quakers avoided involvement in slave sales and weapons for reasons of faith 
convictions. Until the 1960ร, the heart of ethical investing continued to avoid 
companies viewed to be engaging in irresponsible behaviors. The intentional 
exclusion or screening of company stocks remains one of the foremost practices in the 
ethical investing movement at present time. Then, in 1970, in one of the most widely 
discussed articles in the social responsibility literature, Milton Friedman (1970) 
presented the argument that the only ethical responsibility of a business is to increase 
profits for shareholders. This position has been a lightening rod for much of the 
debate regarding not only the role but also the very definition of an ethical company. 
Friedman's position stands in stark contrast to that of industrialist Mohn (1996), who 
writes, "management's objectives are no longer confined to maximizing profits, but 
wi l l aim at optimal efficiency in the interest of society" (p. xiv). 
Complementing Mohn'ร statement on the need for companies to be responsible 
to society is the growing belief that individual investors seek the same balance. While 
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the corporation seeks a double bottom line of profitability and social change, the 
investor seeks financial retums and a social dividend. Domini (1997) writes that the 
advocates of the socially responsible investor (SRI) or ethical investor see it as a 
"means of reUiming corporations to their original purpose whereby financial markets 
serve economic needs" (p. 19). Furthermore, Adamson (1997) says that "The return of 
our investments is much and much more than a total sum of dollars. It is an 
expression of our character and integrity" (p. 1). 
Over the past 30 years, almost all research measuring the financial effects of 
the avoidance/divestment facet of ethical investment has used five traditional social 
screens: alcohol, tobacco, gambling, military, and nuclear power. In the 1990ร, we 
observe the emergence of a new set of more conservative concerns about companies 
profiting from abortion/contraceptives, pornography, and offensive entertainment of a 
gratuitous sexual or violent паШге. The year 1991 is notable for Pope John Paul n's 
renewal of emphasis on social and economic issues in Centesimus Annus, preceding 
his encyclical on abortion/contraceptives and pornography titled Evangelium Vitae 
(SIF, 1991). The Social Investment Forum'ร(1997) "Trends Report" notes that half of 
all ethically screened assets avoid investments in abortion/contraceptives companies. 
A case รณdy on Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) in 1997 which speaks out 
against social injustices like poverty and conservatively disapproves of abortion and 
contraceptives(SRI, 1997). As the richest not-for-profit organization in the world, the 
Roman Catholic Church also has the opportunity to exercise these principles in 
managing funds of Catholic foundations, universities, pension and insurance groups, 
hospitals, archdioceses, and its affiliated charitable organizations. 
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Issues like the environment, civil rights and nuclear energy served to increase 
the social awareness of investors. Accordingly, muณal fiinds/unit trusts were set up 
which met the demand for incoφorating ethical criteria in the investment process. 
This led to a dramatic increase in ethically managed unit trust/mutoal fiind assets, an 
industry which now represents $153 billion in the United States and approximately 
£1.3 billion million in UK as at the end of 2002 (Unit Trust Yearbook, 2003). In the 
case of US, i f it includes all us private and instiณtional ethically screened portfolios, 
then this number tops the $ 2 trillion mark at the end of 2000 (Trend Reports: Social 
bivestment Forum, 2001). 
(1) Ethical Issues 
The dominant characteristics of the ethical investors highlight the controversial nature 
of the field. Therefore, the etMcal or socially responsible investors (SRI,1995); 
1. Believe that the private sector is a critical vehicle for accomplishing social 
objectives through positive or negative reinforcement; 
2. Are advocates for social change; and 
3. Are willing to put their money where their heart is, but still demand no less of 
a financial return (or not significantly less) than they might get with traditional 
investment vehicles. 
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The first characteristic highlights the critical marketplace factor of need. Is the 
ethical or SRI a product in search of a market? The evidence seems to clearly say that 
ethical investment taps into a significant segment of the investor market. One of the 
early criticisms of ethical investment was that it was a one-horse operation—South 
Africa. When apartheid was ended in 1993, it was predicted socially responsible 
investment (SRI) would disappear. It has not. Research conducted by the Social 
Investment Forum finds that 78% of private money managers continued some form of 
SRI after apartheid was dismantled ( SRI, 1995). 
The second characteristic speaks to the issue of credibility. Although ethical 
concerns continue to grow in terms of both level and intensity, the question remains 
whether the screening criteria and the methodology used to evaluate businesses are 
reliable and valid. 
The issues around the development and application of ethical screens are 
substantial. First is the question of the categories themselves, and whether they are the 
'right' ones to define an ethically responsible company. It is true that defining ethical 
responsibility is too ambiguous. Nuclear power or gambling may be perceived as 
wrong by some, but ethically responsible by others. In other words, categories are too 
subjective (Vrana, 1997). Entine (1996) makes the case that screens are really a mere 
reflection of the ethical values of a particular group than measures of responsible or 
ethical behavior. Thus the focus should shift away from ideological issues like animal 
testing and embrace more fundamental issues ,such as job creation, benefits, or safety. 
The second issue is the measurement criterion. For example, exclusionary screens 
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might seem clear cut and easy to apply. I f companies that manufactoe cigarettes are 
to be excluded from an investment portfolio then it would seem easy enough to 
exclude Philip Morris. But what about compani es that supply Philip Morris with 
components such as paper? Maybe those companies have stellar records as socially 
responsible companies. 
Clearly the judgment requires a more complex answer than a simple yes or no. 
Entine (1995) raises the issues of military weapons production and animal testing as 
examples of this complexity. Can military production always be unethical, given 
events such as World War I I and the Holocaust or the more recent conflict with 
Afghanistan? His contention is that rather than the simplistic yes/no screen, the more 
credible approach is one that evaluates the kind and type of military activity and its 
relationship to the reality of hope for peace. 
Testing of Animal raises a different question. The question here is whether the 
right compani es end up being included in the set of ethical investment alternatives. 
Entine (1996) contends that companies like P&G or Gillette may be more worthy than 
companies like the Body Shop or Aveda. While the former companies do animal 
testing, they invest in extensive research laboratories and have pioneered alternatives 
to animal testing. The Body shop or Aveda promote anti-testing values and reportedly 
using animal-tested ingredients in their products but invest nothing in research to find 
altematives(Vrana, 1997). 
114 
The credibility issue is neither likely to go away, nor it should be. It is accepted 
that ethically responsible by definition is not value-neutral. Additionally, the decision 
process necessitates subjective judgments and personal choice regarding the level of 
social change one wishes to express. In an industry with these characteristics, 
dialogue, debate, and even conflict should be encouraged as a way to continually 
clarify the values and direction of the movement (Griffin and Mahon, 1997). 
The third characteristic, the viability of ethical investment, has produced 
considerable debate .Performance has been hotly contested, researched, and analysed. 
The basic question since ethical investment began is whether financial sacrifices have 
to be accepted when one engages in ethical or socially responsible investment (SRI). 
It appears the answer is no. Over more than twenty years, it has been observed in the 
nvimerous รณdies on financial performance (Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini, 1992; 
Guerard, 1997; and Griffin and Mahon, 1997). 
Another researcher Young (1996) reports that the Domini 400 Social Index 
outperformed the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index for the second year in a row. In 
fact, since the Domini 400 was launched in 1990, it has returned 191.3% compared to 
171.4% for the s&p 500. Overall, eleven of the forty-four ethical or socially 
responsible mutual funds returned more than 20% in 1996. In looking at a longer-term 
time frame, Guerard (1997) finds that average monthly retums of unscreened and 
screened portfolios in 1987-1994 were not significantly different. Kurtz and 
DiBartolomeo (1996) conclude that social screens neither help nor hurt performance. 
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The past record of ethical investment indicates its staying power as a concept. 
Its growth curve and research on relative performance suggest a viable product 
meeting a need in the investor market place. It should be expected that, like any 
product, there wil l be a continued evolution with regard to developmental 
enhancements. Part of this developmental need is to improve on the traditional 
investment characteristics. Ethical investment funds stand at the interface among the 
above mentioned factors on the one hand and business on the other hand. This is 
especially important because the role of business could be crucial in dealing with 
issues which are central to the concerns of many ethical funds. 
(2) Entering the Ethical Investment Mainstream 
The first UK ethical unit trust started in 1984, with the launch of the Friends 
Provident Stewardship Fund (EIRIS, 1993). In the year 1985, it was estimated that the 
ethical investment market in the UK would reach a maximum size of around £2 
million. Yet by the end of 2002 it had grown in value to reach some £3.9 billion - and 
the growth shows no signs of slowing^^. 
The rise of ethical investment is closely linked to major changes in society in the 
last third of the century. It follows the growth of key social movements for the 
environment, human rights and animal rights. Major economic trends such as the 
increasing financial independence of women and young people, the growth of 
employment in the voluntary sector, the emerging power of multinationals and the 
massive increase in share ownership by unit trusts, pension funds and insurance 
companies have all helped to drive ethical investment forward. Taken together, these 
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make it a rapidly expanding movement with a powerful future. The combined UK 
membership of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth grew from 50,000 in 1981 to 
over 2 millions by 2000 (Shepherd, 2001). It is therefore not ՏԱՓՈՏ1Ո£ that ethical 
investment took off over this period and outpaced total investment in unit trusts and 
investment trasts. 
The Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS) had been set up in 1983 with the 
help of churches and charities which had investments and needed a research 
organisation to help them to put their principles in practice. Responding to increasing 
concern about environmental issues and sustainable development, "green" unit trasts 
arrived in 1988 with the launch of the Merlin Ecology Fmd (now the Jupiter Ecology 
Fund). For the first time ever, investors were able to put their money into companies 
in order to get benefit from the transition to a sustainable future. Other environmental 
ftmds soon followed (EIRIS, 1993). Many other vehicles for ethical or socially 
responsible investment started in this period. Triodos Bank (formerly Mercury 
Provident) was set up in 1974 to lend to projects with a social benefit. Seven years 
later, the Ecology Building Society began financing the purchase of properties with an 
ecological payback in 1981. The trade union-backed Unity Trust Bank arrived in 
1984, and ethical banking received an important boost in 1992 when the Co-operative 
Bank introduced its highly successful ethical policy (ЕШ8 , 1993). Specialist 
community development finance organisations such as bidustrial Common Ownership 
Finance began to seek "socially directed investments", offering a high social return 
with zero or low interest. By Autu腿 2000, 'Shared Interest', the most successftil 
such specialist, held nearly £20 million to finance fair trade ( Shepherd, 2001). 
25 Bes ides o the r references a c k n o w l e d g e d here, i t is a lso p o i n t e d that th is sub -sec t i on d raws o n the 
117 
The UK Social Investment Foram (SIF) was formed in 1991 to bring together key 
figures across the full range of ethical and socially responsible investment to co­
operate in sharing knowledge and advancing the agenda. Ultimately this helped to 
stimulate interest among pension ftmds, which now own more than a third of all UK 
Shares when back in 1963, they owned just 7% (EIRIS, 1993). Local Authority 
Pension Funds led the way in considering the social consequences of this type of 
investment. In the 1980, councils sought particularly to avoid investment in South 
Africa and some of them later began to invest small amounts in ethical investment 
funds. Following significant court cases in the same decade, the Goode Committee on 
'Pension Law Reform' highlighted the legality of ethical investment for pension 
funds^^. The committee's report declared that trastees are "perfectly entitled to have a 
policy on ethical investment and to pursue that policy, so long as they treat the 
interests of the beneficiaries as paramount and the investment policy is consistent with 
the standards of care and prudence required by law"(PACEC, 1998, p. 11). In 1997, a 
group of University lectiirers launched the Ethics for Universities Superannuation 
Scheme (EUSS) campaign for the ethical and environmental investment of their 
pension fund namely Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS). In 2000, uss 
announced its new policy on Sustainable and Responsible bivestment^''. 
Ethical investment received a further boost in 1998， when the then Pensions 
Minister of UK, John Denham announced that he was "minded to require trustees to 
disclose to what extent, i f any, they have taken account of social responsibility 
exce l len t r e v i e w b y Shephe rd (2001 ) . 
2 6 N o t t i n g h a m s h i r e C o u n t r y C o u n c i l and P u b l i c and Co rpo ra te E c o n o m i c Consu l tan ts ( P A C E C ) , 
Pens ion a n d E n v i r o m n e n t , 1998. 
27 Please see Penny Shepherd , " A H i s t o r y o f E t h i c a l I n v e s t m e n t " , ( U K Soc ia l I n v e s t m e n t F o r u m , 
2 0 0 1 ) , p p l - 2 
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considerations in their investment strategy" (Shepherd, 2001.p. 2). He won early 
support from the pension fund of the Sainsbury supermarket chain, which stated that it 
wanted to improve the environmental behaviour of companies. Since these proposals 
became law on 3 July 2000, all occupational pension funds have to consider formally 
whether or not to develop policies on social, ethical and environmental issues. A UK 
Social Investment Foram (SIF) survey published in October 2001 found that 59% of 
the largest pension funds, representing over £230 billion of assets, had іпсофогаЇе(і 
social responsibility issues into their investment strategies (SIF, 2001). 
Changing company behaviour by shareholder influence is likely to be a key 
future trend within ethical investment. One turning point was the resolution on social 
and environmental policy proposed at the 1997 AGM of Shell by corporate 
governance specialists, Pensions and bivestment Research Consultants and the 
church-based Ecumenical Council for Corporate Responsibility. Shareholders 
representing 17% of Shell's share capital withheld their support from the company on 
the resolution^^. Another example may be mentioned here, in 2001 the shareholder 
resolutions were tabled at the BP Amoco and Balfour Beatt AGMs in order to change 
the company'ร behaviour (Sparkes, 1994). 
4.2-2 Growth in the UK Ethical Funds 
The most visible sign of public interest in socially responsible investment 
(SRI) is probably the continuing strong growth in the number and size of socially 
responsible funds or ethical funds available to the public. This includes unit trusts, 
open-ended investment companies (OIECs) and related pension and insurance funds. 
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It was also observed that there was a rapid growth of ethical unit trasts in the first ten 
years of their life, following the launch of Friends Provident Stewardship in June 
1984^^. 
Sparkes (2000) argues that the universe of retail ethical funds was 
doubling in size every three years since it inception. Despite its larger size, the 
industry is still demonstrating the same extraordinary growth rate. As per Ethical 
investment Research bistitute (EIRIS)'s Annual Report 1999, during the year 1998-
1999; the SRI products were launched by many of the heavyweight names of the UK 
insurance industry: Legal & General; Norwich Union; Scottish Amicable; Sun Life, 
and Standard Life, etc (EIRIS, 1999). Many of these new fiinds are relatively new and 
may be expected to see significant growth over the coming years. Partial causes of the 
growth may be that the last twenty years has seen a steady erosion of public support 
for political parties and the established churches combined with continued growth in 
support for environmental and social campaigning groups such as Greenpeace, 
Friends of the Earth, and Amnesty International. Retail ethical fiinds offer a vehicle 
for supporters of such groups to ensure that their investments mirror the values that 
they feel are crucial (Sparkes, 2000). 
In the year 1985 the ethical unit trast size was £6.58 million in the UK. 
The EIRIS research (EIRIS, 2003) shows that the estimated value of ethical funds 
grew from £2600 million to £3900 million between December 1999 and December 
2002, and the number rose to 62. The growth of ethical funds in value are shown in 
28 M a r k M o o d y - S t u a r t , C h a i r m a n o f She l l T r a n s p o r t & T r a d i n g , F i n a n c i a l T i m e s Gu ides to 
Respons ib le Bus iness , 1998. 
2 9 Please see Russe l l Sparkes, " T h e R e w a r d s o f V i r t u e " , P ro fess iona l I nves to r . ( 1 9 9 4 ) , Ju l y issue 
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table 4.1. Table-4.2 shows the size of all groups of unit trasts from the year 1972 to 
2002 and size of ethical unit trusts from 1984 to 2002 in UK. However, the ethical 
investment in the UK has a long way to go to match the size of the market in the us, 
where the Social Investment Foram estimates that nearly one in eight dollars held 
with investment instiณtions are either in ethically screened portfolios, or subject to 
share voting policies which incorporate social responsibility criteria. This helps to 
predict that a growing number of people wi l l now be investing both for financial 
return and to promote positive change in the world through ethnical investment. 
Table 4.1 Ethical Funds (All Type of Ethical Funds) 
Year 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 
Total £m 321 728 1480 2600 3900 
Total Funds 30 41 45 60 62 
(Source: Professional Investor, June issue, 2000 and ERIS Annual Report 2002) 
According to the statistics published by Association of Unit Trusts and 
Investment Funds (AUTIF) and the Unit Trust & OEIC Yearbook 2002, the global 
bull market for equities peaked up early in 2001. Sheer momentum carried the UK 
investment funds industry toough to the end of 2001 and the year 2002 end peak 
£235,796 million and £206,700 million (tentatively) respectively for funds under 
management. The £260,700 million figure in 2002 represented growth of less than 3 
percent from the end 1999-level (Table 4.2). The period of exceptionally rapid 
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Table: 4.2 Total Fund Size of A l l Unit Trust Groups 
Year Total Fund Size of Al l 
Unit Trast Groups £m 
Total Fund size of Ethical 
Unit Trust out of the Al l 
Unit Trust Groups £m 
1972 2647 
1973 2060 
1974 1310.8 
1975 2512.4 
1976 2543.0 
1977 3461.3 
1978 3873.4 
1979 3936.7 
1980 4968.0 
1981 5902.4 
1982 7768.0 
1983 11689.4 
1984 15099.0 1.01 
1985 20307.0 6.58 
1986 32131.0 11 
1987 36330 11.3 
1988 41574 14.11 
1989 58159 17.04 
1990 46342 22.47 
1991 55145 37.11 
1992 63877 51.9 
1993 95518 41.54 
1994 92116 79.8 
1995 112894 81.5 
1996 131905 88.8 
1997 157583 97.23 
1998 182881 101.9 
1999 253713 106.81 
2000 260970 119.23 
2001 235796 1151.65 
2002 260700 1285.05 
(Sources: Un i t Trust Year Books & Ethics Investment Research Service, 2002) 
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7 years, appears to have ended. The retail sales in the year 2000 expanded new record 
levels, at £17.9 billion against £14.3 billion in 1999, and a mere £3.1bn in 1995. This 
sales flourish of the bull market in 2000 heavily reflected the success of the individual 
savings account (ISA). 
Although since the 1987 crash of the capital market, markets have tended to 
move sideways, at the start of 1991 with a poor set of short term figures for the entire 
unit trusts sector, the growth rate of ethical unit trust were upward from 3.4% to 18 % 
of the total ethical funds so far. The growth of ethical unit trasts shown downward in 
November 1993, following the official abandonment of apartheid (EIRIS, 1999). 
Figure 4.1 Size of A l l Unit Trust Vs Ethical Unit Trusts 
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In the UK as of 2002, there were more than 30 ethical unit trusts out of a total 
of 62 ethical fiinds (all types), valued over £12.8 billion which is the highest record 
growth in UK ethical unit trasts industry so far (Unit Trast Yearbook, 2003). Figure 
4.1 (graphs) shows the comparative performance between total size of all group unit 
trusts and total size of ethical unit trusts. 
4.2-3 Attitude Towards Ethical Investing 
Several รณdies have been conducted in the U.K. in an attempt to ascertain 
investors' attitudes toward ethically sensitive issues and some of them are given 
below: 
(1) NOP SгՄvey: In September 1997, the Ethical Investment Research Service 
(EIRIS), an independent organisation with the most comprehensive data base of 
corporate activity in the U.K., commissioned NOP Solutions to carry out a survey 
representative of all adults in Great Britain researching attitudes toward ethical 
investment (NOP Solution)^". Abnost two-thirds of respondents thought their 
"pension fimd should operate an ethical policy (p.12)."-^' Of these, more than a quarter 
advocated adopting an ethical policy "even i f it may reduce financial return." Fewer 
than one in five considered that their "pension scheme should concentrate on financial 
reณm and not take any ethical factors into account (NOP Solutions, 1998, p. 12)." In 
terms of negative or exclusionary factors, more than half of all respondents would 
object to a pension fund investing in companies that: 
է° Source: N O P So lu t i ons , 1998 
" " E t h i c a l P e n s i o n , " N O P So lu t i ons ( E t h i c a l I n v e s t m e n t & Research Serv i ce ) , 1998 
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Manufacณre weapons (57%). 
Test products on animals (57%). 
Break environmental regulations (54%). 
Make investments in countries with oppressive regimes (51%). 
Use ozone-depleting chemicals (50%). (NOP /EIRIS, 1998, p. 21) 
From a positive or inclusion perspective, more than half of the respondents preferred 
that their pension fund favour compani es with a good record on: 
Employment conditions (53%). 
Environmental issues (52%). 
Fewer than half of the respondents preferred favouring companies: 
with a good record on equal opportunities (46%). 
with a good record on customer care (43%). 
producing products meeting basic needs or solving important problems (38%). 
that support community projects (36%). 
that have good relations with their suppliers (24%). 
(NOP Solutions, 1998, p.24) 
While the NOP study is notable for pointing out general support for aligning 
ethical pre-dispositions with investment policy, it also finds broad differences 
between men and women; geographic areas; age groups; and income classes. 
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(2) Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS) Experience 
The EIRIS'ร client base includes instiณtional investors, charities, religious 
bodies, local authorities, and private investors. The EIRIS (Ethical Investment 
Research Service) has developed over thirty areas of ethical concern, each researched 
to a varying degree. Supporting the NOP survey (1998) results, military-related 
activities, animal testing, environmental impact, and involvement with oppressive 
regimes/exploitation of third world markets are significant concerns of EIRIS's 
clients. Tobacco productie๙retailing is screened for by 80% of clients, while it is 
identified as of concern to only 45% of the NOP respondents (EIRIS, 1998). 
volvement in the nuclear power industry, production of pornographic material, and 
gambling-related activities are screened for by at least half of EIRIS's clients, issues 
not surveyed by NOP. 
(3) Hart's รณdy: 
Hart, quoted in Smith (1996)32, surveyed several "ethical" unit trasts in the 
บ . К to ascertain the criteria he uses to determine which companies are included in or 
excluded from investment portfolios. The รณdy confirms the conviction that 
companies with poor environmental records; maintaining relations with repressive 
regimes; involved in weapons manufacณring; or engaged in animal experimentation/ 
exploitation should be excluded from investment portfolios. The top-ranking 
positive/inclusive criteria include environmental awareness and employees welfare. 
The Hart's study (Smith, 1996) finds higher support among unit trasts for the supply 
of beneficial products/services and community responsiveness than was apparent in 
the NOP or EIRIS studies. 
' Re fe rence o n H a r t ' s s t udy i n th is pa rag raph d r a w s o n the exce l l en t r e v i e w b y S m i t h ( 1 9 9 6 ) . 
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There is significant overlap between the บ.к and American concerns when we 
look at the Domini 400 Social Index^^. Perhaps the most notable difference between 
American and British concerns are in relation to animal rights; the DSI has no specific 
animal-testing screen. In the U.K., screening for some level of testing products on 
animals is perfonned for 80% of EIRIS'ร clients. Animal testing is the most 
significant issue for respondents to the NOP survey and for almost two-thirds of the 
trusts surveyed by Hart (Smith, 1996). Pornography rqjresents another notable 
difference between the American and British experience. In the U.K., the public 
offence associated with pornography prevails over any defence of freedom of speech. 
The DSI400 index's софогаїе citizenship screen includes remuneration as well 
as places emphasis on the relationship between a company and its community, 
tolerance of debate over company activities, responsiveness to shareholders, and 
employee relations. Involvement with oppressive regimes has been a significant 
concern of บ . К investors for many years. When the DSI400 index was launched the 
only oppressive regime screen referred to investments or operations in South Africa. 
This screen was dropped in November 1993, following the official abandonment of 
apartheid (Stephen, 1999). While ethical investors in Britain broadly agree with many 
of the ethical concerns of their American counterparts, significant differences remain. 
33 C o i r q j a r i s o n o f screens adop ted b y D S I 4 0 0 w i t h suppor t b y m o r e t han five surveys /serv ices . 
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4.2-4. Activism of the Ethical Investors 
An important objective of the ethical investment is to influence 
companies to improve their ethical and environmental performance. Lewis and 
Mackenzie (2000) argue that most of the ethical fimds do not pursue any kind of 
engagement with the companies in which they invest, although most ethical funds do 
talk to companies and have meetings with them. It is routine for most fund managers 
to research compani es and meet with them (Smith, 1996). In the majority of the UK 
ethical funds engagement is limited to questions from the fund seeking clarification 
on company policy and information on ethical policy. This activity is not sufficient to 
persuade companies to change their policies. 
In their study Lewis and Mackenzie (2000) further say that at least three 
ethical ftind managers in the UK do have policies of engaging with companies in 
order to persuade them to change their policy, namely Friends Provident Stewardship, 
NPI Global Care and Jupiter Ecology. As at December 1998, the Friend's Provident 
Stewardship has £900 million and the Jupiter Ecology and NPI Global Care have over 
£100 million of funds under their management (EIRIS, 1999). These funds have used 
a number of different procedures to pursue engagement, including writing letters, 
holding meetings with managers, doing sector surveys and feeding back the results to 
management. They also made several attempts to lead policy in more general ways by 
writing articles, briefing the press, giving addresses at conferences and participating 
in industry wide initiatives. 
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4.2-5 Responsibility of the Investors 
Before going to discuss on responsibility of the investors, we should discuss 
about the investment decision of the investors in market. The investment decision is a 
principle of freedom. Firstly, the agent is responsible for his own life and, therefore, it 
is incumbent upon the investor to freely administer the assets. Secondly the principle 
of responsibility that is inherent in any freely made decision: the agent is responsible 
for their free acts^ *^. This means that the ultimate responsibility lies with the investor 
and this responsibility must be judged applying the criteria traditionally used in ethics. 
The nature of the action, whether lending or investing money, is in principle a moral 
action. The effects of this decision include, the direct effects, which wil l primarily be 
those affecting the preservation and growth of wealth, in accordance with the rules of 
prudent financial management. The indirect effects, with an investment decision the 
saver is contributing to fund certain activities and therefore, becomes jointly 
responsible for their morality. This responsibility must be xmderstood not only in the 
light of its positive effects 一 whether what is being funded is a morally good activity -
but also in the light of its negative effects-whether the activity is morally 
reprehensible (Cummings, 2000). The action of investing wealth may give rise to a 
co-operation with good or bad, positive or negative ethical judgements'^. Exercising 
responsibility in ownership always has an ethical dimension, even though the 
motivation of investors in the ethical aspect may vary. 
3 4 H e r e m o r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y is d iscussed, no t lega l r espons ib i l i t y . I n v e s t m e n t dec is ions u s u a l l y mee t the 
requ i remen ts f o r an a c t i o n to be m o r a l l y i m p u t a b l e a n d the e f f e c t o f ac t ions are reasonab ly p red i c tab le . 
35 T h e businesses o f the compan ies f u n d e d b y the inves to rs are bene f i t ed b y a l l . 
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It is often argued that the existence of a moral responsibility in the investor'ร 
decision goes against economic rationality. It is said that the company'ร sole purpose 
is to maximise the value of its shares. Therefore, the sole purpose of any investment 
decision must be to obtain the highest possible return, or better still, a return-risk mix 
that matches the agent's preferences-risk aversion. Argandona (1995) says that this is 
reasonable. But before passing it as morally acceptable, it is necessary to understand 
why it is reasonable. 
I f all investors act in such a manner so as to maximise the yield of their 
portfolios, an optimum wil l be achieved. As a result the economic efficiency wil l be 
maximal-in the sense that, given the resources available, it wi l l not be possible to 
obtain higher production volumes and no subject wi l l be able to increase utility 
without decreasing that of another subject. Maximising share value or portfolio yield 
is therefore dependent upon a certain conception of the economic system's rationality. 
When it is said that compani es or investors "must" act in this manner, what is асШаІІу 
being said is that, by this means, the economic system as a whole wil l achieve the 
optimum profit that is supposed to be its goal. 
4.2-5A Difficulties in Exercising Moral Responsibility of the Investors 
When the investors set out to exercise their responsibilities as owners, they can 
do so from a negative viewpoint (means not to cause harm, that is, not to contribute 
with their capital to financing immoral activities) or from positive motivations 
(Cowton, 1999). The latter can be achieved either by investing only in companies 
whose activities are morally excellent or by trying to change the decisions made by 
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the compani es in which the investors had already invested in or may invest in so that, 
at the very least, they do not act immorally in the future. This diversity of options 
corresponds to the conception of ethics as a minimum which must be met i f man and 
society are not to deteriorate, bl view of the above, there is plenty of room for the 
ethical development of people and society (Prodhan, 1994). 
It is noted that any investor who wishes to act ethically wi l l encounter, at least, 
some of the following difficulties; 
(1) Lack of information about the companies that engage in morally reprehensible or 
excellent activities. The same is also trae for investments made through 
intermediaries, for example, deposits in a bank which, in turn, lends to compani es, 
etc. 
(2) Lack of information about the functioning of investment mechanisms; very rare 
in countries with a financial system developed to a certain minimum level^^. 
(3) Inability to steer investments towards ethically correct companies, for example, 
the companies which are not listed^^. 
(4) Liability to change the company's conduct because the investor is a minor 
shareholder without any voice on the board of directors or at the shareholders' 
meeting. In any case, given the need to diversify the portfolio to reduce the risk, it 
is unlikely that many investors wil l have significant equity holdings in certain 
companies (Argandona, 1995). 
T h e inves to r m a y t h i n k that i f he/she b u y s shares that have a l ready b e e n issued, h is /her funds d o no t 
g o d i r e c t l y to the c o m p a n y engag ing i n u n l a w f u l ac t i v i t i es . 
I n t heo ry , each inves to r c o u l d create w h a t e v e r p o r t f o l i o he/she m a y w i s h . I n p rac t i ce , h o w e v e r , th is 
is n o t t rae due t o i n f o n n a t í o n , t ransac t ion costs etc. 
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(5) Lack of knowledge about the criteria used by the company in making its 
decisions. For example, compames in which it is possible to invest may have 
positive aspects and negative aspects of ethical criteria. 
For many investors, these considerations induce them to invest their 
assets through specialised organisations by purchasing the secondary financial 
products with return-driven and risk-driven goals. It means, that the investor'ร 
responsibility disappears because the investor continues to co-operate with the 
company'ร activities. What wil l change is how the investor wil l exercise it. 
4.2-5B Ethical Funds 
The demand for securities in which investors can exercise their moral 
responsibility^^ is met by a supply by financial intermediaries. It creates specialised 
ethical unit trust, ethical pension fund, ecological funds etc^^; offering standardised 
investment packages as regards return, term, currency, risk etc. Ethical fimds are 
therefore, a response to that demand. In some cases the responsible investor makes 
his/her decision between a minimum (not investing in clearly immoral compani es) 
and a broad range of increasingly extensive opportunities. For example, financing 
companies which stand out for investors' ethical conduct, try to influence companies' 
management so that they cease to act immorally and improve their ethical quality 
(Smith, 1996). 
T h e d e m a n d fo r s o c i a l l y respons ib le inves tments m a y be m response to m o r a l i ncen t i ves as w e l l as 
o ther types o f i n c e n t i v e . T h e d e m a n d for e n v i r o n m e n t - f r i e n d l y i nves tmen ts m a y de r i ve from e c o n o m i c 
incen t i ves and the i n v e s t o r ' s persona l interest. 
3 9 N o t j u s t fonds, b u t a lso soc ia l banks , co -ope ra t i ve banks , c o m m u n i t y - o r i e n t e d ven tu res etc. 
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In view o f the above discussion, the four main groups o f decisions that may 
be made by ethical funds are: 
(1) Selection Criteria 
The determination o f the selection criteria used to choose the industries and 
companies in which the fund w i l l invest or not to invest40. At this stage, the fund 
defines its investment profile and, therefore, its product appeal to the public to "create 
the need" to invest in accordance wi th specific criteria (Argandona, 1995). I f 
promoters o f the fund or managers have definite ethical attiณdes, these attiณdes w i l l 
show in the criteria օհօտ6ո՛". I f they do not have such attitudes, they w i l l formulate 
generic product packages targeting customers wi th imprecisely specified preferences 
(Argandona, 1995). In this case, the criteria set w i l l be generic and based on 
sociological rather than ethical cńteńa^^. 
There is no single, unquestioned definition o f what an ethical company is. 
Furthermore, there w i l l never be unanimous agreement wi th respect to the criteria 
chosen. This process is associated with at least two practical problems. Firstly, the 
more criteria there are and the more specific they are, the smaller the number o f 
compani es that can be invested in. Secondly, the positive criteria can be added to the 
negative criteria or used to offset them. The fundamental criterion is usually the 
4 ° A l l f unds m u s t de f i ne the e c o n o m i c , fínancial c r i te r ia w h i c h i t w i l l a p p l y i n i ts i nves tments . I n the 
case o f the e th i ca l f unds , the f i e l d o f dec i s i on is en la rged , a l t h o u g h i t m a y also be d i v i d e d so that the 
e t ì i i ca l dec is ions are l e f t to the eth ics c o m m i t t e e o f the Asse t m a n a g e m e n t b o a r d , พЫ1е the analysts , 
managers , m e m b e r s o f the b o a r d , etc. take the " t e c h n i c a l " dec is ions . 
" I n a w a y , w e are p r o p o s i n g to d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n funds that are c rea ted ou t o f a genu ine e th i ca l and 
soc ia l concern , and those tha t s i m p l y o f f e r i nves tmen ts w i t h that fea ture , n o t ou t o f p e r s o n a l c o n v i c t i o n 
b u t as a sales s t ra tegy. 
42 I t is l i k e l y that m a n y fonds have i m p l e m e n t e d cer ta in measures m o r e as a r e a c t i o n to p o l i t i c a l events 
than t o t rae e th i ca l p r o b l e m s . O n e e x a m p l e i n th is rega rd is the i n v e s t m e n t b o y c o t t at S o u t h A f r i c a i n 
the years o f the apar the id . 
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nature o f the products or services offered by the company. In this matter, there may 
be the possibility o f non-ethical effects that their production or use may have on the 
environment or on public health, for example: nuclear energy, tobacco, chemicals 
using environmentally damaging or hazardous processes, child labour, etc. Often, 
other criteria are added, such as the company'ร labour, their attiณde towards the local 
community, their co-operation wi th certain political regimes, etc. In view o f this, 
the investors usually may not have clearly defined criteria on what they consider 
ethical or unethical either from an economical, polit ically or morally bias. I f an 
investor knows what he/she wants, he/she can administer his assets himselCberself or 
give precise instructions to his/her manager. He/she cm also try to change the criteria 
used by his/her fimd or promote a new fund. 
(2) Choosing the compani es to invest in 
This is associated wi th information problems and problems arising from a 
prudent application o f the principles described above. Ideally, compani es should 
provide the funds wi th abundant information on its products, markets, technologies, 
production process, personnel policies, customer relations, etc., to enable the funds to 
make informed decisions. However, this information is usually not given, either 
because the companies themselves do not have it, or i f they have but do not want to 
give it. Some times they give it in an incomplete, confusing and non-verifiable 
manner (Argandona, 1995). The existence o f impartial agencies may play a significant 
role towards alleviating these problems. 
The choice o f companies remind the investor about the existence o f a 
problem that is closely tied wi th the ethical funds' basic criteria. From the financial 
134 
viewpoint, the selection is made in accordance wi th future criteria, that is, in 
accordance wi th the companies' expected return. From the ethical viewpoint, the 
criteria used focuses on the past. This is because it is assumed that compames 
showing a good ethical behaviour in the past w i l l continue to behave ethically in the 
fixture, and also its staff members have developed virtues that facilitate morally 
correct action (McEwan,2001). 
However, the above-mentioned concept has a number o f drawbacks. Firstly, 
investments are made in a company'ร stock because it is hoped that its conduct w i l l 
continue to be ethical and not as a reward for past performance. Second, a company 
must be allowed to make mistakes and perform immoral actions, provided that it 
rectifies, apologises and tries to behave ethically again in the future (Joly, 1993). It is 
important to stress that the fact that an ethical fimd includes certain securities in its 
portfolio should not be interpreted as a denial o f the ethical qualities o f the companies 
not included in the fund. To put it another way, the fimd guarantees its customers that 
the companies included in its portfolio meet certain minimum standards or certain 
criteria, and nothing more. 
(3) Setting the investment maintenance and financial rqîlacement criteria 
For ordinary fimds, these criteria are clear, mainly in terms o f yield and 
risk. However, ethical funds must also take into account a third dimension, the moral 
one, by making pradential decisions, such as those indicated above. 
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(4) Establishment o f the policy relationships 
There is needed to establish the policy o f relationships wi th the management 
of the companies whose shares are included in the fund. This includes, for example, 
how the voting right w i l l be used at shareholders' meetings, how the customers' 
instructions, i f any, w i l l be taken into account, for the benefit o f whom the voting 
right w i l l be exercised, etc (Lohnert 1995). 
Related wi th the abovementioned issues are the fiinds' attitude towards the 
definition and implementation o f the company'ร goals and strategies which we could 
call the fiind's "act ivism" (Lewis and Mackenzie, 2000). I f they are simply trying to 
place their assets in ethically correct businesses, they w i l l prefer a passive policy on 
the part of the funds. In that case, i f necessary, it can withdraw its shares from the 
company when it w i l l behave inappropriately. However, i f they take a more active 
attiณde in the application o f their ethical preferences, they w i l l ask for a greater 
involvement by the fund in the companies' management. They w i l l even be prepared 
to suffer economic setbacks for that very reason. Joly (1993, pp. 23-24) sets a series 
o f fol lowing rules that ethical funds should fol low; 
Gross impropr ie ty rule; ethical funds should not invest in companies or industries 
whose activities go against society'ร moral requirements such as drag trafficking, 
pornography, etc. 
Controversial issue rule; when an investment goes against the moral requirements o f 
a large social group, the fund should identify and exclude such investments such as 
nuclear energy, tobacco, arms dealing, etc. 
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Prudence ru le; to assess all companies so that all its relevant results can be identified 
such as on the environment, on individuals, etc. 
Proport ional i ty ru le; the larger the volume (absolute or relative) of the funds placed 
in a company, the more attention should be paid to the economic, moral, social or 
environmental consequences arising from this. 
Accountabi l i ty ru le; the reports on the fund's investment should not only include 
the companies' financial performance but also the extra-economic data that may 
impact on the decision to invest in or divest the security in question. 
Controversial ly ru le; the fact that an investment is controversial does not mean that 
the fund should pul l out o f it but only that it should be studied. 
Negligence ru le; the managers o f ethical fonds should be aware of all o f the 
consequences o f their decisions. Ignorance is no excuse. 
Same boat ru le; it is desirable that the fund's managers should commit at least part of 
their personal assets. 
Collective and ind iv idual responsibil ity; responsibility should be shared by all those 
who take part in the fund's decision. 
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Dilemmas; the solution to dilemmas is not to ignore them but to study them . 
In conclusion, we can say that one o f the most exciting developments in the 
financial world in recent years has been the growth o f the ethical fimds. The UK 's 
first ethical unit trust was launched in 1984. By 2001 some £4 bi l l ion had been 
invested in the U K ethical funds by individuals and organisations wanting their 
investments to reflect their personal values, bidividual investors have played a vital 
role in supporting the growth o f the ethical investment market. Ethical investment was 
given a further boost in July 2000 when new legislation was introduced under the 
1995 Pension Act. Since then many pension fimds have started to take social and 
environmental issues into account in the management o f their investments. They 
include several local authority pensions' funds such as Nottinghamshire and 
Strathclyde, the University Superamuation Scheme etc. Not surprisingly, many 
charities and organisations recognise the importance o f investing in a way that is 
consistent wi th their values. 
4 3 O the r ru les are p r e s e r v i n g the f u n d ' s independence and i m p a r t i a l i t y , p r e s e r v i n g the c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f 
the i n f o r m a t i o n r e c e i v e d o n compan ies , d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n facts and op in i ons . 
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Part - П 
4.3 Measuring Performance of UK Ethical Unit Trusts in 
Changing Economic Conditions 
4.3-1 Introduction 
The investment based on ethical or socially responsible criteria appeals to many 
investors. The general perception is that it most l ikely reduces portfolio performance. 
The financial theory argues that ethical investment w i l l under perform over the long 
term because ethical portfolios are subsets o f the market portfolio which lack 
sufficient diversification. A further issue raised is that selecting stocks according to 
ethical screens can be an expensive practice that may ultimately have a negative 
impact on net return. Therefore, the general perception has been that ethical portfolios 
are l ikely to under-perform their conventional peers. The relevant l i teratoe provided 
up to this point however has not been able to find a sigmficant performance gap 
between ethical and conventional portfolios. For example Di lz (1995), Guerard (1997) 
and Sauer (1997) conclude that there are no statically significant differences between 
the retums o f ethically screened and unscreened universe in United States. Using 
single factor Jensen alpha model Mal l in, Saddouni & Briston (1995); and Gregory, 
Matatko & Luther (1997) find no significant difference between the financial 
performance o f ethical and conventional unit trusts in the United Kingdom. 
There are several extended models to evaluate the performance o f managed fonds 
that too control for several stock market anomalies (Ippolito, 1989). For instance, 
Fama and French (1992, 1996) add promise for size and book-to-market, while 
Carhart (1997) introduces a stock-momentum variable. Later Person and Schadt 
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(1996); Antóniou, Barr and Priestly(1998); Lettali and Ludvigson (2001); Wang 
(2002) and Zhang, (2003) explore the added value o f introducing time-varying betas 
and alphas in existing models. By doing that fixnd managers change their portfolios 
over time, based on observable information variables. Most o f these รณdies, however, 
only deal wi th two, or at most thiee different performance models. Because o f the 
relatively larger number o f managed fund performance models, this potentially creates 
a problem for both academics and practitioners about which models to use for 
performance measurement. 
The objective o f this part o f the study is to provide a comprehensive 
evaluation o f the U K ethical unit trast performance by employing single factor to 
multifactor models using both their xmconditional and conditional versions. Using 
monthly sample o f the U K ethical unit trasts for the period from 1996 to 2003, we 
introduce extra variables such as size, book-to-market, momentum and a bond index 
(which compares with its conventional peer) is explored. In order to address the 
objective, this รณdy has focused on the fol lowing research questions; 
(1) D id the investment performance o f U K ethical unit trasts suffer in comparison to 
those that are not so ethical? 
(2) Which model is suitable for ethical fiind performance evaluation and; 
(3) What is the statistical significance o f adding more factors such as size, book-to-
market, momentum factor and bond index? 
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4.3-2 Brief Literature Review on Ethical Mutual Funds/Unit Trusts 
This literature review w i l l focus on the studies which examine the 
performance o f ethical funds and especially those which directly compare ethical and 
conventional funds. Substantial literature on conventional mutual funds/unit trasts has 
already been documented in the literature review chapter-2, therefore, this literature is 
not considered here. Instead we concentrate on those investigations which have 
examined the risk adjusted геШтร that ethical funds have achieved. 
Early studies o f the U K ethical unit trusts performance only compared ethical 
unit trasts wi th market-wide benchmarks. For example, the study o f Luther, Matatko 
and Comer (1992) provided weak evidence that the ethical fimds outperformed two 
market indices. In a subsequent study, Luther and Matatko (1994) addressed some of 
the concerns raised in this early work. Since the ethical unit trast tended to invest in a 
larger part o f the funds in smaller companies with lower dividend yields, they argued 
that a small company index should be employed as a market proxy for ethical ftmds in 
addition to a broad based stock market index. Their findings demonstrated that ethical 
funds performed much better when evaluated against a small company benchmark, 
than when only the Financial Times A l l Share Price index (FTSA) was used. 
The รณdy o f Mal l in et al. (1995) examined the performance o f U K ethical unit 
trasts by using a matched pairs analysis. They compared the performance o f 29 ethical 
unit trusts wi th a sample o f 29 conventional unit trusts between the years 1986 and 
1993, matched on the basis o f age and size by using the Jensen, Sharpe and Treynor 
performance measures. Their findings concluded that a small majority o f funds from 
both groups underperformed the market as measured by the FTSE A l l Share Price 
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index. These findings were remarkable, since Luther et al. (1992) argued that ethical 
unit trasts have a large number o f small compani es in their portfolios. 
Another study o f the U K ethical unit trast performance by Gregory et al. 
(1997) adopted a matched pair approach which was similar to that used in the Mal l in 
et al. (1995) investigation. They compared the performance o f a smaller sample o f 18 
U K ethical unit trasts wi th 18 conventional unit trasts between 1986 and 1994. They 
also employed a size- adjusted measure o f performance. Their results revealed that 
one ethical unit trasts and one conventional unit trast had a negative Jensen alpha, 
which was significant at the 5% level. However, there was no significant difference 
between the retums earned by the ethical and conventional unit trusts and both groups 
սոճ6Փ6քքօոո6(1 the FTSE A l l Share Price index. 
There are several studies on ethical funds out side the UK. Studies done by 
Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993) and then Statman (1999) compared the геШтร o f 
ethical and conventional us mutual fimds to each other, and to both the s & р 500 
and the DSL Both รณdies used the Jensen's alpha and conclude that no significant 
differences between risk-adjusted retums for ethical and conventional funds exist. 
Kreander, Gray, Power, and Sinclair (2000) extended this analysis to consider 
European funds from a small number o f countries, but encountered the problem o f 
selecting an appropriate benchmark against which to judge the funds. Kreander, Gray, 
Power, and Sinclair (2000) eventually chose the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
World Index, primarily on the pragmatic grounds that this index was commonly 
adopted as benchmark for ethical funds. They pointed out that when Swedish ethical 
funds were evaluated against a Swedish benchmark their performance was 
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outstanding, while the performance was much more modest when compared to 
Morgan Stanley Capital International World Index. 
By employing a multi-factor Carhart (1997) model, Bauer, Koedijk and Otten 
(2003) in their study found little evidence o f significant differences in risk-adjusted 
reณms between ethical and conventional mutual funds. Using both domestic and 
international samples of the Germany, U K and us for the period 1990-2001, their 
results show that introducing time-variation in beta leads to a significant under-
performance o f domestic us тиШа І funds and a significant out-performance o f U K 
ethical funds, relative to their conventional peer. 
The followings are summaries o f the studies on ethical fund performance and 
in particular those using the 'matched pairs' technique. The findings from these most 
o f the cases, the authors concluded that the differences were small or statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, the evidence to suggest that ethical funds systematical ly 
under-perform conventional mutual funds is l imited. Indeed some evidence suggests 
that the risk adjusted performance o f certain ethical funds may outperform the 
conventional funds which do not have any ethical criteria for selecting the equities 
which they include in their portfolios. A list o f the key findings o f the studies on 
ethical funds is reported in the figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2 ะ A list of the key fíndings of the studies on ethical funds 
C o u i i ł T i K c u i o i ť ?nÄw '^.' ' に ， v | ı n n ? P o r H H İ ^ î w l L * l i n d i ñ u s for] i h i c a M n i i u U ՚ · 
Baue r et a l . 
( 2 0 0 3 ) 
G e r m a n y , U . K . 
& U . S . 
103 e th ica l 
m u t u a l funds 
and 4 , 3 8 4 
t r a d i t i o n a l 
т и Ш а І fimds 
January 1990 
M a r c h 2 0 0 1 
-ev idence o f b o t h h ighe r and 
l o w e r re turns 
-d i f f e rences are n o t 
s ta t i s t i ca l l y d i f f e r e n t 
G e c z y et a l . 
( 2 0 0 3 ) 
U n i t e d States 35 n o - l o a d 
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f unds and 
859 n o - l o a d 
c o n v e n t i o n a l 
m u t u a l funds 
J u l y 1963 t o 
D e c e m b e r 
2 0 0 1 - l o w e r re turns d i f f e r e n c e is 
s i gn i f i can t under ce r ta in 
c o n d i t i o n s 
G r e g o r y et a l . 
( 1 9 9 7 ) 
U n i t e d K i n g d o m 18 e th ica l un i t 
t rusts m a t c h e d 
w i t h 18 
t r a d i t i o n a l 
m u t u a l fimds 
January 1986 
to 
D e c e m b e r 
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d i f f e r e n t 
H a m i l t o n et 
a l . ( 1 9 9 3 ) 
U n i t e d States 32 e th i ca l m u t u a l 
fiinđs versus 170 
c o n v e n t i o n a l 
m u t u a l fimds 
January 1981 
to 
D e c e m b e r 
1990 
-no s ta t i s t i ca l l y s i gn i f i can t 
p e r f o r m a n c e d i f i e rences 
H a v e m a n and 
W e b s t e r 
( 1 9 9 9 ) 
U n i t e d K i n g d o m 15 e th ica l ftinds 
versus peer 
med ians 
5-year pe r i ods 
e n d i n g June 
1998 
- l o w e r r e t u m s 
- l o w e r risk 
M a l l i n et a l . 
( 1 9 9 5 ) 
U n i t e d K i n g d o m 2 9 e th ica l u n i i 
t rusts m a t c h e d 
w i t h 29 
c o n v e n t i o n a l u n i t 
t rusts 
January 1986 
to 
D e c e m b e r 
1993 
-h ighe r re tu rns 
- l o w e r risk 
d i f f e rences cons ide red 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t 
O t t e n and 
K o e d i j k 
( 2 0 0 1 ) 
Ne the r l ands 4 e th ica l funds 
n m i c h e d w i t h 4 
c o n v e n t i o n a l 
m u t u a l funds 
January 1994 
to 
D e c e m b e r 
2 0 0 0 
l o w e r re tu rns 
s i m i l a r re tu rns w h e n s ty le 
biases 
co r rec ted 
S ta tman 
( 2 0 0 0 ) 
U n i t e d States 31 腿ณal funds 
versus 
62 c o n v e n t i o n a l 
m u t u a l funds 
Per iods e n d i n g 
Sep tember 
1998 
h i ghe r re tu rns 
d i f f e rences are no t s ta t i s t i ca l l y 
d i f f e r e n t 
Sources: ABN-AMRO (2001), M a l l i n et a l . ( 1 9 9 5 ) , G r e g o r y et a l . ( 1 9 9 7 ) , B a u e r et a l . ( 2 0 0 3 ) 
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4.3-3 Methodology 
The objective o f this study is to provide a comprehensive assessment o f existing 
managed fund/mutual fund performance models, using the U K Ethical Unit Trust data 
from the Micropal database. In doing so, we w i l l be able to investigate ethical unit 
trasts' (muณal fund) performance relative to conventional unit trasts(muณal funds). 
Uncondit ional Models 
Starting wi th the most basic Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), we w i l l 
then explore the added value o f introducing extra variables such as size, book-to-
market, momentum and a bond index. In addition, we w i l l evaluate the use o f 
introducing time-variation in beta and alpha. The models to be used to evaluate risk-
adjusted U K Ethical Unit Trast performance are Jensen (1968) single factor, Fama & 
French (1992， 1993) three factor, Carhart (1997) four factor and finally Elton and 
Gruber (1999) fifth factor model. With respect to single, three factor model, we have 
already discussed in the methodology section o f our previous chapter . In the previous 
chapter , we have evaluated the performance o f the U K unit trusts by employing the 
Fama-French three factor model to รณdy the behavioıՄ o f the U K market. For the U K 
market, the F-F three factor model has better explanatory power than the single factor 
CAPM model, especially for the unit trasts that invest heavily in small compani es. As 
per results, we reported that the U K fund managers are unable to outperform the 
markets. 
In this chapter, we w i l l introduce more models like Carthart(1997) four factor 
and Elton and Graber (1999) five-factor models. 
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Multi-factor Models 
Carhar t Four Factor 
The importance o f a multi-factor asset pricing model can be found from the 
recent studies on cross sectional variation o f stock retums (for example, Fama and 
French, 1993 & 1996; Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996). The findings of these 
studies raise the question about the adequacy o f a single index model to explain 
fund's performance. In view o f this, the Fama and French (1993) toee-factor model 
has been considered to give a better explanation o f fimds behaviour. In this regard, 
this model improves average с А Р М pricing errors but is not able to explain the cross-
sectional variation in momentum-sorted portfolio retums. Therefore Carhart (1997) 
extends the Fama-French model by adding a fourth factor that сарШгеร the Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) momentum anomaly. The Carhart's (1997) four factor model is 
consistent wi th a market equilibrium model wi th four risk factors, which can also be 
interpreted as a performance attribution model, where coefficients and premia on the 
factor-mimicking portfolios indicate the proportion o f mean return attributable to four 
elementary strategies. The model is described in the fol lowing notations: 
Ru - Rf, = «, + ßoi(Rm,-Rf,) + ßuSMB, + ß,,HML, + ß,,Mom, + ε, (4-1) 
where, 
SMBt = the difference in return between a small cap portfolio and a large cap 
portfolio at time t, 
HMLt = the difference in геШт between a portfolio o f high book to market stocks 
and one o f low book to market stocks at time t, 
Mortit = the difference in reณm between a portfolio o f the past 12 months' winners 
and a portfolio of the past 12 month's losers at time t. 
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Carhart(1997)'ร four factor alpha is an estimate o f the net retums earned 
by the fund manager after adjusting for the fund's risk, which is done by 
controlling for its various characteristics. 
Elton-Gruber Five Factor Model 
Elton, Gruber, Das & Hlvaka (1993) and Elton & Gruber (1999) propose the 
inclusion o f a bond index in managed fund performance assessment. They argue that 
some funds invest in higher yielding and risky bonds, which is not picked up by risk-
free rate ( Rf) . Although in their analysis the bond index only shows up significantly 
for less than 50 percent o f all funds, we consider the sensitivity o f fiinds retums to a 
government bond index. The Elton and Graber five factor model reads; 
Rน-Rf = «, + İRm,-Rf,) + ßuSMB, + ß,,HML, + β,,Μοτη, + {Rb, ―Rf,) 
( 4 - 2 ) 
Conditional Models 
Single, Three, Four, and Five Factor Models w i th the Condit ional In format ion 
Traditional approaches to performance measwement are unconditional, which 
means that they use historical average retums to estimate expected performance. For 
example, an alpha may be calculated as the historical average reณm of a fiind in 
excess o f a beta-adjusted historical average for a benchmark portfolio. Sometimes, 
the beta is simply assumed to be equal to 1.0. Unconditional measures do not account 
for the fact that risk and expected reณms may vary wi th the state o f the economy. In 
particular, traditional performance measures ignore the evidence that expected retums 
in the stock market are higher at the beginning o f an economic recovery, when 
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dividend yields are high and interest rates are low. I f the market exposure o f a 
managed portfolio varies predictably wi th the business cycle but the manager does not 
have superior forecasting ability, a traditional approach to performance measurement 
w i l l confuse the common variation between fund risk and expected market reณms 
with truly superior information and abnormal performance. Therefore, in recent times, 
interest in performance evaluation has been renewed wi th the emergence o f two 
branches o f research. The first development is the use of efficient benchmark 
portfolios. The second development is the use o f conditional information variables in 
tests o f asset pricing theories. 
Most significant o f a conditional approach to performance evaluation is that it 
can accommodate whatever standard o f superior information held to be appropriate by 
the choice o f the lagged information. By іпсофогайп£ a given set o f lagged 
instruments, managers who trade mechanically in response to these variables should 
be unable to 'game' the performance measure. In practice, the trading behaviour o f 
managers may overlay complex portfolio dynamics on the underlying assets they 
trade. The desire to handle such dynamic strategies further motivates a conditional 
approach. In this chapter we illustrate the conditional performance evaluation 
approach using lagged default risk, slope term structure, dividend yield and 1 month 
U K Treasury b i l l rates as the conditional ւոքօոոսէւօո՛*՛*. 
Traditional performance evaluation approaches assume that the consumer o f 
the performance evaluation does not use public information on the economy to form 
" F o r ev idence that these var iab les capture v a r i a t i o n i n b o t h risk and expec ted re tu rns , see O t t e n and 
B a m s ( 2 0 0 2 ) . 
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expectations, whereas a conditional approach assumes market efficiency wi th respect 
to the particular market indicators. In a conditional market-timing model, the idea is 
to distinguish market t iming based on public information from marketing information 
that is truly superior to the public information. A technical assumption required for 
this approach is a ftmctional form for the betas or factor sensitivities o f a managed 
portfolio (Person and Warther, 1996). Time variation in a managed portfolio beta 
may arise for three distinct reasons and they are; 
(i) the betas o f the underlying assets may change over time such that even a 
passive strategy, such as buy and hold, w i l l experience changes in beta; 
( i i) a manager can actively manipulate the portfolio weights, departing from a 
buy and hold strategy, and thereby create changes in the portfolio beta; 
( i i i ) a fund may experience net cash inflows or outflows, which the manager 
does not directly control. I f such flows affect the cash holdings of the fiand, then beta 
w i l l flueณate as the percentage o f cash held by the fund flueณates. The combined 
effect o f these various factors on the conditional beta is modelled as "reduced form." 
There are many studies which use the conditional с А Р М - to capture the 
potential sources o f time-varying expected retums (Antóniou, Barr and Priestly, 1998; 
Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001) and conditional с А Р М could hold perfectly- that is, 
conditional alphas are zero(Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001; Zhang, 2003). Jagannathan 
and Wang (1996); Wang (2002) and Ang and Chen (2002) show that the time varying 
betas do help to explain the size, B/M(book-to-market) stocks and momenUim effects. 
Our approach is motivated from Chen & Kenz (1996); Person and Schadt (1996) and 
Bauer, Koedjik and Otten (2003), among others who argue that the с А Р М biases are 
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related to cross sectional conditional retums. We use the fol lowing linear function, 
which is a natural extension o f traditional с А Р М model for fund risk: 
Ķ, 一 R f i = «, + До(Äm, -Rf,) + B\z,_,{Rm, -Rf,) + £·, (4-3) 
Zt-I is a vector lagged pre-determined instrament. Assuming that the beta for a fund 
varies over time, and this variation can be captured by a linear relation to the 
conditional instraments, then β и = До + Β\ζ,_^ ， where В'і is а vector o f response 
coefficients o f the conditional beta w i th respect to the instruments in ζ t-1. A linear 
function may be motivated by Taylor series approximation. A linear function is also 
attractive because it results in simple regression models that are easy to іпїефгеї. 
Although we use simple linear fimctions to illustrative conditional approach, the 
correct specification o f the conditional beta is an empirical issue. The general 
approach can accommodate other choices for functional form, so it should be possible 
to improve upon our example in actual applications. 
The above conditional single index model equation can easily be extended 
to іпсофогаїе at Fama-French three factor and Carhart'ร multiple factor model. 
The conditional three and four-factor model w i l l form the fol lowing regressions 
for the managed portfolio return. 
The conditional Fama-French three factor model: 
Ri,֊Rfl =a,^ß„,{Rm,֊Rf,) + ßuSMB, +ß,^ML, + ß.XRm, -Rf,)xiDeRisk)_,] 
+ Ä , [ R m , - R f , ) x (Slop -Term) ,] + 1Կ{{Rm, ֊Rf,)x(D/P)_,] + 
ß^X(Rm,֊Rf,)xiTBU] + e , — — — — ( 4 - 4 ) 
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and the Carhart four factor conditional model; 
Ru -Rf, = « , + ^ , ( i ? / « , ֊Rf,) + ßJMB,+ß,:HML, + Ä , M o m , + ß,X{Rm,-Rf,)x 
{DeRisk)_,] + ßsi{Rm, -Rf,)x(SlopTermU] + A,KRm, -Rf,)x(D/P)_,] + 
ßv [İRm, ֊Rf,)x{TB)_,] + e,֊֊- ( 4 - 5 ) 
The instraments (market indicators) used in the model are publicly available 
and proven to be usefiil for predicting stock retums by several previous studies (as, for 
example, Pesaran and Timmerman, 1995). The information are: (1) quality spread, by 
comparing the yield o f government and софогаЇе bonds, (2) the slope o f the term 
structure; (3) dividend yield on the market indices and (4) 1-month U K Т-ВІ11 rate. 
A l l instruments are based on lagged 1 month. These variables are essentially 
interaction terms between the excess г еШт o f the benchmark and the lagged values o f 
the market indicators. These interaction terms pick up the movements toough time o f 
the conditional betas as they relate to the market indicators. In the equation (4-5), the 
coefficients ß i , Рг, Рз, ß4, ßs, Вб, ß? measure the response o f the conditional betas to 
the lagged market indicators-SBM, H M L , Momentum, default risk, slope o f the term 
structoe, dividend yield and 1 -month treasury bi l l rate. The intercept, a, is the 
conditional alpha, which measures the abnormal performance. 
Traditionally performance is measured using unconditional expected reftmiร 
assuming that both the investor and managers use no information about the state o f 
the economy to form expectations, however, i f managers trade on publicly available 
information and employ dynamic strategies, unconditional models may produce 
inferior results. Calculating average alpha using a fixed beta estimate for the entire 
performance period consequently leads to unreliable results i f expected retums and 
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risk vary over time. To address these concerns on unconditional performance models, 
Person and Schadt (1996); Antóniou, Barr and Priestly (1998); Lettau and Ludvigson 
(2001); Wang (2002) and Zhang, (2003) advocate conditional performance 
measurement. This is done by using time-varying conditional expected returns and 
conditional betas instead o f the usual, unconditional betas. The predetermined 
information variables we use as used by Person and Schadt (1996) which are publicly 
available and proven to be useful for predicting stock геШтร and they are: lagged 
level o f 1-month U K T-bi l l rate; the lagged dividend yield on market index (FSTE all 
share price index); a lagged measure o f the slope o f the term structure and finally a 
lagged quality spread, by comparing the yield on U K government and corporate 
bonds. 
In the present chapter we w i l l evaluate the added value for performance 
measurement by introducing time-variance in several betas. First we let the с А Р М 
market beta vary over time. Subsequently time-variation is added to Fama & French 
model ( SMB and H M L ) , Carhart four factor model (Momentum) and finally Elton 
and Gruber five factor model (bond beta).. The conditional five -factor model (Elton 
and Gruber, 1999) w i l l form the fol lowing regression for the managed portfolio 
reณm; 
Ru -Rf, = «, + քկİRm,-Rf,) + β,βΜΒ, + ß,^ML, + β,^Μοηι, + {Rb,-Rf,) + 
A,{{Rm, -Rf,)χ (DeRiskU] + д, [Rm, ֊Rf,)x(SlopTerm)_J + 
ß-,MRm,-Rf,)4DIP)_,] + ß,X(.Rm, ֊к/,)х(тву,] +ε, ― (4 — 6) 
We w i l l , therefore, test eight model (please see table 4.3) specifications, which w i l l be 
evaluated based on statistical and economical relevance. 
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Table 4.3 Eight Models 
Models 
1 Unconditional с А Р М 
2. Unconditional Fama and French 3- factor (added s M B and H M L ) 
3. Unconditional Carhart 4-factor ( added momentum) 
4. บทcondition Elton and Gruber 5 factor ( added momentum and bond) 
5. Conditional с А Р М ( added predetermined information variables) 
6. Conditional F -F З- factor( added predetermined information variables) 
7. Conditional Carhart 4-factor ( added predetermined information variables) 
8. Condition Elton and Graber 5 factor ( added predetermined information variables) 
С А Р М , Capital Asset Pricing Model 
4.3-4 The Data 
I. UK Ethical Unit Trust Data 
Using Micropal database we construct a database o f all domestic U K ethical 
unit trusts wi th at least 18-months o f data. We exclude balanced and bonds and the 
funds which invest internationally. Particular difficulties in performance measurement 
arise from international objectives as such objectives require a suitable international 
benchmark portfolio to be specified for unit trasts that invest substantial proportion o f 
their funds overseas. For this reason a sample o f 35 U K ethical unit trusts (opened 
ended ethical mutual fimds) was chosen wi th both predominantly U K based assets and 
U K A l l companies, Equity Income or Active Managed objectives as detailed in the 
Unit Trast Year Book for 2003. The database covers monthly reณm data during the 
period 1996 to 2003 (Appendix 1). A l l retums are in U K pound sterling inclusive o f 
distributions and net o f management fees. To investigate the influence o f investment 
style on performance we divide ethical unit trasts into subgroups, based on the 
definition given by Investment Management Association and Unit Trust Year 
Book(UK) on the basis o f unit trusts' investment objective. This leads to three 
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portfolios o f funds: the U K A l l companieร(capital growth), the U K equity income 
(growing income) and the U K active managed(growth). For рифозе o f comparison, 
35 U K conventional Unit Trast are matched according to age, size and investment 
universe and monthly return data obtained from Micropal database ( Appendix 2). 
I I Benchmark Indices and Factor Variables 
In order to determine the explanatory power to a range o f performance models 
(table 1)， we use a number o f benchmarks. We obtain factor mimicking portfolios for 
size (SMB) and book to market (HML) from Krishna Paudyal"*^. The factor-
mimicking portfolio for one-year momentum in stock retums have been provided by 
Stefan Nageľ^^. Apart from these, we include the U K medium term government bond 
index to test for cash holdings and this data obtained from DataStream. Finally we 
w i l l examine the marginal explanatory power o f introducing time-variation in beta 
and alpha. In the line wi th for instance Ferson and Schadt (1996), we use 
predetermined information variables. We obtain the one-month U K treasury b i l l data 
and dividend yield o f FTSE A l l Share price index from DataStream International, 
slope o f term structure and quality spread (comparing the yield of U K government 
and софогаїе bonds) obtained from The Economist (economic indicators). A l l 
instruments are lagged one month to be predicted. Summary statistical o f all variables 
are show in the Table 4.4. 
45 Professor Krishna Paudyal of Centre for Empirical Research in Finance, School of Economic, 
Fmance and Business, University of Durham, IJK. He updates the benchmark returns every month. The 
Ьепсһпшгк factors (1) the performance of small stocks relative to big stocks (SMB, small minus big) 
and (2) the performance of value stocks relative to growth stocks (HML, High minus loพ). The 
portfolios include all the stocks of FTSE Al l Share price index. Paudyal supplied us only up todate 
benchmark factor data. The momentum factor data was received from Nagel. Вепсһпшгк factor data of 
Nagel was not up to date, therefore we use benchmark factor upto date data provided by Paudyal. 
46 Stefan Nagel is a lecturer at Harvard Business School, United States. 
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Table 4.4 
Summary Statistics 1996-2003 
Panel A ะ Sample 35 Ethical Unit Trust Returns 
Investment 
objectives 
Mean returns Number of funds 
deviation 
U K A l l Company 0.4521 
U K Equity Income 0 3937 
Active Managed 0.6013 
Combined all fund 0.4824 
samples 
3.1634 
3.4713 
4.9225 
3.5345 
32 
2 
1 
35 
Summary statistics 1996-2003 
Panel B: Sample 35 Conventional Unit Trust Returns 
Investment 
objectives 
Mean returns Number of funds 
deviation 
U K A l l Company 0.5346 
U K Equity Income 0.9355 
Active Managed 0.5470 
Combined all fund 0.8004 
samples 
4.0544 
5.6231 
4.4363 
4.93 
32 
2 
35 
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Panel С: Benchmark Returns for the Period 1996-2003 
Cross Correlation 
Benchmark 
Market(rin-rf)) 
SMB 
H M L 
Momentum 
Govt. Bond 
Mean Std dev RM SMB 
return 
0.5941 4.4932 1.00 
0.0630 2.3483 -0.04 1.00 
1.0582 2.8001 -0.15 0.60 
0.3904 4.5048 -0.08 0.35 
5.6399 1.2421 0.11 -0.00 
H M L Moment 
um 
1.00 
0.10 
-0.15 
1.00 
-0.03 
Panel Dะ Instrumental variables for the Period 1996-2003 
Cross Correlation 
Variables 
1 month T-
B i l l 
Def-Risk 
SlopTerm 
Dividend 
Yield 
Mean 
.5701 
0.6422 
0.6616 
2.9232 
Standard 
deviation 
1.1904 
0.5236 
1.7182 
06151 
U K T-Bi l l Def-Risk Slop-Term 
1.00 
0.22 
-0.71 
-0.14 
1.00 
-0.45 
-0.34 
1.00 
0.67 
Note: This table reports summary statistics on the UK ethical unit trast (panel A), conventional unit 
trasts (panel B), Ьепсһпшгк indices (panel C) and ins tramental variables (Panel D). The market factor 
is the excess return on the FTSE Al l Share price index, SMB the factor mimicking portfolio for size, 
HML the factor mimicking portfolio for book-to-market, momenณm factor the factor mimicking 
portfolio for the 12 month return momentum and government bond the excess return on a UK Govt 
Bond index. 
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4.3-5 Empirical Results 
In order to examine the statistical and economic power o f a range o f ftmd 
performance models, we focus the results at an aggregated level. In view o f this, we 
use separate equally weighted portfolio o f the U K Ethical Unit Trasts and the U K 
conventional unit trusts as input. Later we make groups o f unit trusts into portfolios 
based on self-reported investment styles. Table 4.5 presents out findings wi th respect 
to both ethical unit trasts and compared it with conventional unit trust portfolio. In 
each o f the eight models we report alpha, beta, R2 and log-likelihood (Log L) . Using 
Log L we perform a standard Likelihood Ratio (LR) test in order to determine 
whether the explanatory power o f the new model differs significantly from a previous 
one in a statistical sense. These comparisons are performed on two different levels. 
First, we compare all models to the previous model (table 4.5). As for example, we 
examine whether the Fama- French three factor model fits better than the single-factor 
С А Р М and subsequently whether the Carhart քօւՄ-factor model fits better compared 
to the Fama-French three-factor model. Second, we examine whether the conditional 
version fits better than the unconditional version. Further, we compare the conditional 
С А Р М model to the unconditional с А Р М model. I f two times the difference in Log L 
between two models exceeds the corresponding critical value of the χ 2 (degree o f 
freedom) test statistics we report, 'yes'. I f not, a no is reported, indicating that the new 
models do not significantly add explanatory power in assessing ethical unit trust 
performance. In the table 4.5, using single factor unconditional с А Р М model only 
leads to a monthly alpha estimate o f -0.0072 (t-value ֊0.0213), a market beta o f 
0.2935 (t-value 3.93) and R2 o f 0.139. Based on these results we could argue that 
ethical unit trusts do not fol low the market closely and underperforai. The next model 
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we consider is the Fama-French model, which introduces two additional risk factors, 
size and book-to-market. The inclusion o f two extra factors lead to significant 
increase Log L, indicating the relevance o f the Fama-French model versus с АРМ. 
Examining the betas enable us to comment on the ethical unit trusts' average 
investment strategies. As the SMB factor loading is significantly negative ( 1 % 
significant level), we can forecast that all the ethical unit trasts portfolio is relatively 
more driven by large cap retums than small cap retums. The H M L factor loading is 
significantly negative ( 1 % significant level), indicating a sensitivity to low book to the 
market stocks (growth) instead o f high book-to-market stocks (growths). 
Furthermore, there is exposure to the market ups to 0.72, after adding SMB and 
H M L . Controlling for the market risk, size and book-to-market exposures, and the 
alpha estimate rises from -0.0072 to 0.5684 to (at 5% significant level). 
By adding momenUim the Carthar four factor models emerges (equation 4-1). 
The results show that statistically insignificant positive momentum coefficient signal 
the sensitivity o f the ethical unit trust portfolio for low momentum stocks. The 
inclusion o f momentum factor finally makes increase o f alpha (0.5385) at 5 % 
significant level and Log L also increased. Based on this result, we can say that the 
Carhart four factor models are better at explaining ethical unit trasts' геШтร. The last 
unconditional model (equation 4-2) considers the additional value o f a government 
bond index. Although the Log L o f this model increases compared to the previous 
model, it does not meet the critical value at 5% level and underperforms the 
benchmark. 
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The performance results o f the conventional unit trasts portfolio are similar to 
ethical unit trasts portfolio (a t 1 % significant level both F-F three factor and Carhart 
four factor model) . According to statistical viewpoint, we conclude that in an 
unconditional setting both Fama -Franch three factor model and Carhart four factor 
model are best suited to measure the unit trast performance. 
From conditional CAMP model (equation 4-3), we move over to conditional 
performance measurement. This model introduces time variation in the с А Р М beta. 
Judging from the increase in Long L (last c o l u 碰 o f table 4.5), introducing time-
variation in market beta does not add explanatory power in compare to unconditional 
С А Р М model. It is mentioned here that for the conditional models we do not report 
ordinary least squares estimates for betas. It focuses instead on the variation through 
time o f specific variables. 
By adding time-variation market beta , we now allow the SMB and H M L to 
vary as wel l . This does not lead to a significant increase in Log L compared to 
unconditional model. Alpha o f this model is 1.33386 ( t-value 0.936), but not taking 
into account time-variation, lead to an underestimation o f managerial performance. 
Along the same lines we introduce time-variation in momentum and bond . There is 
a little trend in increasing in Log L, but not much significant improvement for both 
models (equation 4-5 and 4-6), compared to the previous conditional models wi th 
fewer factors. Only the introduction o f time-variation in alpha does not lead to an 
increase in explanatory power. The results show that all conditional models 
underperforai much more than their unconditional peers (last column o f table 4.5). 
ร 1 
с 
ร ք 
ñ 」 III 
č 
III 
э 
Ι ΰ 
- J 
I 
ร 
x 
m 
ริ 
(О 
fe 
α 
5 
ч 
է 
ร 
н 
5 
― IB 
I я 
о £ 
ร ш 
ó 
^ §ί. ^ 
ι 
г-
σ^ ՚-Η <Ν ÍN ί> 
00 Ņ Ю OŇ เО Tf 
г-ะ г-^  โľí p p p ՝ r- ի– σ\ r- Γ-· Ф 
ι ι fsļ ι ι ι 
r ֊ ՝ r - ՝ 0 0 O s í N r ง Μ - ο ρ 
i - н ò o o o o o f ņ σ ^ σ \ σ ^ 
o ó o ó o ò ò ò 
р "つ 
р õ 
oõ <^ 
00 ^ ON ig 
řN ÍN 
О О О О 
ฐ S 야 
^ Ю ^ Ю ^ ^ 
00 ร ; ΐ-3 M -н ՞ ๐\ »o յո ON 
З ^ พร ั ๊ ^ ^ :Íไนๆ*^'^ 
ó v ó v ô v ô ô v ô 
<N * ^ І , L ю *^r- § го й ร; ！Я 
I I I I 
I I I 
卜 CO* r o 
寸 ОС" 
Ш
'О
 
69 (N <Ń 
一 
89 
Ш
'О
 
(Ņ 
r、 
ö 
ZOL 
Ш
 vo 卜 σν t—ł 1^ 
สิเ 
_ į Os ^ го 
О ô Ρ 
-Հ -J г*ๆ  -J СО 
о I О I О I 
m f기 
ŞU 
-н ՝0 
ON g ó ¿ ó [r 
о о о о 
о s ô ^ 
' t rJ о *^ о rîS ^ ^ c<ì ^ 
• » » * » J 0\ * * เ/า * เ о * 00 * * ä ?г ^  p r* S: p ^ чо ；！： --^ ^ Kİ «5 00 VO ! ľ ; ท ? 1 2 ^ cĶ ^  o6 ^  ^ į ^ 00 ^ OĢ^ 
«֊н о 
r—Ν vo /—v (Vi ՚—ร о op ^ p\ 
^ - н О ^ о ^ * — ' O ' — ' O ^ o l 
ま 
ԱՂ 
о 
ô 
¿ะ՝r、 
і 
го 
I 
ъ 
ē วิ 
о Cû ๐ 
+ Cû 
+ 
๐ ฬ 
บ 
CD 
บ 
(จ์ 
แ
d
V
 
๐ ๐ 
LL u_ 4
Ғ ul 
寸 
แ
d
V
 ü-
๐ ro ul 
OBJ 
ro Л о น. 寸 寸 
о ๐ 
••֊» 
•о 
-4-« 
(0 
BU (จ со Ipu 
ΐρύ 
Ipu ๐ о ๐ ๐ ч—· о о о 
๐ 
о 
บ 
•๐ で 
с ๐ ๐ о ๐ D D о о о ๐ 
CNJ со 寸 เท (๐ f、 00 
to I 1 
•พ ั 
. ร 
і 
เท 
(ง 
I 
.๐) 
с 
î ま 
то 
s 
1 
I 
Ό 
161 
In summary the results show that when we employ unconditional F-F three 
and Carhart four factor model, the ethical unit trasts outperform. It is observed that 
the value o f alphas increase when we add more factors. But adding bond as factor, the 
unit trusts beat the market. Further, the average result o f conventional unit trust 
outperform against benchmark as we see in the performance o f ethical unit trasts 
except in the single factor and five factors models. Above results show that 
unconditional models are best suited to measure the unit trust performance. 
Investment Style Level 
We w i l l not examine whether the previous results are biased because all ethical unit 
trasts are pooled within one portfolio and compared wi th conventional unit trasts 
portfolio. We w i l l investigate the explanatory power o f our eight performance models 
at the investment style level. Based on the investment style (investment objectives) 
reported by Investment Management Association U K and Unit Trast Year Book, we 
built three equally weighted portfolios o f the U K ethical unit trasts and they are: the 
U K A l l companies, Equity bicorne and Actively Managed. This allows us to dig 
deeper into the drivers of unit trast retums which in turn leads to a more detailed 
analysis o f the fund performance. The results o f the U K A l l companies, equity income 
and actively managed trasts are reported in the table 4.6, table 4.7 and table 4.8 
respectively. We observe in the table 4.6 (UK A l l companies), table 4.7 (Equity 
Income) and table 4.8 (Actively Managed), inclusion o f the SMB and H M L adds 
explanatory power to the unconditional models for all three style portfolios. The 
momentum factor does not show significant result in all the three equally weighted 
portfolios o f ethical unit trusts. The bond factor does not seem to add any 
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explanatory power based on a l l ethical uni t trast por t fo l ios . W e see s imi la r results at 
the a l l convent ional un i t trust por t fo l ios . 
M o v i n g over to condi t iona l performance models w e first observe that the 
in fe r io r i t y o f a l l cond i t iona l models over their uncondi t iona l counterparts (last co lumn 
o f tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8) . W i t h i n the range o f condi t iona l models , the addi t ion o f 
t ime-va ry ing S M B , H M L factors are relevant for a l l style por t fo l ios . The evidence o f 
m o m e n t u m and bond do increase a l i t t le i n L o g L bo th for ethical and convent ional 
un i t trusts. W e do not observe any s igni f icant t ime-var iance i n alpha i n any o f the 
three por t fo l ios either i n ethical or convent ional un i t trasts. The economic signi f icance 
o f the eight d i f ferent mode l specif icat ions w i l l be i l lustrated b y examin ing the 
in f luence o f more elaborate per formance models on alpha. For the U K al l companies 
and act ive por t fo l io o f ethical un i t trasts, the alpha estimates do not change 
dramat ica l ly when go ing f r om an uncondi t ional с А Р М mode l to Carhart four factors 
mode l . The same can be observed w i t h convent ional un i t trusts as w e l l (table 4.6). 
For equi ty income por t fo l i o the use o f elaborate per formance models has a good 
impact on bo th ethical and convent ional un i t trust alphas. M o v i n g from an 
uncond i t iona l с А Р М mode l (table 4.8) to condi t iona l с А Р М mode l makes alpha for 
act ive managed decrease from 0 .12% to -3 .19% per mon th . 
F ina l l y , the di f ferences i n alpha between ethical and convent ional funds 
provides us w i t h an interest ing development. A l t h o u g h i n single factor mode l for bo th 
uncond i t iona l and condi t iona l , alphas are ins ign i f icant and negat ive but subsequently 
w i t h add i t ion o f more factors, alphas are gradual ly t ransformed into a s l ight out-
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performance from 10% to 5 % signi f icant level (Table 4.9) . I t reveals that the U K 
ethical un i t trasts performance c lear ly ho ld up w i t h convent ional funds at least dur ing 
our sample per iod. A s the S M B factor load ing is s ign i f i cant ly posi t ive both 
uncondi t iona l and condi t iona l models , w e bel ieve that a l l fiind por t fo l ios are re la t ive ly 
more d r iven b y smal l cap retums than b y large cap returns. The H M L factor load ing 
on the other hand is s ign i f icant ly posi t ive too, ind icat ing sensi t iv i ty to h igh book to 
market stocks (value). W h e n w e observe the Carhart mode l , the s ign i f icant ly negative 
m o m e n t u m coef f ic ient signals the sensi t iv i ty o f the ethical un i t trust po r t fo l i o for l o w 
т о т е п Ш т stocks. Based on the increase in L o g l i ke l i hood , the 4 factor mode l is 
better at exp la in ing the un i t trast г е Ш т . The inc lus ion o f the m o m e n t u m factor makes 
s l igh t ly the alpha increase to -0.03 i n uncondi t iona l mode l to -0.09 i n condi t iona l 
mode l . The last uncondi t iona l mode l considers the addi t ional value o f a government 
bond index. A l t h o u g h L o g l i ke l ihood o f this mode l s l igh t ly increases, i t does not meet 
the cr i t i ca l value at 1 0 % level . F r o m the statistical v i ew po in t w e do not find any 
s igni f icant d i f fe rent o f the results between uncondi t iona l and condi t iona l models i n 
this case. 
I n summary, w e can say that S M B and H M L add explanatory power to the 
uncondi t iona l models for a l l por t fo l ios styles compared to cond i t iona l models. A f t e r 
con t ro l l i ng the т о т е п Ш т factor, the results show signi f icant per formance to a l l three 
por t fo l ios o f ethical uni t trusts. 
4.3-6 Conclusions 
Ethica l system contains specif ic guidel ines for ach iev ing the mora l filter and for 
conduct ing business. These guidel ines der ive from the interrelated concepts o f un i ty , 
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just ice and trustship. The demand for securities i n w h i c h investors can exercise their 
mora l responsib i l i ty is met b y the supply- the f inancia l in termediar ies-which creates 
ethical funds, f o l l o w i n g the tendency to o f fer standardised investment packages w i t h 
regards to return, te rm, currency etc. Eth ica l funds are therefore a standard response to 
that demand. The responsible investors make their decis ion between a m i n i m u m (not 
invest ing i n c lear ly i m m o r a l companies) and a broad range o f increasing excel lent 
opportuni t ies ( f r o m f inanc ing compani es w h i c h stand out for ethical conduct and 
t r y i ng to in f luence compani es management so that they cease to act i m m o r a l l y or 
improve qua l i ty based on ethics). W e discussed that i t is possible to def ine four ma in 
groups o f decisions that must be made b y ethical f lu ids; (1) the determinat ion o f the 
select ion cr i ter ia based on ethical guidel ines to choose the industr ies and compani es 
i n w h i c h the ethical ftrnd w i l l invest ( posi t ive cr i ter ia) or not to invest (negative 
cr i ter ia) ; (2) choosing the companies to invest i n ( this is associated w i t h in fo rmat ion 
problems and problems ar is ing from the prudent ia l appl icat ion o f ethical pr inc ip les) ; 
(3) sett ing the investment maintenance and replacement cr i ter ia and (4) establ ishing 
the p o l i c y o f relat ionships w i t h the management o f the companies whose shares are 
inc luded. 
The ethical un i t trast industry i n U K has witnessed a rap id g row th i n the last 15-
20 years and has become a s ign i f icant ly large reta i l market . Th is study provides a 
comprehensive assessment o f mutua l fund performance models us ing U K ethical uni t 
trasts relat ive to their convent ional peers w i t h the in tent ion to complement ex is t ing 
รณdies on ethical un i t trust performance. Our results reveal five conclusions. First , 
w i t h i n an uncondi t iona l sett ing, w e find Fama-French three factor and Carhart four 
factor mode l i nc lud ing market beta, S M B , H M L and m o m e n t u m are best able to 
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exp la in ethical uni t trast retums. Second, cond i t ion ing betas on pub l i c l y avai lable 
in fo rmat ion proves to be unsuitable for ethical un i t trust per formance. A l l condi t ional 
models are in fer ior to their uncondi t iona l peers. T h i r d , w e find very l i t t le evidence o f 
t ime-var ia t ion i n fund alphas. O n l y at the investment style level the por t fo l io 
conta in ing fiinds i n the U K A l l companies exh ib i t a l i t t le t ime vary ing i n fund alphas. 
Four th , at the aggregate level al l ethical uni t trust por t fo l ios , the alphas do change 
when go ing from uncondi t iona l с А Р М to condi t iona l Carhart four factor mode l . I n 
the investment style leve l , the in f luence o f uncondi t iona l Fama-French three factor 
mode l and uncondi t iona l Carhart four factor models are more s igni f icant . F i f t h , after 
con t ro l l i ng for style t i l ts and a l l ow ing for t ime var ia t ion i n betas and expected return, 
the U K ethical im i t trast results are consistent w i t h the general percept ion that there is 
no di f ference between ethical un i t trast performance and thei r convent ional peers. 
W h e n w e go to the quest ion o f w h i c h mode l to use fo r per formance 
measurement, w e make statistical and economic relevance. Pure ly based on statistical 
s igni f icance, the uncondi t iona l Fama-French three factor and Carhart four factor are 
c lear ly superior to the condi t iona l models. W h e n measur ing performance at an 
aggregated level the inf luence o f us ing elaborate condi t iona l models are not that 
obv ious. A t the investment style leve l , however , the use o f three factor and 
mul t i fac to r models do have a clear posi t ive impact to estimate alpha o f the funds. 
4.7 Appendix 
Appendix 1 Sample of UK Ethical Unit Trust 1996-2003 
SI. No. Name of the Ethical Trust Sample date/ 
Starting date 
Fund size Investment 
(in million £) Objective 
1 Abbey Nat.Ethical Ac 12.09.1987 
2 Abbey National Ethical Inc 12.09.2000 
3 AEGON Ethical Inc 17.04.1989 
4 Allchurches Amity Acc 10.02.1988 
5 Allchurches UK Equity Gwth Acc 21.10.1988 
6 AS Church House UK Growth 29.06.2000 
7 АХА Ethical Acc 05.05.1998 
8 Berkeley Socially Resp Acc 01.02.2000 
9 CAF Socially Responsible Fund 01.11.00 
10 Credit Suisse Fellowship Rtl 01.07.1986 
11 CIS Unit Marg.Environ Tst 01.01.1996 
12 Family Charities Ethical 01.03.1982 
13 Family Inv.Man. Charities Ethical 01.10.1999 
14 Friends Proฟ. stw. Inc. Trust Ac 01.06.1984 
15 Friends Proฬ. stw. Inc. Trust Dist 13.10.1987 
16 Friends Proฟ. I & S UK Ethical UK 22.11.1982 
17 Henderson UK Ethical A 31.12.1969 
18 Insight Inv Eur Ethical Rtl 17.03.2000 
19 ISIS UK Equity Sc1 Acc 31.05.1984 
20 ISIS UK Ethical Sc2 Inc 01.10.1996 
21 ISIS stewardship Gth SC1 Inc 13.10.1987 
22 Jupiter Environmental Opps 22.11.1999 
23 Jupiter Ecology Fund 01.01.1988 
24 L&G Ethical 05.07.1999 
49.8 UK All companies 
10 UK All companies 
45.4 UK Equity Income 
32.2 UK All companies 
55.2 UK All compari ies 
14 UK All compari ies 
24.2 UK All companies 
66.87 UK All companies 
35 UK All com pan ies 
57.85 UK All com pan ies 
125.8 UK All com pan ies 
10.74 Active Managed 
52 UK All companies 
667.33 UK All companies 
382.68 UK Equity Income 
65.86 UK All companies 
53.9 UK All com pan ies 
19.5 UK All com pan ies 
545 UK All com pan ies 
30.3 UK All companies 
124.2 UK All Companies 
20 UK All companies 
158.3 UK All companies 
32.7 UK All companies 
25 Могіеу SF UK Growth 19.02.2001 
26 Norwich UK Ethical 10.05.1999 
27 Old Mutual Ethical A Inc 31.03.1998 
28 Scot Amicable Ethical 20.08.1997 
29 Sovereign Ethical 02.05.1989 
30 St Jam Place Ethical Ac 01.05.1999 
31 St Jam Place Ethical Inc. 01.05.1999 
32 Std Lf UK Ethical Rtl 16.02.1998 
33 ร พ Environmental Investor Acc 30.09.1987 
34 ร พ Ethical A Acc 30.09.1987 
35 Teachers Sov. Ethical Fund 01.10.1996 
41.9 UK All companies 
69.01 UK All companies 
9.3 UK All companies 
43.3 UK All companies 
25 UK All companies 
22 UK All companies 
21 UK All companies 
52.8 UK All companies 
142.01 UK All companies 
40.4 UK All companies 
25 UK All companies 
Appendix 2: Sample of Conventional UK Unit Trust 1996-2003 
SI. No. Name of the Trust Sample start 
date 
Fund Size Investment 
as on 28.03.02 Objective 
1 Abbey Natl N&p UK Growth 01.01.1996 69.4 UK All Companies 
2 Aberdeen UK Opps A Inc 01.01.1996 61 UK All Companies 
3 AEGON UK Equity Growth A 01.01.1996 287.7 UK All Companies 
4 Artemis UK Growth 01.05.1998 200.9 UK All Companies 
5 Allianz Dresdner UK Equity с 01.01.1996 63.2 UK All Companies 
6 АХА UK Growth 01.01.1996 344.18 UK All Companies 
7 BWD UK Mid Cap Growth 02.08.1999 29.41 UK All Companies 
8 BWD UK Blue Chip Growth 01.01.1996 31.1 UK All Companies 
9 BGI Growth & In^^^ Inc 01.01.1996 152.5 UK All Companies 
10 Canlife General 01.01.1996 167.2 UK All Companies 
11 Cavendish Opportunities Rtl 01.01.1996 8.27 UK All Companies 
12 Cazenove Managed UK Equity в 01.12.1999 39.91 UK All Companies 
13 Credit Suisse FTSEIOOTkr Rtl 03.05.1999 14.14 UK All Companies 
14 Deutsche Genesis 01.01.1996 82.1 UK All Companies 
15 Endurance Fund 01.01.1996 17.6 UK All Companies 
16 Fidelity Growth & Inœ^ 01.01.1996 180.5 UK All Companies 
17 Fidelity MoneyBuilder UK Indx 01.01.1996 241.7 Active Managed 
18 GAM Multi-UK Inc 01.06.1999 29.03 UK Equity Income 
19 Hiscox UK Opportunities 01.04.1998 50 UK All Companies 
20 INV PERP Rupert Children's 01.01.1996 71.28 UK All Companies 
21 INV PERP UK Key Trends 02.03.1998 26.22 UK All Companies 
22 ISIS UK Prime SC1 Acc 01.05.2001 27.2 UK All Companies 
23 JPMF UK Dynamic Shares Acc 01.11.2000 49.99 UK All Companies 
24 Jupiter Undervalued Assets 01.06.2000 43.7 UK All Companies 
25 L&G stoekmarket Growth (xBa) 01.06.1998 
26 L&G Growth Inc 01.12.2000 
27 M ま ^ UK 100 Cos 01.01.1996 
28 Merrill Lynch UK Dynamic Inc 01.11.2000 
29 MFM Bowland Fund 02.08.1999 
30 ร พ UK Tracker A Acc 01.11.1996 
31 SocGen UK Spec 350 Equity 03.01.2000 
32 Solus UK Growth 01.01.1996 
33 Solus UK Special Situation 01.01.1996 
34 SVM UK Opportunities Rtl 03.04.2000 
35 SVM UK 100 Select Rtl 03.04.2000 
75.3 UK All Companies 
64.2 UK All Companies 
356 UK All Companies 
270.9 UK All Companies 
3.03 UK All Companies 
298.11 UK All Companies 
94.4 UK All Companies 
8.96 UK All Companies 
34.51 UK Equity Income 
18.3 UK All Companies 
_ 1 8 . 2 UK All Comoanies 
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Chapter 5 
Ethical Investing 
The Impact of Ethical Screening on Investment Performance 
一 The Case of the Dow Jones Islamic Index 
5.1 Introduction 
One o f the most impor tant features that enables Is lamic ethical funds to 
d is t inguish themselves f r o m convent ional funds is the type o f ethical screening they 
per fo rm. General ly , Is lamic ethical fimds apply t w o screenings - posi t ive and 
negative. Negat ive screenings delete stocks hav ing a poor rank ing on certain Is lamic 
ethical indicators wh i l s t pos i t ive screenings reward companies hav ing a h igh one. The 
l i terature also refers to a th i rd type o f screening - best o f sector (best i n class) w h i c h 
combines bo th pos i t ive and negative screening on a sector basis (Cummings , 2000). 
A n example m igh t be the best scor ing company w i t h i n the o i l sector (a l though this 
sector has issues o f po l lu t ion ) . 
Is lamic screening is designed, on Is lamic pr inc ip les, to ensure social 
responsib i l i ty i n the investment universe. I t uses a series o f f inancia l and social 
cr i ter ia i n order to ensure that investments are consistent w i t h the personal value 
systems and bel iefs o f the investors. Thus there are proh ib i t ions on buy ing stocks i n 
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companies whose p r imary business invo lves convent ional bank ing , a lcohol , pork 
processing, gambl ing , pornography (e.g., the pub l i sh ing , p r in t ing or who lesa l ing o f 
magazines etc.), tobacco, weapons product ion (e.g., the sale or p roduc t ion o f strategic 
goods or services for m i l i t a r y use inc lud ing nuclear weapons) , the m a n u f a c t o e o f 
ozone-deplet ing chemicals, the extract ion/ use o f large quanti t ies o f t ropical 
ha rdwood , env i ronmenta l po l l u t i on and any other ac t iv i ty deemed of fens ive to the 
pr inc ip les o f Is lam. M o r e recent ly, Is lamic invest ing concerns have expanded to 
inc lude corporate c i t izenship issues evaluat ing corporate responsiveness to the needs 
o f the envi ronment , customers, employees and the c o m m u n i t y i n general. W h i l e the 
focus o f Is lamic ethical screens continues to evolve as new issues become impor tant , 
i t is reasonable to expect interest i n Is lamic investments to cont inue ( Iqba l , 2000; 
Hassan, 2002) . Is lamic invest ing, however , is not w i thou t i ts cr i t ics. The p r imary 
object ive o f this research is to gain further insights in to the potent ia l impact these 
addi t ional Is lamic ethical screens have on investment per formance. 
There are essential ly t w o opposing v iews regarding the economic v iab i l i t y o f 
Is lamic invest ing. Advocates o f Is lamic invest ing argue that i t makes good social and 
economics sense to evaluate potent ia l investments w i t h bo th financial and Is lamic 
ethical screens. B y screening potent ia l investments, Is lamic ethical investors ensiire 
that the investments they select are consistent w i t h their personal values, wh i l e also 
ra is ing this awareness to firms that are not responsible to social concerns. A s Is lamic 
ethical investors become aware o f a firm's non-responsiveness to social concerns, 
they can place pressure on those firms to change. I n addi t ion, they argue that the 
resul t ing set o f firms may be stronger financially and more prof i tab le than those firms 
that are e l iminated through the screening process. I n contrast, opponents o f Is lamic 
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invest ing h igh l igh t the potent ia l adverse side effects that m igh t result from us ing 
Is lamic screens to l i m i t the investment universe. M a j o r concerns inc lude the potent ia l 
increase i n vo la t i l i t y , l ower re tums, reduced d ivers i f ica t ion and the addi t ional 
screening and mon i to r i ng costs that result from imp lement ing Is lamic ethical 
screening. I n part icular, Is lamic screenings tend to e l iminate larger firms from the 
investment universe and as a result, the remain ing firms tend to be smal ler and have 
more vo la t i le геШгаร. L o w e r retums are also possible as Is lamic screens el iminate 
stable b lue chip companies and otherwise attractive investment opportuni t ies from 
further considerat ion. 
Contrary to what m igh t be expected, Is lamic ethical screening has not 
hindered the expansion o f Is lamic invest ing, b ideed, o f ten hai led b y convent ional 
financial observers as the pre-eminent emerg ing market . Is lamic invest ing has g rown 
from a smal l regional ac t iv i ty to an internat ional indust ry encompassing mutua l fund 
complexes, investment banks, and retai l brokerage, etc. 
D u r i n g the late 1990ร, Is lamic ethical fonds rode o n the technology boom. I n 
1996, for example, there were twenty-n ine Is lamic funds on the market w i t h $US800 
m i l l i o n i n assets. However , (a l though according to a study on Is lamic funds for the 
year end ing 2001 (Fai laka) , the h igh g row th rate o f about 5 0 % , has dropped) b y ear ly 
2000 the number o f fiinds had g rown to n inety-eight w i t h approx imate ly $US5 b i l l i o n 
i n assets. A s at December 2 0 0 1 , there were over one hundred Is lamic equi ty funds 
w i t h tota l assets estimated at rough ly us$ 5.3 b i l l i o n (Fai laka, 2002). 
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A key factor i n the g row th m a y be that Shar i 'ah scholars have accepted the 
c o m m o n stock guidel ines 一 there is Shar i 'ah agreement that the buy ing and sel l ing o f 
софога їе stocks does not v io late Is lamic norms because stocks and shares represent 
real assets 一 and, as a result, interest has been generated among the managers o f 
equi ty fimds. Fur thermore, the payment o f d iv idends compl ies w i t h Shar i 'ah 
(whereas the payment or receipt o f interest (riba) does no t ) . Therefore, un l i ke fixed 
income assets such as government bonds, mutua l funds and equit ies are more 
compat ib le w i t h the Is lamic doctr ine o f p ro f i t and risk shar ing pr inc ip les. 
U n t i l n o w , most academic รณdies on ethical fund per formance have รณdi ed 
the average per formance o f ethical fimds as a group or compared the performance o f 
ethical mutua l fimds w i t h the performance o f al ternat ive, unrestr icted benchmark 
por t fo l ios (Statman, 2000; Luther and Mata tko , 1994; M a l l i n , Saadouni and Br is ton , 
1995), wh i l s t i gnor ing any effect screening m igh t have. The reason for this is obvious 
- a lack o f comprehensive data and in fo rmat ion on the exact approach fo l l owed b y 
the funds. The screeners deviate more c lear ly from convent ional fimds w i t h respect to 
investment style. Obv ious ly screening leads to d i f ferent per formance and investment 
style patterns and the inf luence o f screening on per formance provides a first hand 
observat ion for Is lamic ethical investors. Despite the increasing attent ion g iven b y 
pract i t ioners to Is lamica l ly ethical screened investments, there is scant academic 
research. A s far as w e k n o w , no other studies have t r ied to di f ferent iate between 
Is lamic ethical and convent ional investment and to compare their per formance. 
The p r imary object ive o f this study is therefore to determine the impact that 
Is lamic screens have on investment performance. Th is research is interest ing, because 
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the nature o f equi ty funds inh ib i ts our ab i l i t y to use a compar ison o f Is lamic fund 
performance as a means for iso lat ing the addi t ional costs that result from app ly ing 
Is lamic screens. I f w e go in to depth concerning the nature o f this p rob lem, i t m a y be 
observed that Is lamic fund performance does not mere ly ref lect the retums to i ts 
under ly ing securit ies, but rather that i t also ref lects di f ferences i n management fees 
and transaction costs w h i c h can vary w i d e l y across muณa l fund companies and stated 
investment object ives. I n addi t ion, convent ional or Is lamic ftind performance ref lects 
a fund manager 'ร ab i l i t y to make appropriate decisions concern ing asset a l locat ion, 
sector select ion and securi ty selections w i t h i n each sector. Together, these 
confound ing effects make it ext remely d i f f i cu l t to re ly upon the di f ferences i n fund 
performance to establish the impact that the appl icat ion o f Is lamic ethical screens has 
on investment performance. 
Therefore, w e examine the performance o f characterist ic Is lamic screened 
stock indexes that impact upon the performance o f act ive ly managed Is lamic ethical 
funds. A compar ison o f the performance characteristics Is lamic screened index 
( D J I M ) w i t h the per formance characteristics o f t w o unrestr icted benchmark por t fo l ios 
cou ld p rov ide a better p ic ture b y subject ing the investment universe to Is lamic ethical 
screening. I n th is รณdy, w e w i l l address the research questions o f wha t are the acณal 
relat ive re tums o f an Is lamic ethical por t fo l io? and wha t impact does an Is lamic 
ethical screen have on investment performance? 
W e evaluated the performance o f the Is lamic and convent ional indexes using 
the t radi t ional risk-adjusted measures such as the Sharpé, T reynor and the Jensen 
measures. W e also employed more elaborate mul t i - fac tor models that cont ro l led fo r 
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size, book to market , momen tum and t ime-var ia t ion i n betas. Results show that 
expected retums o f Is lamic screened por t fo l ios are h igher than the expected retums o f 
convent ional por t fo l ios . The chapter is organised in to eight sections. Sect ion 5.2 
discusses the feaณres o f the Is lamic ethical funds and investment. Section 5.3 
h igh l ights the regulatory framework o f Is lamic capital markets. Sect ion 5.4 looks at 
the possible ways i n w h i c h Is lamic ethical investment cr i ter ia can impact o f financial 
performance. Sect ion 5.5 discusses the models and methodo logy used i n the 
performance analysis. Sect ion 5.6 focuses on the data sources and variables 
employed i n the study. Sect ion 5.7 presents the empi r ica l results based on the single 
factor asset p r i c ing mode l , the three factor Fama -French mode l as w e l l as Carhart 'ร 
four factor mode l us ing bo th uncondi t iona l and condi t iona l in fo rmat ion . Sect ion 5.8 
contains conclusions. 
5.2 Features of Ethical Funds and Investment 
5.2-1 Islamic Ethical Investment 
Is lamic ethical investment can be def ined as investment i n f inancia l services and 
investment products that adhere to pr inc ip les established b y the Shari 'ah. These 
pr inc ip les require that; 
• Investments must be i n ethical sectors ( i .e., prof i ts cannot be made from 
proh ib i ted act iv i t ies) . 
• L·ivestment i n interest (r iba) based f inancia l inst i tut ions is not a l lowed. 
• L·ivestment i n interest-based securities (e.g. bonds, bank deposits etc.) is not 
a l lowed since these securities prov ide retums that are predetermined and 
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unrelated to the under ly ing performance o f the asset that is generating the 
retums. ՚*^  
• A U weal th creat ion should result from a partnership between the investor and 
the user o f capital i n w h i c h rewards and risks are shared. 
• Retums o n invested capital should be earned (i .e. t ied to the prof i ts generated 
b y the capi tal) rather than be pre-determined (as i n interest based reณrns 
prov ided b y bank deposits). 
5.2.2 Stock Market Investment 
There is a near consensus among contemporary scholars that i t is l a w f u l 
(halal) to invest i n stock markets p rov ided the company invested i n is not engaged i n a 
business forb idden b y Shari 'ah ( บ ร m a m , 2002) . However , there is also a m i n o r i t y 
v i e w that even w h e n an investment i n a business is p r ima facie l a w f u l (hala l ) , i t w i l l 
s t i l l not be l a w f u l because a l l businesses, especial ly pub l i c l y l isted j o i n t stock 
companies, i n pract ice use interest-based f inanc ing to establish and run their business. 
That said, the opin ions o f contemporary scholars are converg ing more i n favour o f 
shares o f companies whose gear ing level does not exceed 3 3 % and whose earnings 
from interest and inc identa l un law fu l (haram) act iv i t ies do not exceed 5 % o f the total 
earnings and whose assets do not comprise cash and receivables i n excess o f 4 9 % . 
Based on the cr i ter ia out l ined above, special indices 一 e.g., D o w Jones Sustainabi l i ty 
b idex , D o w Jones Is lamic Marke t b idex, F T S E Is lamic Index et al - have been 
designed conta in ing stocks l isted wor ld -w ide . 
47 By the same logic, equity securities (shares) are considered pemiissible by a consensus of 
сопіепфогагу Islamic ethical scholars (e.g. Ше Islamic Fiqh Academy), because the profits an investor 
makes on equity securities are tied to retums of the underlying company and hence are risk related. 
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As the popularity o f equity markets increases, Islamic scholars and business 
people have progressed towards defining and implementing the principles underlying 
Islamic investing (DeLorenzo, 2001). The progress has been helped by the 
establishment of the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIM) in 1996 and the FTSE 
Global Islamic Index in 1999. The two Indexes have spawned over fifteen style 4 8 and 
regional indexes tracking stocks conforming to Islamic principles. 
As o f 3 1 " December 2002, the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIM) had a 
total market worth approximately $7.5 tr i l l ion and is composed o f over 1,000 equities. 
The average capitalization o f a firm on the index is about $12 bi l l ion. The DJ IM 
index is reviewed quarterly to ensure it keeps up wi th religious and capitalization 
guidelines. It is weighted approximately 75% to the Americas, 15% to Europe and 
Afr ica and 10% to Asia and the Pacific Rim. The high weighting for the Americas 
occurred in part because American companies, which have relatively low debt ratios, 
generally survive screening better than firms in other parts o f the world. As per offer 
documents published by the Dow Jones bidex Group in 2003, it is expected that $15 
bi l l ion to $30 bi l l ion w i l l be under management in active and index mutual fimds 
within 4 to 5 years. Given this expansion, it can be expected that the Dow Jones 
Islamic index w i l l be followed wi th special interest by ethical investors l iving in the 
West. 
48 The managers o f individual stock fimds nowadays feel pressured to keep the portfolios they manage 
fu l ly invested at all times, and to confine themselves to a given port fol io style that defines die fund's 
strategy-growth versus vaiue stocks, for example, or large-cap stocks versus small-cap stocks. 
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5.2.3 Qualitative and Quantitative Screening of Stocks 
The D J IM addresses demand by creating a standard for applicable Islamic 
equity investing. It was designed to track the performance of leading, publicly traded 
compani es whose activities are consistent wi th Islamic Shari'ah principles. Two 
types o f screening are practised; 
1) Qualitative Screen; 
This is a part o f the general rules followed by Shari'ah scholars in determining 
what is lawful (halal) and what is unlawful (haram) for investment. 
There are two types o f qualitative screens; 
(i) Industry screening (positive screening); 
Is the company in an industry prohibited as per Islamic ethical criteria or in an 
industry involved in unethical business/ activities? 
(і і) Business practices (negative screening); 
Is the company exploitative in its relationship wi th customers and suppliers or 
unethical in its trade practices? 
2) Quantitative Screen; 
Again, this is a part o f the general rules followed by Shari'ah scholars in 
determining what is lawfti l (halal) and what is unlawful (haram) for investment. 
There are three types o f quantitative screens; 
(i) Debt/ asset ratio; 
Has the company borrowed fiinds on interest (whether fixed or floating)? It is 
clear that there should ideally be no interest-based debt but that it should be based on 
the Islamic legal principle o f " l i al-akthar hukm al-kul" (to the majority goes the 
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verdict o f the whole) and subsequent scholarly opinions that a company is not a 
permissible investment i f debt financing is more than 33% of its capital. 
(i i) Interest-related income; 
Does the company generate any interest or interest-related income? This 
includes those companies which do not make earning interest their business but place 
their surplus funds in investments that yield interest income. As in the previous case, 
ideally no income should come from interest-related sources. According to some 
scholars, however, up to 10% of a company's total income can be derived from 
interest sources. 
( i i i ) Monetary assets; 
Are substantial portions o f the company's assets monetary? Items such as 
accounts receivable and l iquid assets such as bank accounts and marketable securities 
are relevant. Various minimums have been set for the ratio o f i l l iquid assets (assets 
that are not in the form o f money) necessary to make an investment permissible. 
Some set this minimum at 5 1 % (again, according to the principle o f "to the majority 
goes the verdict o f the whole"). A few ethical scholars cite 33% as an acceptable ratio 
o f i l l iquid assets to total assets. 
Like socially responsible screening, Islamic screening criteria provide a 
complete framework for fund managers to fol low in their investment practices. 
Consequently, the exclusion of some sectors and preference for others w i l l have an 
effect on the direction that Islamic ethical funds follow. This can be a positive or 
negative effect depending on the balance o f sectors in the portfolio. Major concerns 
include the potential increase in volatil ity, lower retums and reduced diversification 
(Sauer, 1997) and opponents argue that Islamic screening tends to smaller and more 
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volatile геШтร. Lower retums are indeed possible because Islamic screens can 
eliminate stable blue chip and other attractive investment opportunities. 
5.2.4 Trading and Investing Practices 
In addition to criteria for selection o f securities, Shari'ah principles are also 
applicable to investing and trading practices when applied to individual investors as 
well as Islamic ethical funds. Among the principles is the insistence that investable 
funds must be free o f interest-based debt. The investors cannot borrow on interest to 
finance their investments, and therefore they cannot trade on margin i.e., borrow to 
purchase shares. Conventional funds such as hedge fimds, arbitrage funds and 
leveraged buy-out (LBO) funds all borrow heavily in order to finance their investment 
practices, and so are prohibited for Islamic ethical investors. 
Unlike conventional investors, Islamic ethical investors are prohibited to 
participate their investment decisions on short-term speculation. Trading is important 
and should be wel l timed to take advantage o f market prices but these considerations 
should go hand in hand wi th the fundamental value o f the compani es in which 
investment is made. 
5.3 Regulatory Framework of the Islamic Capital Market 
The main goals o f stock market regulation are to promote efficiency and to 
ensure ethics and fairness in the markets. However, a conflict exists between 
efficiency and ethics and in such cases regulations involve a trade-off between 
efficiency and ethics. Islamic norms and ethics are enunciated by Islamic 
jurisprudence (Shari'ah) which governs Islamic markets. 
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The problem arises because allocative efficiency implies that funds should be 
channelled into financially desirable projects. Prices theoretically signal the flow o f 
funds and reflect the intrinsic value o f stocks in both the primary market where initial 
public offerings are made and the secondary market where stocks are continuously 
traded. Pricing efficiency (prices of stocks must equal their respective fundamental 
values at all times) is a prerequisite for allocative efficiency. The equality between 
prices and value o f a stock can only be achieved where there is informational 
efficiency. A further aspect o f the situation is that, in order for there to be operational 
efficiency, transactions should be executed at minimal costs. Thus both informational 
efficiency and operational efficiency are pre-requisites to pricing efficiency. 
Consequently, any move or regulation that reduces transaction costs, simplifies the 
trading system, increases the availability and accuracy o f information or improves 
information processing by participants, is a step towards improving allocative 
efficiency. In an efficient market, violent price swings are also ruled out. 
5.3.1 Ethics and Efficiency Issues in Conventional and Islamic Ethical Investing 
However, whilst the promotion o f efficiency is the primary goal of the stock 
market regulator, another goal is to ensure ethics and fairness in the markets. Shefrin 
and Satatman (1992) present a much broader framework and identify the fol lowing 
seven classes o f market fairness; 
• Freedom from coercion; all investors have the right not to be coerced into a 
transaction. 
• Freedom from misrepresentation; all investors have the right to rely on 
information voluntarily disclosed as truthful. 
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• Equal information; all investors are entitled to have equal access to a particular set 
of information. 
• Equal processing power; all investors are entitled to a competency floor o f 
information processing ability and protection against cognitive errors. 
• Freedom from impulse; all investors are entitled to protection from imperfect self-
control 
• Efficient prices; all investors are entitled to trade at prices they perceive as 
efficient or correct. 
• Equal bargaining power; all investors are entitled to equal power in negotiations 
leading to a transaction. 
Shenfin and Sataman (1992) also analyse the fol lowing six major stock market 
regulations; 
(1) Merit or blue sky regulations 
(2) Mandatory disclosure regulations 
(3) Stability regulations 
(4) Margin regulations 
(5) Trading intemiption regulations 
(6) Insider trading regulations 
Regulations would vary across country markets because o f differences in the 
relative importance given to concerns about ethics and efficiency by regulators. In 
many countries that have Islamic stock markets, regulators seem to have adopted the 
framework o f governance that exists in the us as a benchmark, thus having 
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underlying US model ethics-efficiency notions but subjecting them to an Islamic 
evaluation. 
The Islamic system can be defined in terms o f rights or entitlements alone. Rights 
in the Islamic framework are subsumed under the broader concept o f fairness (haqq) 
which places an emphasis on both rights and obligations. Islamic jurisprudence 
(Shari'ah) as formulated through various judicial schools contains commands and 
prohibitions in five broad categories; 
(1) Obligatory acts, 
(2) Recommended acts, 
(3) Permitted actions, 
(4) Acts that are discouraged and regarded as reprehensive but not strictly 
forbidden, 
(5) Acts that are categorically forbidden. 
Both ethics and efficiency notions involve Islamic jurispradence (Shari'ah), which 
underlie all Shari'ah ralings that form the basis o f legislation and regulation in an 
Islamic system. The objectives of rulings or regulations in the Islamic system 
comprise benefits and maintain fairness. Regulations in conventional markets, such 
as the US, have continuously evolved over time. Their present shape may be traced to 
decades o f debate, discussions in the light o f new events, practices in markets and the 
experiential learning o f regulators and policy makers. A l l regulations and rules in an 
Islamic system are derived from the Quran, Hadith (tradition o f the Prophet) and 
through Ijtihad (the process o f extracting or deriving legal rules form the sources o f 
law is termed Ijtihad, which means endeavour involving total expendiณre o f effort). 
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5.3.2 Etbics and Regulation of Islamic Stock Market 
The stock market regulation framework, according to Islamic ethics, is based on 
the fol lowing principles; 
(1) Freedom of Contract 
Neither conventional nor Islamic markets provide total freedom from coercion. 
Conventional markets are characterised by merit regulations and trading halts. In the 
primary market, merit regulations govern the issuance and sale o f securities. This 
diminishes the right to freedom from coercion and makes sense only in a world where 
investors are l ikely to commit cognitive errors and lack o f perfect self-control. 
Regulations requiring mandatory disclosures improve the informational efficiency of 
the market. 
As far as secondary markets are concerned, trading halt regulations permit an 
exchange to suspend trading temporarily. Similar regulations also attempt to introduce 
price limits 一 upper and lower bound - outside which trading cannot take place, and 
disallow short-sale when prices are declining. In an Islamic market, there are far 
greater constraints on freedom. A constraint that has a direct impact on the size o f the 
Islamic stock market relates to the objective o f the exchange. In an Islamic market, 
the objective o f the contract must be lawful. Equity or stock as a contract has been 
subjected to much scrutiny and has been generally found to be acceptable in an 
Islamic system. However, while stocks of all kinds o f companies may be traded in a 
conventional market, the universe o f permissible stocks is considerably smaller than 
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in an Islamic market. Based on Shari'ah compatibility, only about 22 % o f stocks that 
are part o f the Dow Jones Index are found to be permissible. 
(2) Prohibition of Riba (interest/usury) 
Prohibition o f riba is central to the Islamic financial law and also unique to an 
Islamic stock market. The Quran and Hadith (tradition o f the Prophet) are explicit in 
condemning riba and leave little room for divergence o f views or interpretation. The 
riba-related norms require that stocks o f conventional banks and financial instiณtions 
that explicitly deal in interest-based activities are excluded from the universe o f 
permissible stocks. Another major requirement o f riba prohibition is that stocks must 
reflect ownership interests in real assets and not in debts or money in order to be 
tradable at a market price. When a stock represents ownership interests in money or 
debt, these can only change hands without any increase or riba. The norm relating to 
riba-prohibition also rules out interest-based borrowing that is part o f the market 
microstrucณre, such as margin trading. 
(3) Prohibition of Gharar 
The Arabic word gharar means risk, uncertainty and hazard. Some degree o f 
gharar is acceptable in the Islamic stock market. Only conditions o f excessive gharar 
need to be avoided. There are several categories o f gharar, as fol low; 
• Settlement Risk (when the seller has no control over the subject matter 
i.e. a sale without taking possession), 
• Inadequacy and inaccuracy o f information (gharar or uncertainty may 
be caused by a lack o f adequate value-relevant information), 
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• Complexity in Contracting (gharar also refers to undue complexity in 
contracts; Shari'ah does not permit interdependent contracts, for 
example combining two sales in one is not permitted according to a 
number of authenticated hadiths), 
• Games o f Chance (the Quran prohibits contracts based on uncertainty 
or pure games o f chance). 
A gharar transaction is a zero-sum game wi th uncertain payoffs (Al-Suwailem, 
1990). A zero-sum game, by definition, is a game in which the interests o f the two 
parties are in direct opposition. The set o f Islamic rules and regulations, such as the 
prohibition o f gharar, seek to ensure that exchange is undertaken for achieving win-
w in outcomes and excluding transactions leading to win-lose or lose-lose outcomes. 
A legitimate question arises concerning the difference between buying a lottery ticket 
and buying a share in the stock market. A clear difference is that a lottery is a zero-
sum game. The winner o f a lottery only wins at the expense o f the others. In a stock 
market, all participants might w in when economic conditions are favourable. The 
implication is that since collective winning is possible in a stock market, it certainly 
does not involve gharar and is therefore permissible. Al-Suwailem (1999) provides 
very useful regulatory rules for the stock market as far as gharar is concerned. 
Therefore, it is evident that the regulator would need to be extremely vigilant, play a 
dynamic role and ensure that speculation is discouraged to the minimum, even i f not 
entirely eliminated. But the microstructure o f conventional markets is often designed 
to facilitate such speculation. Wi th minimisation o f speculation as an important 
motive o f the regulator, the regulator should focus on curbing the anomalies which 
arise primarily due to the presence o f speculation fuelled by the availability of usury 
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(riba) based financing o f stock transactions, stock lending systems, margin trading and 
periodic settlement systems. 
(4) Free and Fair Price 
At the macro level, Islamic finance envisages a free market where prices are 
determined by forces o f demand and supply. There should be no interference in the 
price formation process even by the regulators. Islamic ethics condemn any attempts 
to influence prices toough creating artificial shortage o f supply 一 the Islamic term for 
this is ihtikar. Similarly, any attempt to bid up the price by creating artificial demand 
is considered unethical. The presence o f ghubn means the difference between the 
price at which a transaction is executed and the fair price and this makes a transaction 
unethical. 
Speculation is also against the norms o f Islamic ethics and an Islamic market 
would be free from any mechanism that encourages speculation. However, since the 
distinction between speculation and genuine investment is largely a matter o f 
intention by the individual, the former cannot be directly prohibited. O f course, the 
observed difference is generally in terms o f the difference in time horizon. To curb 
speculation i t is suggested that a minimum holding period requirement should be 
imposed. 
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5.3.2-1 Speculation, Margin Trading, Short Selling and Insider Trading not 
Allowed in the Islamic Market 
We observe from the above discussion that in an Islamic market speculation is 
not acceptable and measures would have to be taken to control speculative trading. In 
addition short selling and margin trading are restricted. Causes are discussed below; 
Speculation 
Speculators take a number of forms, but underlying the practice is the fact that 
speculators are not concerned with the underlying commodity or security in which 
they trade. A speculator may trade in gold, us dollars or Saudi Riyal or I M B stock, 
not because o f an interest in the economic aspects o f being a long term investor but 
because o f a desire to make a quick gain from buying and selling. A speculator w i l l 
buy stock wi th the anticipation o f prices rising usually wi th a short-term horizon. The 
danger o f this is that what is init ial ly planned as a short-term position wi th a sale to be 
completed before taking delivery o f stock, may wel l result in a longer-term position 
when the stock does not perform as expected. Such purchases are often financed on 
margins or other forms o f borrowing. A speculator w i l l sell in anticipation o f prices 
falling. This strategy may involve a short sale whereby the speculator borrows stock 
from a broker wi th a view to subsequently buying it at lower prices, thereby 
completing the deal. Related to speculation is the practice o f arbitrage. A n arbitrageur 
is a particular type o f speculator who seeks to obtain a risk free return wi th a zero 
investment. An example o f a potential arbitrage opportunity is the existence o f 
identical assets at different prices in different markets. Such practices are more 
diff icult wi th modem communications and computerised trading, as price 
discrepancies in different domestic markets are quickly eliminated from the system. 
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From an ethical viewpoint this type o f arbitrage w i l l be regarded as one aspect o f 
speculation. The use o f the term speculation w i l l apply to any practice that aims at 
short term gain without an intention to participate as an equity investor in the 
company concerned. In view o f this, the speculation is unacceptable in Islamic capital 
markets because o f its association wi th gambling and excessive risk taking. In 
addition, speculation creates volatility. 
Margin Trading 
Margin trading refers to the purchase o f stocks on credit using a margin accorai 
at a stockbrokering firm. The opening o f an account enables the client to commence 
margin trading, that is buying stock by paying part o f the price in cash and borrowing 
the remainder from the broker at an interest rate called the margin interest rate. 
Formalised margin trading is wel l established in most stock markets and regulatory 
authorities attempt to use margin call and margin interest rates as devices for 
controlling speculative activity. Non-formalised margin trading through personal 
borrowing, without notification to the broker concerned, is more diff icult to control. 
The appeal o f margin trading is the ability to magnify any gains on a transaction, but 
at the same time it magnifies any losses, as these are not shared with the brokers. 
Therefore, in an Islamic capital market, the margin trading is unacceptable. 
A short selling is simply the sale of a stock not owned by the vendor. The 
purpose is to take advantage o f an expected price decline. When the price declines, 
the stock is purchased and the short position closed. To facilitate these transactions 
the vendor'ร broker w i l l cover the sale by lending stock. Islamic shari'ah does not 
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permit the sale of any commodity a person does not posses, however there are certain 
exceptions such as Salam contracts. Under the Salam contract, a clearly identifiable 
commodity can be sold for піШге delivery provided the vendor has paid in ful l for the 
commodity in advance. It may be possible to view a short sale as resembling a Salam 
contract but it would fail a test o f being permissible because short sales involve part 
payment through a margin account. The vendor hopes to buy the stock at a filณre date 
at an amount below the selling price. The purchase price is not yet known and cannot 
be paid in ful l . The balance o f evidence is that short selling is not accepTable in an 
Islamic stock market. 
Insider Trading 
bisider dealing is a phenomenon subject to regulation in many stock markets in 
the world. A n insider is typically defined as any director, officer or stockholder o f a 
company who has access to privileged information not available to other stockholders 
or potential investors in the firm, bisiders do some time trading in the firm's stock 
(Cao, Field and Hanka, 2004). The danger is that insiders may trade on inside 
information to the detriment o f other investors. Generally, the mere act o f trading on 
inside information to the detriment o f other investors, even i f the trader is not an 
insider, is interpreted as an unacceptable price. In many countries it i s deemed to be 
illegal. In an Islamic market it is also prohibited. 
5.3.3 Efficiency of Islamic Markets 
The absence o f professional speculators, l iquidity and operational efficiency 
adversely affects Islamic markets but it would certainly have a salutary impact on its 
allocative efficiency. Keynes (1936) shows that prices o f stocks deviate significantly 
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from their underlying values because o f the undue emphasis on liquidity. Even the 
so-called presence o f informed and professional investors is not l ikely to ensure 
pricing efficiency or equality between prices and values. Subsequent developments in 
stock market literature brought back the emphasis on liquidity as the efficient market 
theory gained wide acceptance and that stock prices are at all time equal to their 
values in an efficient market. The efficient market theory was the raling paradigm for 
about four decades until the 1980ร. The second half o f the 1980ร witnessed the birth 
o f a new body o f literaณre which questioned the fiindamental assumption underlying 
the efficient market theory that the markets are dominated by informed and not noise 
traders. This brings the focus back to the need for ensuring equality between prices 
and values. In the Islamic framework, this is attempted through stringent restrictions 
on all forni o f speculation. What is condenable in an Islamic market is mi ld 
speculation and marginal discrqjancy between price and value, not because these are 
desirable, but because, since intentions and perceptions play a role, it is diff icult to 
ful ly eliminate them. 
In view o f the above discussions, we see that there is great degree o f commonality 
between the notions of Islamic ethics wi th the secular notions o f ethics and efficiency 
raderlying regulations in conventional markets. Furthermore, Islamic ethics would 
ensure stability and allocative efficiency by reducing disparity between prices and 
stock values. 
5.4 The Possible Ways: Islamic Ethical Investment Criteria Can 
Impact on Financial Performance 
There are many ways in which company strategies perceived as ethical can 
impact on share prices both at the company and at the Islamic ethical portfolio level. 
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We w i l l examine the different ethical influences ttoough two models in order to 
understand how risk and returns can be affected by the performance. 
5.4.1 The Effects of Ethical Behaviour on Company Share Prices 
The social responsibility o f business is to maximise profits (Friedman, 1958). 
Spiller (2000) argues that this belief does not describe what the most successful 
compani es асณally do. Citizen campaigns against irresponsible софогаїе behaviour 
along wi th consumer action and increasing shareholder pressure have given rise to the 
'stakeholder approach'. Wheeler and Sillanpää (1997) examined stakeholder 
relationships and company success and in conclusion stated that "the long-term value 
o f a company rests primarily on the knowledge, abilities and commitment o f its 
employees; its relationships wi th investors and customers; and the way the company 
is perceived to create 'added value' beyond the commercial transaction. Added value 
embraces issues like quality, service, care for people and the natural environment and 
integrity. It is our belief that the future o f the development o f local, inclusive 
stakeholder relationsMpร w i l l become one o f the most important determinants o f 
commercial viabil i ty and business successes." (page 48) 
Agenda 21 of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (บNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 adopted two important issues 
o f sustainable development 一 financing and technology transfer from developed 
countries to underdeveloped countries. In light o f the demands for sustainable 
development and the call o f agenda 2 1 , the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) recognised the importance o f financial institutions by stating that "financial 
instiณtions which assume the risk o f companies and plants can exercise considerable 
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inf luence - i n some cases, cont ro l - over investment and management decisions 
w h i c h cou ld be brought in to p lay for the benef i t o f the env i ronment " ( U N E P , 1998, 
p.17). b ivestment managers stand a good chance o f i m p r o v i n g their po r t fo l io 
per formance and reducing their risks i f they pay closer at tent ion to the envi ronmenta l 
per formance o f the companies i n w h i c h they p lan to invest. There are 'downs ide ' 
factors w h i c h m a y serve to depress investment retums and 'ups ide ' factors w h i c h 
cou ld benef i t companies. The downside factors are the cost and ava i lab i l i ty o f capi ta l , 
increased l i ab i l i t y c la ims, expanded rules on disclosure, greater emphasis on 
env i ronmenta l factors i n credit risk rat ings, the ava i lab i l i ty and cost o f insurance, the 
emergence o f env i ronmenta l taxes, and the increasing use o f economic arguments b y 
ecological pressure groups. The upside factors inc lude; increases i n resource 
p roduc t i v i t y , market share g rowth and new business development due to companies 
recognis ing the potent ia l o f fered b y the upside factors ( E I R I S , 1999). 
Figure 5.1 Effects of Ethical Behaviour on Company Share Price 
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W e w i l l see the ways i n w h i c h company strategies perceived as ethical can 
impact on share pr ice. The mode l (F igure 5 . 1 , w h i c h is repl icated from the E IR IS 
mode l ) shows the ma in l inks between the company, shareholders, employees, 
customers and government and h o w ethics can impact on a company 'ร cash flow i n 
terms o f costs, sales and the cost o f capital . 
Company Policies 
Improved env i ronmenta l per formance can lead to cost savings b y prevent ing 
env i ronmenta l l iab i l i t ies , and b y reduc ing materials and energy consumpt ion. A t the 
same t ime i t should be recognised that some o f the behaviour that ethical investors 
favour is ve ry un l i ke l y to be more prof i tab le for a company, at least i n the short term. 
A good example is a company 'ร decis ion to tu rn d o w n a lucrat ive m i l i t a r y contract 
w i t h an oppressive reg ime - that is not l i ke l y to increase pro f i ts unless the company 
can find an equal ly prof i tab le contract elsewhere but the l ong term effects on their 
reputat ion m a y prove to be more benef ic ia l . S im i l a r l y not a l l effects to reduce 
detr imental impacts on the envi ronment m a y save money or earn a reward i n the 
marketplace. 
Reputation 
I t m a y be ment ioned that ethical or unethical behaviour can have an impact on 
reputat ion and share pr ice. A good example is how an o i l exp lo r ing company l ike 
Shel l can be sidetracked b y w ide r social issues. The boycot t o f Shel l i n 1995 
resul t ing f r o m the company 'ร attempt to dump its Brent Spar o i l p l a t f o rm i n the N o r t h 
Sea showing a wi l l ingness b y the consumer to favour companies w h i c h have a po l i c y 
to respect the envi ronment . Later Shel l f ound i tse l f at the centre o f an internat ional 
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controversy for its operations in N ige r ia i n re lat ion to that count ry 'ร poor human 
rights recorď*^. Shareholder and consumer pressure forced Shel l to recognise that the 
separation o f business from w ider society is not heal thy for business. Klassen and 
M c L a u g h l i n (1996) argue that env i ronmenta l disasters such as o i l spi l ls reduce 
company share prices i n excess o f the direct clean up costs. 
Consumers 
I n the business w o r l d , professional companies are increasingly recognis ing 
that they have to pay attent ion to al l their stakeholders. Enl ightened consumers are 
aware o f the market movement and o f the fact that concern about unethical behaviour 
can harm sales. I n 1996, M O M conducted a p o l l about the consumer product o f 
companies and found that three out o f ten people had chosen or boycot ted a product or 
company fo r ethical reasons^". Campaign ing organisations are increasingly target ing 
thei r campaigns against large mul t inat ionals and using the power o f consumers and 
investors whose awareness o f ethical issues is g row ing to persuade companies to 
change. 
M O R I has developed a mode l for assessing the key relat ionships o f a business, 
cal led the Relat ionship H ie ra rchy (Hu t ton , 1997). I t proposes that the k e y 
relat ionships o f a business can be thought o f i n terms o f a hierarchy, as shown i n the 
F igure 5.2. The level o f l oya l t y or commi tmen t imp l ies not on l y a wi l l ingness to 
repurchase bu t also to recommend the business to others i f asked. A t the highest level 
o f advocacy, the ind iv idua l is so impressed b y the company that customers w i l l 
ご M a r k M o o d y - S t u a r t , Financial Times Guide to Responsible Business, 1998. 
5 ° F o r m o r e deta i l s , P . H u t t o n ( 1 9 9 7 ) , " M O ผ C u s t o m e r R e l a t i o n Research : U s i n g Research to I m p r o v e 
Q u a l i t y and Serv i ce P r o v i s i o n , " Paper p resented at տա Con fe rence January 1997. 
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recommend i t to others w i thou t be ing asked. Thus the company 'ร o w n customers and 
other stakeholders are do ing its marke t ing for them. 
Figure 5.2 MORI Relationship Hierarchy 
Advocacy 
Loyalty or Commitment 
Satisfaction 
Transaction 
Trust 
Awareness 
(Source: M O ผ Customer Re la t ion Research) 
Regulation 
Government regulat ion plays an impor tant ro le i n p romo t ing ethics i n 
business. Managers o f ethical ňmds also c la im that the companies they select for 
investment w i l l , because o f the companies ' proact ive stance on the envi ronment , be 
that o f us ing the latest env i ronmenta l technology, m i n i m i s i n g damage to the 
envi ronment or operat ing 'best pract ice ' ie. benef i t ing from future regulat ion b y be ing 
ahead o f the game. 
Employees Motivational Training 
H u m a n resources development or the mot iva t iona l t ra in ing o f employees make 
for a pleasant w o r k i n g envi ronment and sound w o r k i n g practices w h i c h have a 
posi t ive effect on p roduc t i v i t y and ef f ic iency. Mo t i va t i ona l t ra in ing can prov ide 
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p ro f i tab i l i t y w i t h i n the company. A M O R I survey i n 1996 found that 4 1 % o f 
employees satisf ied w i t h their j obs w i l l recommend their emp loyer ' ร products or 
services w i thou t be ing asked. O n the other hand i t may also be observed that not a l l 
attempts to invest i n better stakeholder relat ions can be expected automat ica l ly to 
y ie ld a greater return. 
5.4.2 The Effects of Islamic Ethical Investments on a Portfolio 
The Is lamic ethical cr i ter ia o f the fund and its managers are the key inf luences 
on por t fo l i o performance. The Shar i 'ah Superv isory Board based o n Is lamic ethics 
w i l l def ine the ethical universe from w h i c h the fund manager can invest. I n the case 
o f a passively managed fund , i t is on l y the Is lamic ethical cr i ter ia and the index 
construct ion rules that are the key inf luences, a l though ve ry few passively managed 
ethical tracker funds exist. F igure 5.3 be low shows the ways i n w h i c h Is lamic ethical 
investment cr i ter ia can impact on por t fo l io per formance (a mode l developed based on 
the mode l o f E I R I S , 1999). 
Diversífícatíon 
The use o f Is lamic ethics to def ine the investable universe at the por t fo l io level 
means there m a y be some degree o f lesser d ivers i f icat ion. The por t fo l io var iab i l i t y 
does not ref lect the average var iab i l i t y o f its components because d ivers i f ica t ion 
reduces var iab i l i t y (Howcro f t , 2001). Brear ley and M y e r s (1996) argue that even a 
l i t t le d ivers i f icat ion can prov ide a substantial reduct ion i n va r iab i l i t y but that the 
investor can get most o f the benefi ts w i t h re la t ive ly f e w stocks. Therefore the 
d ivers i f ica t ion effects o f select ing stocks from an Is lamic and eth ica l ly constrained 
universe are l i ke l y to be ve ry t iny . 
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Figure 5.3 Effects of Islamic Ethical Investment on a Portfolio 
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Sector and Stock Effects 
Is lamic ethical restr ict ions w i l l have an impact o n the size and structure o f the 
resul t ing invest ib le universe. I t is o f ten said that ethical investment funds exhib i t a 
smal ler-companies effect since they tend to invest i n smaller or m e d i u m size 
companies (Gregory, Mata tko and Luther , 1997). Larger companies m a y be more 
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l i ke l y to be ru led out b y Is lamic ethical screening as they tend to be i nvo l ved i n a 
larger number o f areas o f w h i c h investors m igh t disapprove. Smal ler companies may 
be more vo la t i le than larger companies, w h i c h matters in the short te rm, a l though a 
por t fo l io o f smaller companies w i l l d ivers i fy away the speci f ic risk o f ind iv idua l 
stocks. 
Is lamic ethical funds are of ten overweighted i n some sectors such as 
technology and service sectors. The Is lamic ethical universe comple te ly avoids 
sectors l i ke tobacco, convent ional b anks, pornography, a lcohol , gambl ing , po l lu t ing 
industr ies and so on , w h i c h are against the Is lamic Shar i 'ah cr i ter ia. I n the short te rm, 
these sectoral effects w i l l come into p lay as some sectors do better than others. Th is 
can have a posi t ive or negat ive effect depending on the balance o f sectors i n the 
po r t fo l i o compared w i t h the unconstrained universe. Nevertheless, sometimes sectors 
v i ewed as unethical w i l l have inherent long- term l iab i l i t ies, for example the tobacco 
sector. Overa l l , the l i ke l ihood is that ind iv idua l sectoral effects w i l l balance out, at 
least i n the long te rm. 
Tracking Error 
The t rack ing error o f an Is lamic ethical fund against unrestr icted 
(convent ional ) indices (such as M S C I - U S or CRSP) compared w i t h that o f an 
unconstrained fund is also l i ke l y to be higher. Shorter te rm per formance may d iverge 
w i d e l y from that o f fimds us ing more convent ional approaches and from the 
unrestr icted indices (convent ional index) . B u t the t rack ing error may not matter to the 
investor concerned about the balance between г е Ш т and risk measured b y the 
vo la t i l i t y o f a fund. 
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Missed Opportunity 
Sometimes opportuni t ies m igh t be missed because a Shar i 'ah supervisory 
board based on Is lamic ethical cr i ter ia m a y prevent investment i n a company that is 
predicted to out -per form. 
Concentration 
L i k e mainstream ethical funds, a few Is lamic ethical funds c l a im that because 
they have fewer compames to invest i n , they k n o w those companies better and are 
more focused on their act iv i t ies and, as they are o f ten long te rm investors, this pays 
o f f over t ime. I f Is lamic ethical funds have fewer companies to invest i n and a 
tendency to invest i n them for longer, there w i l l be less c h u m i n the por t fo l io and 
hence lower t rad ing costs. 
The style o f fund manager and their level o f experience m a y or m a y not fit 
w i t h a part icular Is lamic ethical approach. A part icular style may suit restr ict ions 
better than others or for some fimd managers Is lamic ethical cr i ter ia m a y interfere 
w i t h thei r strategy. For example, suppose a fimd manager 's strategy calls for an 
overwe igh t ing o f chemica l stocks; i n this case Is lamic screening may interfere w i t h 
implementat ion because o f env i ronmenta l considerations. A possible source o f under 
per formance cou ld therefore be a mismatch between the sk i l l and style o f the fund 
manager and the requirements o f the part icular Is lamic ethical approach adopted. 
The research cost in to the company act iv i t ies may be passed on b y fund 
managers to the investor because increased management costs may imp inge on the 
financial per formance o f some Is lamic ethical funds. Pradhan (1994) argues that 
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screening may represent i n an extra layer o f cost but this is more than compensated 
for b y the h i gh level o f customer retent ion that ethical funds appear to have. 
Management of Fund 
W i t h regards to the po r t fo l i o effects from the fund manager 'ร perspective, the 
Is lamic ethical investment indust ry c la ims that w h i l e assessing a company 'ร 
env i ronmenta l and social record, a better insight in to an organisat ion's f inancia l 
performance can be gained. Some behaviour also pos i t i ve ly v i ewed f r o m an ethical 
standpoint (such as the implementa t ion o f an env i ronmenta l management system or 
good employee relat ions) can be a p r o x y for a general ly we l l -managed company. 
I n conc lus ion w e can state that there are a w i d e range o f ways i n w h i c h ethical 
or unethical behaviour cou ld in f luence a company 'ร commerc ia l success and its share 
pr ice. The above models demonstrate that the use o f Is lamic ethical cr i ter ia i n the 
selection o f a po r t fo l i o o f shares cou ld also have a var ie ty o f pos i t ive and negative 
effects upon investment per formance. The combinat ion o f a l l these factors m a y have 
the overal l effect o f b road ly s imi lar financial per formance. I t is not true that Is lamic 
ethical cr i ter ia w i l l a lways lead to a good performance, nor w i l l i t a lways lead to a bad 
one. 
5.5 Research Methodologies 
This รณdy assesses the per formance o f the D o w Jones Is lamic b idex ( D J I M ) 
to see i f there is any ethical effect. Simul taneously, the รณdy examines the impact o f 
the type o f per formance used on the estimated performance. The questions o f this 
study are approached as fo l l ows . First , the performance o f the D o w Jones Is lamic 
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Marke t Index and D o w Jones Index-US are assessed using the t rad i t ional measures o f 
per formance i n re la t ion to a risk adjusted benchmarks (Sharpe, 1966; Treynor , 1965; 
and Jensen, 1969) and compar ing the results between Is lamic ethical index and 
convent ional index. Subsequently, the Carhart (1997) approach to cond i t iona l asset 
p r i c ing models is f o l l owed to see the dif ferences between the uncondi t iona l and 
condi t iona l approaches to measur ing per formance. The ma in mode l used i n this รณdy 
is the capital asset p r i c ing ( C A P M ) single index mode l extended to the Fama & 
French three factor mode l . The intercept o f such a mode l , a , gives the Jensen alpha 
w h i c h is usual ly іпЇефгеІЄ(і as a measure o f out or under per formance relat ive to the 
used market p roxy . Subsequently, these results are compared w i t h the Carhart (1997) 
four- factor mode l to test robustness. 
Sharpe Measure 
Based on his earl ier w o r k o n the C A P M , รһафе (1966) conceived o f a 
composi te measure o f per formance deal ing w i t h the capital market l ine ( C M L ) . The 
Sharpe measure o f po r t fo l i o performance ( ร ) indicates the risk p r e m i u m return per 
un i t o f total risk (sd) to compare the por t fo l ios to the C M L . It measures the r e ณ m o f 
a po r t fo l i o , i n excess o f the risk-free rate, relat ive to i ts to ta l risk. 
Sharpe measure( Si) = ֊֊― (5.1) 
び, 
Ri = average r e ณ m for the asset і , 
Rrf = average rate o f return on the risk free asset, 
O j = standard deviation of the rate of геШт of the asset i. 
Higher Sharpe measures are associated w i t h superior performance. 
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Treynor Measure 
I n contrast to the รһафе measure, the Treynor (1965) measure ( T ) treats on l y 
non-d ivers i f iab le market risk (beta) b y examin ing performance in re lat ion to the 
securi ty market l ine ( S M L ) as fo l l ows ; 
R¡֊Rrf 
Treynor Measure (T ) = (5.2) Д 
where ; 
Ri = average rate o f г е Ш т for the asset i , 
Rrf = average rate o f return on the risk free asset, 
ßi = the systematic risk for asset i. 
L i k e the Sharpé ( ร ) measure, the Treynor (T ) measure is a re lat ive measure 
and must be compared w i t h the values o f the benchmark (Tm). B y assumpt ion the beta 
o f the market p r o x y is 1.0. H igher Treynor measures are associated w i t h superior 
per formance. 
5.5.1 Unconditional Models 
Start ing w i t h the most basic Capi ta l Asset Pr i c ing M o d e l ( C A P M ) , w e then 
explored the added value o f in t roduc ing extra variables such as size, book- to-market 
and momen t im i . I n addi t ion to that, w e evaluated the use o f in t roduc ing t ime-var ia t ion 
i n beta and alpha. The models to be used to evaluate risk-adjusted performance are 
Jensen (1968) single factor, Fama & Fren^ (1992, 1993) three factor, and Carhart 
(1997) four factor. I n respect o f the single and the three factor mode l , w e have already 
discussed these i n the methodo logy section o f our previous chapter 3 (please see 
equat ion 3.3 and 3.4 i n chapter 3) . The Carhart (1997) four factor w h i c h w e have also 
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employed i n chapter 4 is used to evaluate the ethical un i t trast per formance (please 
see the equat ion 4.1 i n chapter 4) . Th is four factor mode l is consistent w i t h a market 
equ i l i b r ium mode l w i t h four risk factors, w h i c h can also be interpretcă as a 
performance at t r ibut ion mode l , where coeff ic ients and p remia on the factor-
m i m i c k i n g por t fo l ios indicate the p ropor t ion o f mean return attr ibutable to four 
elementary strategies. 
5.5.2 Conditional Model 
Four Factor Model with the Conditional Information 
The signi f icance o f the condi t iona l approach to per formance evaluat ion is that 
i t can accommodate whatever standard o f superior i n fo rmat ion is he ld to be 
appropriate b y the choice o f the lagged in fonna t ion . B y т с о ф о г а й п § a g iven set o f 
lagged instruments, managers w h o trade mechanica l ly i n response to these variables 
should be unable to ' game ' the per formance measure. I n pract ice, the t rad ing 
behaviour o f managers may over lay complex por t fo l io dynamics on the raderlying 
assets they trade. The desire to handle such dynamic strategies fiirther mot ivates a 
condi t iona l approach. I n this chapter w e emp loy the condi t iona l per formance 
evaluat ion approach using the condi t iona l in fo rmat ion^ ' . 
I n a cond i t iona l marke t - t im ing mode l , the idea is to d is t inguish market t i m i n g 
based on pub l i c i n fo rmat ion from marke t ing in fo rmat ion that is t ru l y superior to the 
pub l ic in fo rmat ion . A technical assumption required for this approach is a funct ional 
f o r m for the betas or factor sensit ivi t ies o f a managed por t fo l io (Ferson and Warther , 
5' F o r ev idence that these var iab les capture v a r i a t í o n i n b o t h risk and expec ted re tu rns , see O t t e n and 
B a m s ( 2 0 0 2 ) . 
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1996). T i m e var ia t ion i n a managed por t fo l io beta m a y arise for three dist inct 
reasons; 
( i ) the betas o f the under ly ing assets m a y change over t ime such that even a 
passive strategy, such as b u y and ho ld , w i l l experience changes in beta; 
( i i ) a manager can act ive ly manipulate the po r t fo l i o weights , depart ing from a 
buy and ho ld strategy, and thereby create changes i n the por t fo l io beta; 
( i i i ) a ftind m a y experience net cash i n f l ows or ou t f l ows , w h i c h the manager 
does not d i rect ly cont ro l . I f such flows affect the cash ho ld ings o f the fund , then beta 
w i l l fluctuate as the percentage o f cash held b y the fund fluctuates. The combined 
effect o f these var ious factors o n the condi t iona l beta is mode l led as " reduced f o r m . " 
The condi t iona l Carhar t 'ร four- factor mode l w i l l f o r m the regression for the 
managed por t fo l io return (please see the condi t iona l Carhart four factor mode l 
equat ion 4.5 i n chapter 4 ) . The condi t iona l in fo rmat ion is ; (1) qua l i ty spread, b y 
compar ing the y ie ld o f government and corporate bonds; (2) the slope o f the term 
structure; (3) the d iv idend y i e l d on the market indices and (4) the 1-month u s T-Bİ11 
rate. A l l instruments are based on a 1 mon th lag. These variables are essential ly 
interact ion terms between the excess return o f the benchmarks ( M S C I - U S and CRSP) 
and the lagged values o f the market indicators. These interact ion terms p i ck up the 
movements through t ime o f the condi t ional betas as they relate to the market 
indicators. I n the equat ion (4-5 i n chapter 4 ) , the coef f ic ients ß i , ß2， Рз, ß4, ßs, Вб, βτ 
measure the response o f the condi t iona l betas to the lagged market indicators - S B M , 
H M L , M o m e n t u m , default risk, slope o f the te rm structure, d iv idend y ie ld and 1-
mon th treasury b i l l rate. The intercept, a, is the condi t iona l alpha w h i c h measures 
abnormal performance. 
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5.5.3 Hypotheses 
This study examines the return o f the D o w Jones Is lamic Index ( D J I M ) 
against the M S C I - U S and CRSP benchmark indices and compares the results w i t h 
convent ional D o w Jones Index-Amer icas o f the D o w Jones Group over the per iod o f 
January 1996 to December 2003. There are three alternative hypotheses about relat ive 
re tums o f Is lamic ethical por t fo l ios and convent ional por t fo l ios and they are; 
(1) The expected r e ณ m (r isk adjusted) o f Is lamic ethical por t fo l ios are equal to 
the expected return (r isk adjusted) o f convent ional por t fo l ios . Th is is 
consistent w i t h a w o r l d where the Is lamic ethical responsib i l i ty feature o f 
stocks is not pr iced. I n other words , Is lamic ethical investors w h o sell stocks 
find enough convent ional investors ready to b u y them such that the prices o f 
the stocks do not drop. Th is is the hypothesis that is closest i n spir i t to the 
standard framework o f finance, where factors that are not proxies for risk do 
not affect expected г е Ш т ร (Statman, 2000) . Because expected retums to 
investors are also the cost o f capital to the company; th is hypothesis imp l ies 
that Is lamic ethical investors do not reduce the relat ive cost o f capital to 
Is lamic e th ica l ly responsible compani es b y favour ing their stocks. 
(2) The expected retums o f Is lamic ethical por t fo l ios are lower than the expected 
reณms o f convent ional por t fo l ios . Th is hypothesis imp l ies that Is lamic ethical 
investors have an impact on stock prices. They increase the ethical values o f 
the companies relat ive to the value o f convent ional companies. I t imp l ies , 
contrary to the f i rst hypothesis, that the market prices ref lect Is lamic ethical 
characterist ics. 
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(3) The expected re tums o f stocks o f Is lamic ethical por t fo l ios are h igher than the 
expected retoms o f convent ional por t fo l ios . Th is happens w h e n a large 
number o f investors consistent ly underestimate the p robab i l i t y that negat ive 
in fo rmat ion is released about the companies that are not e th ica l ly responsible. 
For example, i t is stated that convent ional investors consistent ly underestimate 
the p robab i l i t y that o i l companies w i l l find themselves i n t rouble because o f 
o i l spi l ls (Moody -รณar t , 1998). Decl ines i n the pr ice o f o i l company stocks 
f o l l o w i n g o i l spi l ls w i l l lower the return on convent ional por t fo l ios ho ld ing o i l 
company stocks but the por t fo l ios o f Is lamic ethical investors w h o shun o i l 
stocks w i l l be affected. 
T o determine w h i c h o f the three hypotheses is consistent w i t h the evidence, w e 
evaluate the per formance o f the D J I M . W e thus test; 
Ho: ๙= ๙ 
H i : ๙ <α' ' or 
H , : ๙ >๙ 
where is the return o f Is lamic ethical por t fo l ios and ď is the return o f 
convent ional por t fo l ios . 
5.6 Sampie Data and Variables 
Why study an Islamic Index? 
A l t hough Is lamic funds are the fastest g row ing funds i n the markets o f 
developed countr ies, one o f the problems o f under tak ing research on Is lamic funds is 
the lack o f rel iable data. Since our study is related to the impact o f Is lamic screening 
on the investment per formance o f Is lamic funds, the per formance impl ica t ions 
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resul t ing from the use o f Is lamic screens can be assessed b y compar ing the 
performance characteristics o f the D o w Jones Is lamic Marke t Index ( D J I M ) w i t h t w o 
unrestr icted and w e l l d ivers i f ied benchmark por t fo l ios . M o r e speci f ica l ly the 
performance o f the D J I M w i l l be compared to the per formance o f the M o r g a n Stanley 
Capi ta l Internat ional - Un i t ed States ( M S C I - U S ) and the Chicago for Research i n 
Secur i ty Prices (CRSP) . These benchmarks are not act ive ly managed and therefore, 
their per formance is not impacted b y transaction costs, management fees or changing 
investment po l i c y as mutua l funds, as equi ty fimds are. I n ef fect , the M S C I - U S and 
CRSP benchmark por t fo l ios represent two ideal prox ies fo r the unrestr icted 
investment universe o f equi ty securities traded. 
The D o w Jones Is lamic Marke t b idex ( D J I M ) represents a carefu l ly 
constructed por t fo l io o f Is lamic stocks that is not subject to the con found ing effects 
that impact on an Is lamic fund 's performance. A s an index, the per formance o f the 
D J I M does not change i n investment po l i cy . N o attempt are made to shi f t the 
por t fo l i o ' s compos i t ion i n response to a changing market , rather the compos i t ion o f 
the D J I M is on l y af fected b y changes i n Is lamic social concerns and b y changes i n 
софога їе responsiveness to those concerns. Acco rd ing l y , the performance o f the 
D J I M mere ly ref lects the return to its under ly ing securities o f Is lamica l ly screen 
stocks. B y design, securit ies i n the D o w Jones Is lamic Marke t Index ( D J I M ) are 
selected to m in im ise the potent ia l negative side effects associated w i t h the 
implementa t ion o f Is lamic ethical investment. Therefore, the D J I M represents an ideal 
p r o x y for the restr icted investment universe o f Is lamica l l y screen stocks. 
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The D J M is made up of one thousand stocks and is an Islamic equity benchmark 
index that excludes stocks from the DJGI whose company and primary business is 
non-permissible based on Shari'ah principles. The DJIM is a capitalisation weighted 
price index computed on the basis of the last price. It does not include reinvested 
dividends and is based from December 3 1 " 1995 on the base value set at 1000. On the 
other hand, the Dow Jones bidex-Americaร includes all stocks from the corresponding 
Dow Jones Global L·idexes (DJGI) country index that meet the defined criteria for 
growth or value. The Dow Jones Index-Americas cover 95% of the float-adjusted 
market capitalization of United States. It does not include reinvested dividends. 
Data Variables 
The Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIM) data was obtained directly from 
Dow Jones & Company. The data consists of the monthly prices for the DJIM^^. The 
monthly data of the Dow Jones Index-Americas (as index portfolio) was obtained 
from DataStream International. 
Two market proxies were ԱՏ6(1^՝՛. The first was the MSCI-US (Morgan 
Stanley Capital bitemational-United States) index as benchmark and the monthly data 
for the period from January 1996 to December 2003 was obtained from DataStream 
International. The second market proxy used as a benchmark was the CRSP (Centre 
for Research and Security Prices) for the period from January 1996 to December 2003 
and the monthly data was obtained from a French database^". The performance 
Montìily return formed the database for most of the major investigations of stock market activities. 
53 MSCI-US index aims to serves as a large cap proxy aud CRSP value weighted index was selected in 
order to minimise any potential small firm size effect. 
54 Fama-French obtained the size portfolio from the CRSP of the Umversity of Chicago. The size 
portfolios are value-weighted portfolios using NYSE and AMEX stocks. At the begmning of each 
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implications resulting from the use of Islamic ethical screens was isolated by 
comparing the performance characteristics of the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index 
with MSCI-US and CRSP. These two benchmark portfolios are actively managed and, 
therefore, their performance is not impacted by transaction costs, management frees or 
changing investment policy. These benchmark portfolios represent two proxies for the 
unrestricted investment universe of equity securities traded in the us. 
The one-month US Treasury bill return obtained from Ibbotson Associate is 
used as a proxy for the risk-free rate. This rate is subtracted from the D J M , Dow 
Jones Index-Americas and the benchmark (MSCI us and CRSP) indices retums to 
compute monthly excess retums. 
To test the robustness of the results, the performance of D JIM and the Dow 
Jones-Americas were evaluated by employing the с АРМ, Fama-French (F-F) three 
factor and the Carhart four factor models. We use the F-F factor data i.e. size, SMB, 
HML and momentum which were obtained from a French database. The risk free rate 
is deducted from these to get the (Rm-Rf) factor. The Fama and French benchmark 
factors were constructed by Fama and French based on; (1) the overall market return 
(Rm); (2) the performance of small stocks relative to big stocks (SMB, Small Minus 
Big) and (3) the performance of value stocks relative to growth stocks (HML, High 
Minus Low). The Fama & Fre^^ benchmark portfolio has been constructed from the 
CRSP database using sorts on size (market equity and the ratio of book equity to 
market equity). The book-to-market ratio is high for value stocks and low for growth 
stocks. The т о т е п Ш т factor is added in the case of Carhart'ร four factor model. 
month, stocks are ranked based on their market capitalisation which is the closing price at the end of 
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In order to test the robustness using conditional information in the four factor 
model, the data in respect of yield of софогаїе and government bonds were obtained 
from the Economist. Dividend yields of the MSCI-US and CRSP retums were 
obtained from DataStream and a French data base respectively. 
Summary statistics of the raw monthly excess return of the Dow Jones Islamic 
Market Index (DJIM), Dow Jones bidex-Americaร, MSCI, CRSP, SMB, HML and 
т о т е п Ш т (Mom) factors are presented in panel A and в of Table 5.1. The mean 
raw excess return (1.0334) of the Dow Jones Islamic Index is larger than its 
conventional сошіїефагі Dow Jones Index-Americas (0.4793) and the two un­
restricted benchmark indices- MSCI-US (0.3909) and CRSP (0.5485). 
This appears to suggest that DJIM out-perfonns the conventional Dow Jones 
bidex-Americaร as well as the benchmark indices. The skewness and kurtosis for all 
the series except the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index, HML and Momentum, 
suggests that returns are not normally distributed. 
previous month multiplied by the number of shares outstanding to form ten size portfolios. Each 
portfolio contains same number of stocks. 
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Table 5.1 
Panel A: Summary Statistics of Monthly Excess Returns of DJ Islamic 
Market Index, Dow Jones-Americas index, MSCI-US and CRSP indices, SMB, 
H M L Momentum Factors from 1996 to 2003 
( Number of Observation: 95) 
Series Mean 
Excess 
Retam 
Std. Devn Min imum Maximum Skewnes 
ร 
Kurtosis Chi^2 (Normalit 
test)/p-value 
Dow Jones 1.0334 3.5412 -12.876 11.315 -0.5924 2.3152 15.310 
Islamic [0.0005]** 
Dow Jones 0.4793 4.8893 -12.838 12.962 -0.3500 -0.1598 2.3977 
Americas [0.3015] 
MSCI-US 0.3909 4.7133 -16.143 9.9971 -0.4983 0.6094 4.4110 
[0.1102] 
CRSP 0.5485 5.0783 -15.990 8.1600 -0.6406 0.0072 9.6315 
[0.0081]** 
SMB 0.4200 4.1597 -11.600 14.620 0.2991 0.6701 2 8138 
[0.1485] 
H M L 0.2042 5.1158 -20.790 14.920 -0.6692 3.4157 
[0.0000]** 
Mom. 0.9358 6.3117 -24.960 18.380 -0.61522 2.7153 18.890 
「請^ 
Note: This table reports summary statistics on the Dow Jones Islamic index, Dow Jones index 
Americas (dependent variables). The benchmarks are (1) Centre for Research in Security Priceร(CRSP) 
and (2)Morgan Stanley Capitol International-United States(MSCI-US). SMB is factor mimicking 
portfolio for size, HML the factor mimicюng portfolio for book-to-market, momentum factor is prior 
one year factor mimicking portfolio (12 months return momentum). 
** Coefficient is statistically significant at 5% 
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Table 5.1, Panel в: Summary Statistics: Cross Correlations from 
Cross Correlations 
Portfolios Market Market SMB HML Mom Dow J. Dow J. 
MSCI-US CRSP Islamic Americas 
Market 1.0000 0.8774 -0.0284 0.0543 -0.4330 0.5189 0.8735 
MSCI-
Market 0.8774 1.0000 0.2010 -0.2937 -0.2572 0.5961 0.9422 
CRSP 
SMB -0.0284 0.2010 1.0000 -0.3835 0.0189 0.0749 0.1815 
HML 0.0543 -0.2937 -0.3835 1.0000 -0.6362 -0.3634 -0.2507 
Mom -0.4330 -0.2572 0.0189 -0.6362 1.0000 0.0239 -0.2955 
Dow J. 0.5189 0.5961 0.0749 -0.3634 0.0239 1.0000 0.5916 
Islamic 
Dow J. 
Americas 
0.8735 0.9422 0.1815 -0.2507 -0.2955 0.5916 1.0000 
Note: this table reports summary of cross correlations of excess return of Dow Jones Islamic mdex, 
Dow Jones Index- Americas ( all are dependent variables). Excess return of benchmark indexes 
(MSCI-US and CRSP), SMB,HML, Momenณm factors are independent variables. 
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Tables. 1, Panel с: Summary statistics: Instrumental у ariables 
Cross Correlations 
Variables Mean 
Excess 
Return 
Std. 
Devn 
1-month 
US T-bill 
Delชรк Term 
Spread 
Dividend 
Yield 
(msci-us) 
Dividend 
Yield 
(crsp) 
1-month-
UST-bill 
1.0060 1.6977 1.0000 -0.3400 -0.9301 -0.2799 0.0315 
Default 
Risk 
1.4260 0.3812 -0.3400 1.0000 0.1190 -0.3294 -0.0894 
Term 
Spread 
1.6985 1.3849 -0.9301 0.1990 1.0000 0.4345 0.0033 
Dividend 
Yield 
(msci-us) 
1.5389 0.3003 -0.2799 -0.3294 0.4395 1.0000 0.2008 
Dividend 
Yield 
(crsp) 
1.9292 4.6532 0.0315 -0.0894 0.0033 0.2008 1.0000 
Note: This tables reports summary statistics of conditional infoiroation variables. They are (1) 
1 -month T-bill rate, (2) dividend yields on the benchmark indexes (CRSP, MSCI-US), (3) the slope of 
term structure and (4) the quality spread, by comparing the yield of government and corporate bonds. 
Al l theses variables are independent variables. 
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A brief comparison of the standard deviations or variability of the monthly 
mean excess retums of the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIM), Dow Jones 
Index-Americas, MSCI-US and CRSP indices reveal an interesting result. The 
standard deviation of the retums for the DJIM (3.54) is much lower than conventional 
Dow Jones Index-Americas - (4.88). The standard deviation of the retums for the 
MSCI-US (4.71), CRSP (5.07), SMB (4.15), HML (5.11) and МотепШт factor 
(6.31) are also larger than the Dow Jones Islamic market index. This result implies 
that the reณms volatility of the Islamic ethically screened index DJIM is a lower 
return volatility and similar in the case of conventional Dow Jones Index-Americas as 
well as the two unrestricted MSCI-US and CRSP benchmarks. This result is contrary 
to popular opinion that ethically screened investment portfolio wil l always yield 
volatile retums compared to unrestricted welレdiv portfolio. The argument is 
that an unrestricted portfolio tends to have relatively bigger stocks than a screened 
portfolio and therefore its return volatility tends to be lower. This result may be 
somewhat misleading because of the independent comparison of raw excess retums 
and standard deviations of the DJIM, which is an ethically screened index, and the 
MSCI-US and the CRSP which are unrestricted benchmark indices. Therefore, more 
appropriate risk-adjusted performance measures such as รhæpe'ร index, the Treynor 
measure, the Jensen measure and the Fama-French estimations are more relevant for 
making inferences. These are discussed in section 5.4. 
Panel В of Table 5.1 shows the results of the correlations between the market, 
SMB, HML and momentum (Mom). It explains that the market factor together with 
the size (SMB), B/M (HML) and Momentum (Mom) proxies better explain the 
variations in average portfolio reณms. The SMB, HML and Momentmn (Mom) 
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factors do explain the differences in retums in stock, while the market factor (Rm-Rf), 
the risk premium for being a stock (rather than a one month T-bill), explains the 
average reณms of stocks over one month T-bills. 
In line with Ferson and Schadt (1996), we use a collection of public 
information variables that have been proven to predict returns and risks over time. 
Panel С of Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics on informational variables. 
5. 7 Empir ical Results 
First of all we examine the Sharpé Index, Treynor measures performance of 
the Dow Jones Islamic Index (DJIM) and Dow Jones bidex-Americaร relative to the 
two benchmarks for the sample period of 1996 to 2003. The results of the Sharpe and 
Treynor measures for the DJIM and the Dow Jones bidex-Americaร, as well as the 
two benchmark indices, are reported in Table 5.2 
Table 5.2 Sharpe and Treynor Performance Indices for the Period 
1996-2003 
D J Is lamic ՜DowJones-Amer՜ ՜MSCI-US՜CRSP 
Sharpe Performance Index 0.2904 0.1006 
Treynor Performance Index 1.0333 0.4948 
0.0823 0.1074 
0.3909 0.5485 
The use of the รһафе index for evaluating the performance of an ethically 
screened portfolio is more appropriate and relevant than the Treynor տ63տ1Մ6 . It can 
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be argued that a more appropriate measure of risk exposure for an Islamic ethically 
screened portfolio might be total risk, rather than market risk. This is because 
investors implementing Islamic ethical screens restrict their investment universe and 
inadvertently subject themselves to an otherwise diversifiable risk. The Shaipe index 
represents the average risk premium per unit of total risk and therefore represents a 
more relevant risk-adjusted performance measure for less than a well-diversified 
portfolio. Since the Treynor measure uses undiversifiable risk, ß， it is of little 
importance here. The results indicate that the รһафе risk-adjusted premium per unit 
of total risk for the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (0.2904) is statistically better 
than that for the Dow Jones Index-US (0.1006), MSCI-US (0.0923) and for the CRSP 
(0.1074). 
Using the Treynor measure, which is the average risk premium per unit of 
systematic risk (β), DJIM (1.0333) also performs better than its согтїефагі Dow 
Jones Index-Americas (0.4948). The D J M out-performs against the two benchmarks 
MSCI-US (0.3909) and the CRSP (0.5485) whereas the Dow Jones Index-Americas 
outperforms against the MSCI-US benchmark and has an almost similar performance 
to the CRSP benchmark 
As per the results in Table 5.2， the รһафе Index for the Dow Jones Islamic 
Market Index (DJIM) is distinguishable from the Sharpe bidexe for the competing 
unrestricted benchmark portfolios. This result is somewhat surprising since it is 
reasonable to expect that the CRSP index would be more efficient in eliminating 
diversifiable risk through a passive diversification strategy. The evidence indicates 
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that the use of Islamic screens does not necessarily have an adverse impact on the 
risk-adjusted retums for the less than well-diversified investor. 
5.7.1 Results of the Single-Factor с АРМ Model Using the MSCI-US and CRSP 
Indices 
The empirical evidence created by using the รһафе Index, as reported earlier 
in this study, clearly indicates that the application of Islamic screens alone does not 
necessarily have an adverse impact on performance. These results pertains from the 
perspective of both a well diversified and less than well diversified investor as 
reflected in the performance of the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIM) relative 
to the MSCI-US and CRSP value weighted market indexes respectively. The 
application of Islamic ethical screens does not necessarily result in higher volatility or 
reduced геШтร. 
We estimated the Jensen measure of performance based on the standard с АРМ 
security market line against the MSCI-US and CRSP benchmarks. The single factor 
model was estimated by Ordinary Least Squire (OLS) and the comparative 
performance against both benchmark results are reported in Table 5.3. Results in 
Table 5.3 show that the Dow Jones Islamic index (DJIM) demonstrated positive 
abnormal performance ( 1 % significant level) against the MSCI-US and also 
outperformed (by a significant 5% level) against the CRSP benchmark. The alpha of 
Dow Jones Islamic index (0.8809, t=2.80) against the MSCI-US and alpha (0.8053, 
t=2.72) and against the CRSP benchmark are statistically different from zero. 
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Table 5.3 Summary Performance, с АРМ Regressions of Dow Jones Islamic 
Market Index and Dow Jones Index-US from 1996 to 2003 
(Regressions are based on monthly return. Observations: 95, t-statìstics in parentheses) 
Dependent Variables Alpha Beta-Market R 
(Benchmark MSCI-US) 
DJ Islamic Market Index 
Dow Jones Index-Americas 
(Benchmark CRSP ) 
DJ Islamic Market Index 
Dow Jones Index-Americas 
0.8809 
(2.80)*** 
0.1251 
(0.505) 
0.8053 
(2.72)** 
-0.0181 
(-0.107) 
0.3899 
(5.86)*** 
0.9061 
(17.3)*** 
0.4157 
(7.16)*** 
0.9071 
(27.1 ) * * * 
0.2693 
0.7630 
0.3554 
0.8877 
The table reports the results of estimation single factor с АРМ model. Alpha is risk adjusted 
retum.R^ is coefficient of deteraiinatìon. 
** Coefficient is statistically significant at 5% 
* * * Coefficient is statistically significant at 1% 
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These positive abnormal alpha results of the Dow Jones Islamic index imply 
that contrary to earlier research, the performance of ethically screened portfolios is not 
inferior to the fully diversified unrestricted portfolios. The coefficient of 
determination (R2) of the Dow Jones Islamic index (DJIM) is in both cases 26.93% 
and 35.54% with the estimations using the MSCI-US and CRSP benchmarks 
respectively. These low percentages imply that separately the two benchmarks leave 
much of the changes in the D J M retums to be explained by some other unknown 
factors. It also indicates that perhaps the chosen benchmarks are not able to fully 
explain the fund retums. Kothari and Warner (2001) argue that standard performance 
measures depend on the benchmarks' ability to mimic the fund style, and therefore the 
benchmarks must be carefully selected. 
The performance results of the conventional Dow Jones Index-Americas are 
not statistically significant against both benchmarks (Table 5.3). The coefficient of 
determination (R2) of the Dow Jones bidex-Americaร against the MSCI-US proxy is 
higher (76.30%). The R 2 against the CRSP benchmark is also very high (88.42%) 
which implies that the Dow Jones Index-Americas follow the market quite closely. 
Table 5.3 shows that the Dow Jones Index-Americas performs as well as the Dow 
Jones Islamic Market Index but that alpha is not statistically significant against the 
MSCI-US benchmark and underperforms against the CRSP benchmark. In order to 
validate the robustoess of this conclusion, the asset-pricing model is extended to a 
three-factor modelling following Fama & French (1993). 
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5.7.2 The Fama- French Three Factor Model Results 
One of the central themes of the Fama-French tfeee-factor model is that i f 
assets are priced rationally, non-beta variables that are related to average retums, such 
as size and book-to-market ratio, must proxy for sensitivity to common (shared and 
thus undiversifiable) risk factors in retums (Banz, 1981). Chan, Jagadeesh and 
Lakonishok (1996) argue that size and book-to-market equity are related to economic 
fundamentáis and therefore have reasoned that they proxy for undiversifiable risk 
factors in retums. The Fama-French model is an extension of the с АРМ based single 
factor regressioni^. In the model, the factors are the value-weighted index, as well as 
mimicking portfolios for size and book-to-market factors. In such model, a non-zero 
intercept in a regression of excess portfolio returns on excess factor returns wil l 
denote an abnormal performance. 
The time-series regressions in this รณdy estimate the excess reณms (the 
monthly portfolio, the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index and the Dow Jones bidex-
Americaร retums minus the one-month us T-bill rate) to be the dependent variables 
and the excess returns of the value-weighted market factor, the size and book-to-
market factors to be the explanatory variables. The summary test statistics are 
presented in panels A and в of Table 5.1. The estimated results from the Fama-
French toee-factor model, together with the comparative single factor results, are 
presented in Table 5. 4. 
Many studies have also been pubUshed arguing (to various degrees) against the Fama and French 
approach (Kothari, Shanken & Sloan, 1995; Clare, Priestly & Thomas, 1997; Shumway and 
Warther, 1999) 
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Performance Measurement (α) 
The alpha (intercqjt) in the с АРМ based single factor model as well as the 
three factors Fama-French model (when non-zero), are interpreted as a measure of out 
or under performance relative to the used market proxy. In the Fama and French 
sณdy， adding the market factor to the SMB and HML factors caused the intercepts to 
reduce. Since in the three factor regressions, the market slope (beta) is very high, this 
average market risk premium then absorbs or reduces the similar strong intercepts 
observed in the regressions of stock reณms on SMB and HML. It means that the size 
and book-to-market factors can explain the differences in average return on stocks but 
that the market factor is needed to explain why stock геШтร are on average above the 
one month T-Bill rate. 
The comparative results for the single and three-factor are presented in Table 
5.4. Using the MSCI-US as benchmark, both the single and three factor estimation 
models produce intercepts (a's) of the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index that are 
positive abnormal returns with statistically significant performance. In the single 
factor model α = 0.8809 (է value =2.80) and in the three-factor model α =0.9594 
(t=3.38). This observation implies that irrespective of the estimation model chosen, 
the Dow Jones Islamic Market L·idex produces a positive abnormal performance 
compared to that obtained by the MSCI-US. The performances of the conventional 
Dow Jones Index-Americas are insignificant for both the single factor model and the 
three-factor model against the MSCI-US market proxy. 
When the CRSP is used as the benchmark, both the single and three factor 
models again yield positive abnormal performance of the Dow Jones Islamic Market 
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Index. The single factor α = 0.8053 is statistically significant (է value=2.72). Again 
the three factor, a= 0.9067 (t value = 3.13), is positive abnormal with statistically 
significant (Table 5.4). We observe that the magnitude of the market beta increases 
from the single factor to the three-factor regression. It is also observed that the 
intercepts are improving from the single factor to the three factor regression. This 
result is contrary to the Fama-French conclusion but in agreement with the results of 
the รณdy by Ottens and Bams (2002). In the case of the conventional Dow Jones 
Index-Americas, alphas are statistically insignificant against market proxies for both 
the single factor and the three factor model. The market betas are significant at 1% in 
both the single factor and the three factor against both benchmarks and this result is in 
agreement with the Fama-French result. The portfolio of the Dow Jones Islamic 
Market Index exhibits a negative factor loading/ sensitivity on both the size and book-
to-market factors SMB and HML (Table 5.4) while the retums on the SMB portfolio 
and HML portfolio are quite high (see Panel A of Table 5.1). Therefore, adding these 
two additional factors (SMB and HML) to the market factor causes the alpha of the 
portfolio to increase. 
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Table 5.4. Comparative Performance, CAPM Single Factor and F-F 
Three-Factor Model from 
(Regressions are based on montìily retums, КгітЬег of Observations: 95, t-statístics ： 
parentheses) 
Alpha Beta-
Market 
Beta-
SMB 
Beta-
HML 
R 2 
Single Factor 
(Benchmark MSCI-US) 
DJ Islamic M. bidex 0.8809 
(2.80)*** 
0.3899 
(5.86)*** 
0.2693 
Dow Jones Index-Am 
Single Factor 
(Benchmark CRSP) 
DJ Islamic M. Index 
11 
ІІ 
* 
* 
g
 
řマ 
g Co 
0.7630 
0.3554 
Dow Jones L·idex-Am 
Three Factor 
(Benchmark MSCI-US) 
DJ Islamic M. Index 
-0.0181 
(-0.107) 
0.9594 
(3.38)*** 
0.9071 
(27.1 ) * * * 
0.4055 
(6.80)*** 
-0.0601 
(-0.823) 
-0.2906 
(-4.88)** 
0.8877 
0.4274 
Dow Jones Index-Am 
ち
 
― 
՜に
 ミ
 
* * 
は
 -0.2463 (-6.11)*** 0.8622 
Three-Factor 
(Benchmark CRSP) 
DJ Islamic M. Index 0.9067 
(3.13)*** 
0.3824 
(6.47)*** 
お
 -0.1752 (-2.82)*** 
0.4090 
Dow Jones bidex-Am -0.0290 
(-0.167) 
0.9150 
(25.8 ) * * * 
0.0019 
(0.0441) 
0.0277 
(0.744) 
0.8884 
The table presents the results from unconditional single factor CAPM and unconditional Fama-French 
three factor model. Alphas are the risk adjusted return of Dow Jones Islamic index and Dow Jones 
index-Americas against MSCI-US and CRSP benchmarks 
** Coefficient is statistically significant at 5% 
*** Coefficient is statistically significant at 1% 
228 
Factor Sensitivities (SMB and HML) 
The results show that in the three-factor Fama-French model, the portfolio 
RojiM-Rf exhibits a positive abnormal and significant loading for the CRSP (Rm-Rf) 
and MSCI-US (Rm-Rf). The size (SMB) and book-to-market (HML) factors show 
rather significant negative loadings against both benchmarks. This seems to suggest 
that the retums of the portfolio appear to be driven relatively more by size (SMB) and 
book-to-market (HML) factor of the stocks. The SMB and HML factors therefore 
seem to add more explanatory power to the variation in the average portfolio returns. 
According to Fama & French (1992), the firms with high B/M (i.e. a low stock price 
relative to book value) tend to have low earnings on assets while low B/M (high stock 
price relative to book value) is associated with persistently high earnings. Controlling 
for book-to-market equity, small firms tend to have lower earnings on assets 
compared to bigger ones. The fact that small firms can suffer long-term earnings as 
opposed to big firms suggests that size is associated with a common risk factor, which 
might explain the negative relation between size and average retums. Similarly the 
relation between B/M equity and earnings suggest that relative profitability is the 
source of a common risk factor, which might explain the positive relation between 
B/M and average retums. This apparent negative relation between size and retums on 
the one hand and the positive relationship between B/M equity and returns on the 
other, are not evident from the results in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 shows that the conventional Dow Jones Index-Americaร (Ri-Rm) 
exhibits a significantly positive loading ( 1 % significant) for both MSCI-US (Rm-Rf) 
and CRSP (Rm-Rf). The size (SMB) factor show a significant (5% level) positive 
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loading and rather significant (1%) negative loading on the book-to-market (HML) 
factor against the MSCI-US benchmark. In the other case, the size (SMB) and book-
to-market (HML) factors show insignificant positive loadings against the CRSP 
market proxy. This seems to suggest that the retums of the portfolio appear to be 
driven relatively more by the book-to-market (HML) factors. The SMB factor seems 
to add less explanatory power to the variation in portfolio average retums. 
Market Beta 
Another important issue raised by the Fama-French (1993) study relates to the 
market beta and its changing characteristics in the single and three factor models. 
With a low slope (beta) of the market factor in the single factor CAPM-based model, 
adding the SMB and HML factors increases the market beta and causes it to move up 
towards 1. However, i f the market beta in the single factor model is already greater 
than 1, adding the SMB and HML causes the market beta to move downwards 
towards 1. According to Fama & French (1993), this behaviour is due to correlations 
between the market and SMB or HML. This conclusion is apparently contrary to the 
results summary in Table 5.4. 
In respect of the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index, the market betas in the 
single factor regression are 0.3899 (t-value = 5.86) and 0.4157 (t value = 7.16) for 
MSCI-US and CRSP respectively. This beta sensitivity increases in magnitude to 
0.4055 (t-value=6.80) against MSCI-US and decreases to 0.3824 (t value = 6.47) 
when the SMB and HML factors are added. The correlations between the market, and 
the SMB and HML retoms can be seen in panel в of Table 5.1. The implication here 
is that the market factor together with the size (SMB) and B/M (HML) proxies better 
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explain the average portfolio retums. The SMB and HML factors do explain the 
differences in retums in stock, while the market factor (Rm-Ri) and the risk premium 
for being a stock (rather than one month T-Bill), explains or links the average retums 
on stocks and one month T-bills. 
In the case of the conventional Dow Jones Index-Americas, the market beta in 
the single factor regression is larger and more statistically significant (1%) against 
both the MSCI-US and CRSP market proxies. This beta sensitivity increases m 
magnitude against both benchmarks when the SMB and HML factors are added 
(Table 5.4). This means that the market factors together with the SMB and HML 
proxies better explains the average portfolio retums. 
Coefficient of Determination 
The coefficient of determination R2 expresses the percentage or proportion of 
variations in the portfolio Dow Jones Islamic Market Index retums that is explained 
by the explanatory variables (Rm-Ri), size (SMB) and book-to-market (HML). From 
Table 5.4, the R 2 value increases from the single factor (R2 = 26.93%) to the three-
factor (R^= 42.74%) against the MSCI-US and single factor (35.54%) to the three-
factor (40.90%) against the CRSP market proxy. These increases in R2 mean that the 
market factor alone is responsible for only amount of percentage of the R2 of the 
variation in the portfolio retums. In other words, the market leaves much of the 
variations in portfolio returns that might be explained by the size and book-to-market 
factors. Together the 3 factors explain 42.74% (against the MSCI-US) and 40.90% 
(against the CRSP) of variations in the portfolio retums, while the rest of the 
percentages are due to unknown factors. Such large unexplained proportions of return 
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might be due to a possible model misspecification in which the case size and book-to-
market factors even fail to capture completely the characteristics relevant for retums. 
Another problem might be the time-varying nature of retums and so on (Kothari and 
Warner, 1997). 
On the other hand, the coefficient of determination R2 expresses the 
percentage or proportion of the variations in the portfolio of the Dow Jones bidex-
Americaร retums that is explained by the explanatory variables (Rm-Rf), size (SMB) 
and book-to-market (HML). From Table 4, the R2 value increases from the single 
factor (76.30% against the MSCI-US and 88.77% against the CRSP) to the thiee-
factor (86.22% against the MSCI-US and 88.84% against the CRSP). 
By employing the single factor с АРМ and the three factor Fama-French 
models for both the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index and the Dow Jones Index-
Americas, we observed the results of alpha, beta, log-likelihood and R2. Based on the 
results we could argue that both portfolios follow the market but that the Dow Jones 
Index-Americas սոժ6Փ6քքօոոտ the benchmarks. However, the inclusion of the two 
risk factors; size and book to market- alpha, log-likelihood and R2 increased in the 
three factor model. 
5.7.3 Carhart Four Factor Model Results 
Table 5.5 presents the alphas, market beta, SMB, HML, Momentum, Log 
Likelihood and R2 for the Carhart-four factor (unconditional) model. In Table 5.6, we 
compare the results using both the three and four factor models. The results from the 
Fama-French model are imported from Table 5.4. First we notice that with the 
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inclusion of another factor i.e. Momentum, the Alpha(a) of the Dow Jones Islamic 
Market Index again showed a positive abnormal return (alpha =0.9777, է value=3.20) 
at 1% significant level against the MSCI-US benchmark index. The Alpha (a) exMbits 
positive abnormal performance (alpha=0.8895 and է value=2.81) against the CRSP 
benchmark index in the Carhart four factor model. Secondly, (see Table 5.6), there is 
a minor increase in average R2 for the multifactor model i.e. 0.4276 against the MSCI-
US and 0.4091 against the CRSP respectively compared to the three-factor model 
(0.4274 and 0.4090 against the MSCI-US and CRSP benchmarks respectively). This 
indicates that the extended model is more able to explain the fund retums. 
In addition to this we reported the log-likelihoods of both models, which 
enabled us to perform a standard LR test. This confirmed the results of examining the 
differences in R2. Log-likelihood of the three-factor model against both benchmarks 
is higher than ones obtained from the four factor model. Thirdly, the market-beta is 
significant against both the MSCI-US and CRSP benchmarks (both at a 1% 
significant level) and significantly negative SMB against the MSCI-US benchmark (at 
a 1% significant level). Also the factor loadings revealed negative significant HML 
( 1 % significant level against the MSCI-US and CRSP benchmarks) with the Fama-
French three factor model and insignificant against both benchmarks in the Carhart 
four factor model. 
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The results also show insignificant Momentum loadings with the Carhart four 
factor model against both the MSCI-US and CRSP benchmarks. Al l these results 
indicate that the momentum strategy slightly added value in the Dow Jones Islamic 
Market Index (DJIM) which showed positive abnormal retums and confirmed that the 
Carhart four factor model is able to explain the DJIM retums. In other words, we can 
say that the performance of the DJIM is driven toward positive abnormal return by the 
inclusion of the momentum factor. 
On the other hand the performance of the conventional Dow Jones bidex-
Americaร showed first time positive abnormal retums (at a 10% significant level) 
against the MSCI-US and insignificant positive retums against the CRSP. After 
controlling for market risk, size, book-to-market and momentum, the alphas are not 
significantly different from zero. Al l these results indicate that the momentum 
strategy more or less added value in the Dow Jones bidex-Americaร positive 
abnormal retums ( 1 % significant) against the MSCI-US market proxy and positive 
insignificant return against the CRSP market proxy (Table 5.5) which confirms that 
the Carhart four factor model is able to explain the Dow Jones bidex-Americaร 
retums. Like the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index, we also reported the log-
likelihoods of both models for the Dow Jones Index-Americas, which enabled us to 
perform a standard LR test. This confirms the results of examining the differences in 
R2. Log-likelihood of the three-factor model against both benchmarks is higher than 
ones obtained from the four factor model (Table 5.6). 
However, we wil l draw our conclusion after the robustness test by estimating 
the four factor model, using conditional information. 
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5.7.4 Robustness Test: the Conditional Four-Factor Model 
Time Varying Conditional Alphas(a) 
In Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, we estimated the single factor CAMP and the 
three-factor Fama and French against the MSCI-US and CRSP benchmarks. The 
unconditional с АРМ assumes that both betas and the alphas are constant over time 
but that they may differ across funds. The conditional Carhart four factor model 
allows time varying betas but assumes that any abnormal performance is captured by 
the fixed alpha coefficients. Table 5.7 summarises the results of estimating the four 
factor model equations in the conditional four factor model with time varying 
conditional alphas. This model approximates the conditional alpha as a linear fianction 
of the predetermined information, allowing the function to be different for each fund 
manager. While estimating the conditional Carhart four factor model, Table 5.7 
reports that the average R2 goes up more for both the Dow Jones Islamic Market 
Index and the conventional Dow Jones Index-Americas when the conditioning 
variables such as 1 month treasury bill, default risk, term spread or dividend yield are 
brought into the model. This suggests that there is a time variation in the fund betas 
that washes out at the aggregate level. Regressions for the dependent portfolios show 
this to be the case. Using a 5% significance level, the F-statistics (Wald test) is 
rejected by both the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index and the conventional Dow 
Jones bidex-Americaร. 
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Table 5.7 also reports a test for the hypothesis that the betas are constant for 
each dqjendent variable. These are based on the Bonferroni^^ inequality and the 
results in Table 5.7 reject the hypothesis that the manager of the fiind has constant 
conditional betas. In the results it is also observed that unconditional and conditional 
versions of all alphas of the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index show positive abnormal 
performance at a 1% significant level and average larger than unconditional alphas. 
This similarity in distributions is an interesting result, in view of the finding by 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) that conditional alphas for mutual funds are on average 
larger than unconditional alphas. Ferson and Warther (1996) show that these 
differences reflect a positive correlation between expected market retums and the flow 
of new money into the funds over time, combined with a negative relationship 
between new money flows and fund betas. 
Additionally, in the case of the conventional Dow Jones bidex-Americaร, 
unconditional and conditional versions of all alphas show underperformance (except 
in the unconditional four factor model against the MSCI-US market proxy which 
showed a positive abnormal performance at a 10% significant level) and conditional 
alphas are on average lower than unconditional alphas (Table 5.7). While we also find 
time-varying betas for conventional Index-Americas, it is likely that the flow of 
monies and the cash holdings of the conventional ftinds do not respond as much in the 
56 Consider the event that any of N statistics for a test of size р rejects the hypothesis. Given dependent 
events, the joint probability is less than or equal to the sum of the individual probabilities. The 
Bonferroni p-value places an upper bound on the p-value of a joint test across the equations. It is 
comupted as the sanillest of the N p-values of the indvidual tests, multiplied by N, which is the number 
of funds in a group. The Bonferroni p-values one-tailed tests of the hypothesis that all of the slope 
coefficients are zero against the alternative that at lest one is positive (maximum value) or negative 
(minimum value). 
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short ո տ to expected market retums. This may explain the difference between our 
results in Table 5.7 and the findings of Person and Schadt (1996). 
In the conditional four factor model among the conditional information, the 
dividend yield and the Treasury bill yield are more important variables. In respect of 
the Dow Jones Islamic Market L·idex, the coefficient for alpha, on both the dividend 
yield and on the Treasury bill are positive, and for the Dow Jones Index-Americas, the 
coefficient for alpha, both the dividend yield and the Treasury bill are also negative. 
This says that the managers of Islamic ethical funds deliver higher risk adjusted 
abnormal performance relative to the CAMP when dividend yields are high and short-
term interest rates are low, even after allowing for time-varying risk exposures. Since 
high dividend yield predicts high stock retoms, the conditional alphas tend to be 
positively correlated with expected stock market retums 
In the conditional four factor model, the conditional alpha of the Dow Jones 
Islamic Market Index shows the positive abnormal return (alpha is 1.045 and t-value: 
3.31) at a 1% significant level against the MSCI-US benchmark and also positive 
abnormal return (alpha is 1.003 and t-value is 3.13) against the CRSP benchmark. In 
the results, the conditional models do suggest that the Dow Jones Islamic Market 
Index (DJIM) routinely out-perform the MSCI-US and CRSP benchmarks on a risk-
adjusted basis. Table 5.7 shows that in the conditional four factor model, the 
conditional alphas of the conventional Dow Jones Index-America are statistically 
insignificant against both benchmarks as exhibited in Table 5.4. 
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In the above results, we observed that the performance result is essentially 
higher in the case of the Dow Jones Islamic Market bidex and lower in the case of the 
conventional Dow Jones Index-Americas (underperform) against both benchmarks, as 
would be expected in an efficient market. Why does the conditional model produce 
such impressions about the alphas of Islamic portfolios compared to conventional 
portfolios as exhibited in the unconditional single and three factor models? The 
statistical reason is that there is a common variation through time in the fund's 
portfolio betas and in the expected market return. This variation is captured by the 
interaction terms in the conditional model. A comparison of the results between the 
unconditional four factor model and the conditional four factor model shows that the 
difference between the two measures of alphas are determined by the average values 
of the interaction terms. These terms measure the covariance between the conditional 
beta and the expected value of the market return formed using the lagged instraments. 
I f this covariance is positive (negative), the conditional alpha wil l be lower (higher) 
than the unconditional alpha. Therefore, the key to xmderstanding the different results 
about alpha is the behaviour of the conditional betas. 
The R2 values of the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index for the conditional four 
factor model are 0.5487 against the MSCI-US and 0.9068 against the CRSP 
benchmarks whereas the R2 values for the conditional four factor model are 0.0560 
against the MSCI-US and 0.9155 against the CRSP benchmark 一 significantly higher 
than the Fama-French three factor (that does not include the momentum factor) and 
the unconditional Carhart four factor model. 
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It seems that in a conditional setting the factor model is suited to measuring 
the Islamic portfolios. This indicates that; (1) the Momentum factor adds significant 
explanatory power and that (2) the conditional four factor model explains most of the 
variation in average portfolio retums. Therefore, our results are consistent with the 
results of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) and Wang (2002) who argue that conditional 
information helps to explain most of the variation in average portfolio retums. 
Explaining Beta Changes 
We can consider two reasons as to why the fund managers tend to reduce their 
market betas when public information implies relatively high expected market returns 
and/ or raises them when expected retums are low ( Person and Warther, 1996). They 
are; 
(1) The betas of the underlying assets change over time, such that even a buy and 
hold strategy has changing betas. 
(2) Fund portfolio weights depart from a buy and hold strategy because of flows 
of cash into the fonds or active management behaviour. 
Table 5.7 records the coefficients of the conditional beta models for both the 
Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIM) and the conventional Dow Jones Index-
Americas and their t-ratios. Estimating the conditional betas of the underlying 
strategies of assets as they change over time produce negative coefficient of default-
risk and slope of the term structure. Firstly this result suggests that it is likely that 
some of the beta variation is the result of time-varying conditional betas for the 
underlying assets of the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIM). The results also 
show that the conditional constant betas of both Islamic and conditional dependent 
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variables are positive and statistically significant at 1% against both benchmarks. Al l 
conditional constant betas are lower than the unconditional models indicating the 
strong time varying betas. The factor loading HML is statistically significant and 
negative against both benchmarks. The SMB and the Momentum that allow for time 
variation in the DJIM betas are negative and statistically insignificant against both 
benchmarks. 
The second explanation for the movements in the DJIM betas involves the 
flow of money into the portfolios (ftmd) of the DJIM. I f money flows into the fund's 
portfolio when the public perceives expected stock retoms to be high and i f managers 
take some time to allocate new money according to their usual investment styles, then 
the fund'ร portfolio would have large cash holdings at such a time. Large cash 
holdings imply low betas. The effect of new money flows on the portfolios' betas 
wi l l depend on the magniณde of the flows, the size of the asset holdings and the speed 
with which new monies are invested. Warther (1995) reports a study of net cash 
flows for тиШаІ funds whereby net cash is defined as new sales (excluding reinvested 
dividends minus withdrawals, plus net transfers between funds), normalised by the 
lagged aggregate stock market value. A strong correlation is found between net cash 
flows and concurrent stock market retums, พЫсһ suggest a connection between cash 
flows, which are also strongly correlated with the portfolio weight in cash. When 
inflows are large, the cash balances of fünds tend to increase. 
Therefore, our results indicate that the Islamic ethical investors can expect to 
lose nothing by investing in Islamic ethical funds. Overall, the evidence of Table 5.7 
supports the hypothesis that the Islamic fund's portfolio flows partly explain the 
243 
changes in betas over the time, which are captured by the lagged market indicators 
and therefore affect the performance results. 
We can draw conclusion from the above results that the Dow Jones Islamic 
Market Index has much higher raw retums than the conventional Dow Jones Index-
Americas as well as the two unrestricted benchmark. The Sharpe risk-adjusted 
premium per unit of total risk for the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index is statistically 
better than that for the conventional Dow Jones Index-Americas as well as for the 
MSCI-US and CRSP proxies. When the single factor с АРМ, the Fama-French three 
factor and the Carhart four factor models are employed, the risk adjusted returns of 
the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index are statistically significant (at a 1% significant 
level) and the alphas are increased with the addition of extra factors. 
On the other hand, when the single factor CAMP, the Fama-French three 
factor and the Carhart four factor models are employed, the alphas of the conventional 
Dow Jones Index-Americas remain statistically insignificant against both benchmarks 
except for the four factor model against the MSCI-US (at a 1 % significant level) 
although with the addition of the additional factors the value of the alphas are slightly 
increased. Overall, introducing the conditioning information seems to have a greater 
impact on the measures of performance than does moving from the single factor to the 
four factor model. 
Therefore the alternative hypothesis that expected retoms of Islamic screened 
portfolios are higher than the expected retums of conventional portfolios is accepted. 
The hypothesis implies that Islamic ethically responsible investors do not face any 
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adverse effects from Is lamic eth ical ly screened stock pr ices and that an Is lamic ethical 
investor can expect as m u c h retums as an investor w o u l d gain from a convent ional 
fund or i n some cases may be even higher return. Moreover , Is lamic ethical investors 
increase the value o f e th ica l ly responsible companies relat ive to the value o f 
convent ional companies b y k e q î i n g retoms records at a par w i t h the market , bivestors 
can expect to lose no th ing b y invest ing in Is lamica l l y screened ethical por t fo l ios and 
ethical factors have a posi t ive effect on expected stock retums or companies cost o f 
capital . 
5.8 Concluding Remarks 
The use o f Is lamic ethical cr i ter ia in investment dec is ion-making has g rown i n 
popu lar i t y i n the western w o r l d since 1990. M a n y Is lamic ethical investors engage 
w i t h companies that t r y to inf luence them on ethical issues. Where companies can 
anticipate f inancia l rewards b y changing po l i cy , Is lamic ethical investors are most 
l i ke l y to be successful i n in f luenc ing companies. I n respect o f per formance effects 
concerning Is lamic ethical cr i ter ia, there are a number o f ways in w h i c h Is lamic ethics 
cou ld have an in f luence and an impact both on the company and ethical por t fo l io 
level . I t is not trae that Is lamic ethical cr i ter ia w i l l a lways lead to good per formance, 
nor w i l l i t a lways lead to bad performance. I t m a y be po in ted out that i n some cases 
the issue o f f inancia l retums for some Is lamic ethical investors is not o f p r ima ry 
importance. Some investors may be w i l l i n g to accept a lower reUim i n order that their 
investments do not compromise their bel iefs, i n the same w a y that some consumers 
w i l l pay a pr ice p r e m i u m for fair trade goods. 
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There is a great degree o f commona l i t y between the not ions o f Is lamic ethics 
w i t h the secular not ions o f ethics and e f f ic iency under ly ing regulat ion i n convent ional 
markets. However , what makes an Is lamic market dist inct is its emphasis on riba 
(usury) p roh ib i t i on and curbs on speculat ion. Regula t ion is a dynamic process and a 
Shar i 'ah scholar should be part o f a process o f cont inuous mon i to r ing and 
survei l lance o f the market and should come up w i t h regulatory rules based on the 
reali t ies o f a g iven market. I t may be noted that the Is lamic stock market does not 
hamper market e f f i c iency w i t h i n Is lamic ethics. 
Is lamic ethical investments are to be found most par t icu lar ly i n developed 
markets rather than i n the Is lamic or emerg ing markets. The reason beh ind this m igh t 
be the fact that most markets i n develop ing countries i n general and in the Arab w o r l d 
i n part icular are considered to be vo la t i le , inef f ic ient and i l l i qu i d . A t the same t ime, 
be ing a re la t ive ly new industry , Is lamic ethical finance has been seeking more rel iable 
investments i n industr ia l economies and especial ly i n ' n e w ' sectors. The leading 
per formance o f technology related sectors, par t icu lar ly i n the second h a l f o f the 
1990ร, encouraged Is lamic f i i nd managers to take advantage o f the soaring prices b y 
p lac ing a large percentage o f their investments i n technology stocks, mos t l y i n the us. 
However , due to poor pe r fo rm ing stock markets w o r l d w i d e dur ing the sample per iod 
o f our study, Is lamic ethical funds, jus t l i ke unscreened funds, reacted accord ingly b y 
rebalancing their hold ings. There is a cont inu ing t rend i n the Is lamic ethical funds 
industry o f sh i f t ing from b lue-ch ip technology stocks to O l d economy ' stocks, 
especial ly i n the energy sector. L i k e ethical investment i n the us and the U K , Is lamic 
ethical investment has a lways faced the prejudice that l i m i t i n g one 's potent ia l 
investment poo l w i l l also l i m i t one'ร potent ia l for financial g rowth . 
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For the purpose o f the robustness test, w e compared the per formance o f D o w 
Jones Is lamic Marke t Index w i t h its convent ional counterpart the D o w Jones b idex-
Amer icaร o f the same D o w Jones Group. The Sharpe risk-adjusted p r e m i u m per un i t 
o f tota l risk for the D o w Jones Is lamic Index was stat ist ical ly s igni f icant and better 
than that for the convent ional D o w Jones Index-Amer icas as w e l l as fo r the M S C I - U S 
and CRSP proxies. W h e n the single factor с А Р М , the Fama-French three factor and 
the Carhart four factor models are employed, the risk adjusted returns o f the D o w 
Jones Is lamic Marke t Index were stat ist ical ly s igni f icant (1 % s igni f icant) . Overa l l , 
in t roduc ing the cond i t ion ing in fo rmat ion seems to have had a greater impact on the 
measures o f per formance than m o v i n g from the single factor to the four factor mode l . 
Add i t i ona l l y , i n the case o f the convent ional D o w Jones b idex-Amer icaร , 
uncondi t iona l and condi t iona l versions o f a l l alphas showed underperformance 
(except i n the uncondi t iona l four factor mode l against the M S C I - U S market p r o x y 
w h i c h showed a pos i t ive abnormal performance at a 1 0 % s igni f icant level ) and the 
condi t iona l alphas were average lower than the uncond i t iona l alphas (Table 5.7). I n 
their study, Luther and Ma tako (1993) associated the in fe r io r per formance o f ethical 
un i t trusts compared to the who le U K stock market between 1985 and 1992 to the 
heavy concentrat ion i n the smal ler company sector, w h i c h had per fo rmed poor l y over 
the รณdied per iod. The empi r ica l evidence presented i n this chapter c lear ly indicates 
that investors can choose Is lamic ethical investments that are consistent w i t h their 
va lue system and bel iefs w i t h o u t be ing forced to sacri f ice per formance. 
Therefore, the alternative hypothesis o f expected retums o f Is lamic screened 
por t fo l ios be ing lower than the expected retums o f convent ional por t fo l ios is rejected 
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i n our รณdy. Th is hypothesis impl ies that Is lamic eth ica l ly responsible investors have 
an impact on stock pr ices. 
Wh i l s t some o f the screens w o u l d i m p l y a negative impact o n per formance 
wh i l s t others suggest a posi t ive impact (Sauer, 1997), this รณdy indicates that the net 
effect o f the var ious screens, even when more rigorous measures o f per formance such 
as the single index с А Р М mode l and the Fama-French toee-factor mode l are used, is 
not a negat ive but rather a posi t ive abnormal per formance. W h e n w e add the 
m o m e n t u m factor and estimated uncondi t iona l and condi t iona l four factor models , 
according to the results, the four factor mode l explains most o f the var ia t ion in 
average por t fo l io reณms. B y emp loy ing bo th the uncondi t iona l and condi t iona l 
Carhart 'ร four factor mode l , the D J M shows pos i t ive abnormal per formance against 
the bo th benchmarks. These results are consistent w i t h the results o f Let tau and 
Ludv igson (2001) and W a n g (2002) w h o argue that the m o m e n ณ m factor and 
condi t iona l i n fo rmat ion can help to expla in most o f the var ia t ion i n average por t fo l i o 
retums. 
W i t h regard to the study on Is lamic ethical invest ing, several issues should be 
considered. F i rs t ly , the sample per iod considered (1996 to 2003) was very short i n 
the case o f t ime series analysis. Fur thermore, the second h a l f o f the 1990ร was one o f 
the longest b u l l runs i n h is tory and the screening poss ib ly generates a por t fo l io biased 
in favour o f stocks that do w e l l i n a bu l l market and thus per formance may be due to 
the non-eth ical characteristics o f the D o w Jones Is lamic Marke t b idex ( D J I M ) . 
Besides this, the p roh ib i t i on on stocks w h i c h der ive a substantial part o f their revenue 
from interest income, suggests that the index cou ld b y defaul t be select ing companies 
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that make the most product ive use o f their surplus cash. A s imi la r argument can be 
put fo rward for the l ow receivable screens and more ef f ic ient w o r k i n g capital 
management. Another cause can be the l o w average leverage screen, w h i c h m igh t 
reduce the risk o f the index, wh i l s t the sector exclusions ( f inancia l services) m a y 
increase the non-systematic risk o f the index. 
I n order for an Is lamic ethical fund to succeed, i t must be successful ly 
p romoted. A qua l i f ied investment advisor may be capable o f se l l ing funds but they 
m a y not be w e l l versed i n Is lamic practices to promote Is lamic ethical fiinds. 
Know ledge o f the Shar i 'ah board is qui te useful i n th is s i tuat ion b y p rov id ing 
recommendat ions o n how to promote Is lamic ethical funds. Another step for a 
successfi i l Is lamic ethical f und is d is t r ibut ion, as a fiind m a y either be marketed 
through a reputed dist r ibutor or f inancia l investment firms w h o may create its o w n 
fund . E i ther way , the company should have a so l id reputat ion for successful 
investments and customer service. A t this junc ture , the reputat ion o f the Shar i 'ah 
A d v i s o r y Board must also be considered. I n order for funds to get widespread 
approval , the Shar i 'ah members must be wel l - respected Is lamic scholars. I n many 
ways the success o f the fund is based on the Shar i 'ah Board 's reputat ion. 
The Is lamic ethical fiind must be easi ly accessed through mu l t i p le d is t r ibu t ion 
channels and there exist opportuni t ies for the fund managers i n marke t ing Is lamic 
investments wo r l dw ide . Is lamic investors as w e l l as ethical investors i n the West 
wan t to o w n prof i tab le companies that w i l l make a cont r ibu t ion to society and help 
economic g rowth . There is no quest ion that there is a sizeable, yet untapped market 
for Is lamic funds. I f f inancia l inst i tut ions want to capital ise on th is market , they must 
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be knowledgeable o f Shar i 'ah precepts and structure thei r products accordingly. The 
final step necessary to face the challenges fac ing the Is lamic financial sector are 
achiev ing a degree o f consistency and persistence i n per formance, obta in ing a h igher 
level o f d ivers i f icat ion i n terms o f markets and sectors and the need for new Is lamic 
ethical equi ty instraments to help hedge against potent ia l risks. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Th is thesis presents a comprehensive evaluat ion o f ex is t ing managed funds 
per formance b y emp loy ing single factor to mul t i fac tor models bo th i n their 
uncondi t iona l and condi t iona l versions. Rat ionale is o f fered to exp la in the immense 
popu lar i ty o f managed funds i n l igh t o f the research findings w h i c h suggest that 
sometimes managed funds are unable to do s ign i f icant ly better than a large 
unmanaged por t fo l io . W e examine the performance for a m o n t h l y sample o f al l the 
U K equi ty uni t trusts, the U K ethical un i t trusts and the D o w Jones Is lamic index- an 
Is lamic ethical screened index, to see whether these act ive ly managed por t fo l ios 
ип0ефег£огт or ou tper fo rm the benchmark. The managed fund performance i n the 
U S is w e l l documented i n finance literatxire but the l i terature on performance o f 
managed fund on the U K un i t trasts and Is lamic ethical funds are lack ing . 
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth l i teraüire rev iew on mutua l fiind per formance, 
mode l stock return and m o d e m por t fo l i o theory. The most c o m m o n l y used managed 
fiind per formance indices l i ke Sharpe (1966) , Treynor index (1965) and Jensen (1968) 
alphas have drawbacks i n the performance evaluat ion. Fama and French (1996) 
demonstrate that their three-factor mode l captures many o f the w i d e l y documented 
patterns i n stock retums. For example, the mode l accounts fo r the long- term return 
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reversal documented b y Debondt and Thaler (1987) . A l t h o u g h Berk ( 1995) and 
K i r b y (1998) and some other authors argue that size and book- to-market equi ty 
cannot be interpreted as risk factors i n the t radi t ional sense, no one seems to quest ion 
their empi r ica l importance i n exp la in ing stock reณms. The issue o f whether the value 
and size premiums are caused b y the risk o f ine f f i c iency m a y never be resolved to 
everyone's sat isfact ion, as feel ings run strong on bo th sides o f the argument. There 
are t w o cruc ia l points to remember bo th for investors and managers. First o f a l l , 
factors based on value and size have expla ined much o f the c o m m o n var ia t ion i n the 
U S stock retums for the past three quarters o f a century. A n d secondly, va lue and size 
p remiums have been observed i n several other countr ies, w i t h the value p r e m i u m 
be ing observed i n developed countr ies that have been studied. W h i l e these 
observations are consistent w i t h a risk-based story, they do not prove anyth ing. 
Nevertheless, something very fundamental w o u l d have to change i n the f inancia l 
markets i n order for these p remiums to disappear. Moreover , the re tums observed i n 
the U S market dur ing 1999 show that 'va lue minus g r o w t h ' is not a l ow risk strategy. 
Performance evaluat ion is i n essence an assessment o f the tools o f 
measurement through the asset p r i c ing theory models , w h i c h w i l l i n tu rn help to 
forecast the expected return o f the under ly ing securities o f the companies. I t is 
therefore not 8ифгі8Іп§ that the issues i n per formance measurement arise out o f the 
va l i d i t y and assumptions o f the return generating process. The impos i t i on o f the semi-
strong e f f i c iency assumption using i n fo rma t ion variables has g iven rise to condi t iona l 
models o f per formance measurement. A related issue is the consistency o f the 
mu l t i tude o f potent ia l per formance measures. 
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The latest per formance measures have arisen out o f developments i n asset 
p r i c ing theory. For example, the use o f ef f ic ient benchmark por t fo l ios i n order to 
combat the p rob lem o f amb igu i t y and rank reversal o f passive por t fo l ios as a result o f 
inef f ic ient benchmarks. U n l i k e the t radi t ional approaches to per formance 
measurement w h i c h are uncondi t iona l , the latest per formance measures use 
condi t iona l in fo rmat ion variables to account for t ime var ia t ion i n expected retums and 
risk. Subject to certain l imi ta t ions o f their o w n , these measures have been considered 
more accurate and, potent ia l ly , the future o f per formance measurement w i l l be 
enhanced toough more research. 
The U K uni t trust industry is becoming popular to ind iv idua l investors, 
academics, and regulators. Therefore, the ro le o f the fund manager is, w i t h respect to 
select ion stocks, also impor tant i n the f inancia l markets. Chapter 3 provides a detai led 
discussion on the goal o f the un i t trasts select ion to improve investor 'ร odds o f 
earning a good г е Ш т on investment. Investors w i l l make more i n fo rmed choices i f 
they understand the relat ionship between past and future fund performance. The study 
addresses the f o l l o w i n g research questions; 
1) D i d the fund managers and smal l stocks outper form the market? 
2) Does fund per formance persistence exist ？ 
In order to address the above questions, w e examine the performance o f a l l the 
U K un i t trusts that concentrate their investments i n the U K equit ies. The study covers 
the per iod from January 1986 to December 2001 . The return o f these un i t trasts is 
compared w i t h a three-factor mode l w h i c h takes into account thei r exposure to 
market , value and size risk. Once these risk factors are cont ro l led , i t is observed that 
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the fiind managers underper form the market. The results are worse for smal l company 
uni t trusts. Cont rary to the not ion that smal l company shares o f fe r abundant 'beat the 
marke t ' opportuni t ies, i t is found that smal l company trusts are the wors t performers. 
I n methodo logy , this รณdy leans heav i ly on the same k i n d o f three-factor 
mode l that Fama and French have found to g ive an accurate descr ipt ion o f the 
behaviour o f the U S equi ty markets. For the U K market , the t føee-factor mode l has 
better explanatory power than a single-factor mode l , especial ly for uni t trusts that 
invest heav i l y i n smal l compames. Does f u n d per formance persistence exist? The 
results say ' yes ' bu t on l y poor performance. Carhart (1997) shows that the persistence 
performance o f the us mutua l funds occurs because persistence exist i n the 
under ly ing stocks w h i c h the investors buy. I t w o u l d require further research to 
determine whether this explanat ion appl ied to the U K un i t trasts. 
Eth ical investment refers to a set o f approaches that inc lude social or ethical 
goals or constraints as w e l l as more convent ional financial cr i ter ia i n decis ion over 
whether to acquire, ho l d or dispose o f a par t icu lar investment. Chapter 4 discusses 
that the practice o f ethical investment is directed towards the pursui t o f t w o p r imary 
goals; firstly, p rov i d i ng a solut ion to the investment ethics p rob lem, and secondly, 
addressing the corporate ha rm prob lem. The ethical investment avoids invest ing i n 
companies w i t h unethical practices and, instead, invests i n companies w h i c h can be 
regarded as m a k i n g a posi t ive ethical cont r ibut ion. Dec l i n i ng to invest i n the securit ies 
o f companies that act i n a soc ia l ly i rresponsible w a y is not o n l y a f o r m o f social 
protest, but can also have the effect o f d im in i sh ing the demand for a company's 
securities. D im in i shmen t o f demand may have an adverse financial impact on a 
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company. Th is may be a factor i n in f luenc ing companies to change and to become 
more eth ical ly responsible. However , the quest ion s t i l l arises; is an ethical investor 
w h o declines to purchase the securit ies o f enterprises deemed to be disadvantaged 
w i t h regards to investors w h o have no such restr ict ions? I n other words , has the 
investment per formance o f ethical investors suffered i n compar ison to those w h o are 
not so responsible? T o answer the above, this รณdy has encompassed 35 ethical un i t 
trusts i n the Un i t ed K i n g d o m . The investment per formance o f ethical un i t trasts has 
been compared to convent ional un i t trusts, w h i c h are not e th ica l ly responsible. The 
รณdy shows no clear pattern o f either superior or in fer ior investment rates o f г е Ш т 
for ethical un i t trasts when compared to convent ional un i t trasts. 
I n chapter 4， a comprehensive evaluat ion o f ethical un i t trasts per formance is 
presented b y emp loy ing var ious return-based benchmark models at bo th their 
uncond i t iona l and condi t iona l versions. U s i n g the data o f the U K ethical uni t trusts for 
the per iod from 1996 to 2003, this study explores the added value o f in t roduc ing extra 
variables such as size, book- to-market , m o m e n t u m and a bond index, w h i c h compare 
w i t h its convent ional peer. I n add i t ion to that, the use o f in t roduc ing t ime var ia t ion i n 
betas and alphas is evaluated. The search for the most suitable mode l to measure the 
U K ethical un i t trast per formance has addressed t w o po in ts ; firstly, the statist ical 
s igni f icance o f adding more factors to the single factor mode l and, secondly, the 
economic importance o f more elaborate mode l specif icat ions. The results reveal five 
conclusions. 
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First, w i t h i n an uncondi t ional sett ing i t is found that Fama-French (1992) three 
factor and Carhart (1997) four factor mode l i nc lud ing market beta, S M B , H M L and 
m o m e n t u m factors are best able to expla in ethical un i t trust re toms. 
Second, cond i t ion ing betas on pub l i c l y avai lable in fo rmat ion proves to be 
unsuitable for ethical un i t trast performance. A l l condi t iona l models are in fer ior to 
their uncondi t iona l peers. 
Th i r d , w e find ve ry l i t t le evidence o f t ime-var ia t ion i n fiind alphas, w i t h the 
except ion o f the investment style level o f the por t fo l io funds. I t is also noted that a l l 
companies exh ib i t a l i t t le t ime va ry ing i n fund alphas. 
Four th , at the aggregate level , a l l ethical un i t trast por t fo l ios , the alphas do 
change when go ing from uncondi t ional с А Р М to condi t ional Carhart four factor 
mode l . In the investment style leve l , the inf luence o f uncond i t iona l Fama-French three 
factor mode l and uncondi t iona l Carhart four factor models are more signi f icant. 
F i f t h , after con t ro l l i ng for style t i l ts and a l l ow ing for t ime var ia t ion i n betas 
and expected г е Ш т , the U K ethical uni t trust results are consistent w i t h the general 
percept ion that there is no s igni f icant d i f ference between ethical un i t trust 
per formance and their convent ional peers. 
W h i c h mode l is best for performance measurement w i t h regards to statistical 
as w e l l as economic relevance? Based pure ly on statistical s igni f icance, the 
uncondi t iona l Fama-French three factor and Carhart four factor are c lear ly superior to 
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the condi t iona l models. W h e n measur ing performance at an aggregated level , the 
inf luence o f us ing elaborate condi t iona l models is not that obvious. A t the investment 
style leve l , however , the use o f richer models do have a clear impact on alpha 
estimates. 
The performance o f ethical un i t trusts indicate that long te rm investment rates 
o f re turn are not in f luenced b y use or lack o f use o f social cr i ter ia as part o f the 
investment selection process. These results are support ive o f M a l l i a n , Saadouni and 
Br i s ton (1995) w h o find that ethical fixnds outper fo rm non-eth ical funds. I t is even 
seen that some results (Gregory et a l , 1997) m igh t disappoint the ethical investors 
w h o hope to pe r fo rm w e l l wh i l e do ing good. They m igh t also disappoint ethical 
investors w h o are w i l l i n g to receive l o w retums as fa i r exchange for c o m p l y i n g w i t h 
their bel iefs. B u t not a l l etMcal investors have the same mora l out look. A s 
Dom in i ( 1992 ) noted: " O f t e n socia l ly responsible investors express the impetus to 
manage their money as a desire for an integrat ion o f money into one's se l f and into 
the se l f one wishes to become" (p. 11). A n ins t iณt ion m a y str ive for consistency 
between its miss ion and the w a y i t achieves that miss ion. I n bo th instances, this 
mo t i va t i on comes from w i t h i n . The provost o f a Quaker Col lege was asked w h y his 
col lege d id not invest i n the manufacณrers o f armaments. D i d the board o f trustees 
th ink i t was go ing to stop the armaments b u i l d up? ' N o , ' he responded, "ou r board 
isn ' t out to change the w o r l d . W e ' r e seeking [un i t y ] between ourselves and our 
Lo rd . " (pp . 5-7) 
Chapter 5 examines the potent ia l impact o f Is lamic ethical screening 
restr ict ions on investment per formance o f Is lamic ethical c o m m o n stocks b y 
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compar ing the per formance characteristics o f a d ivers i f ied po r t fo l i o o f Is lamic 
screened stocks ( D o w Jones Is lamic index) w i t h t w o convent ional benchmarks. The 
research questions addressed i n the study are ； ( і ) what are the actual relat ive returns 
o f Is lamic ethical por t fo l io versus convent ional por t fo l io and ( і і ) what is the impact o f 
Is lamic ethical screening on investment performance? 
Is lamic ethical investors app ly both shar i 'ah and financial cr i ter ia when 
evaluat ing investments i n order to ensure that the securit ies selected are consistent 
w i t h their value system and bel iefs. In contrast to p r io r research on ethical 
investment, the result o f this study indicates that any assumption that Is lamic ethical 
investment is not financially prof i tab le as compared w i t h other forms o f investment is 
questionable. Th is is supported b y re lat ive ly higher risk adjusted returns i n the 
รһафе and Treynor measures and posi t ive abnormal per formance o f Is lamic 
por t fo l ios (alpha) b y emp loy ing the single factor, Fama and French three-factor and 
Carhart four factor mode l . Cont rary to expectations, our f ind ings indicate that 
appl icat ion o f Is lamic ethical screening does not necessari ly have an adverse impact 
on investment performance. There are three ma in conclusions i n th is chapter. 
F i rs t ly , that the Is lamic eth ica l ly constrained D o w Jones Is lamic market index 
del ivers s igni f icant abnormal retums over the per iod examined. 
Secondly, that the abnormal per formance indicated is af fected b y whether or 
not the models used to measure per formance w h i c h іпсофогаїе lagged in fo rmat ion 
variables. Th is can be ver i f i ed b y the fact that the condi t iona l measure increases the 
uncondi t iona l measure by above 10%. 
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F ina l ly , w e conclude that f o l l o w i n g one's conscience in financial investments 
do not necessarily lead to the investor be ing f inanc ia l l y penalised. However , i f these 
screens prov ide pr ivate in fo rmat ion , w e can expect that this effect w i l l be arbitraged 
away. A s the i n f l ux o f g lobal investment banks into th is field indicate, the Is lamic 
ethical fund sub-sector m a y become increasingly attractive to those w h o may not 
share the ethical concerns but desire a share o f the Is lamic ethical rewards. The 
acceptance o f the importance o f the value expressive features o f the Is lamic ethical 
funds w o u l d prov ide more than a better framework for fund analysis. I t w i l l also open 
the door to insights about the value-expressive feaณres o f a l l investments, f r o m 
m im ic ipa l bonds to hedge funds and internet stocks. Acceptance o f the importance o f 
the value-expressive feaณres o f investments w o u l d also take us a long the road to 
future "behav ioura l asset p r i c ing m o d e l , " w h i c h has been described b y s tatman 
(1999) , i n w h i c h bo th u t i l i ta r ian and value-expressive features determine the demand 
for investments and expected retums. Sharpé, i n an in terv iew w i t h Bu r ton (1998) , 
described an 'ex tended ' capi ta l asset p r i c ing m o d e l i n w h i c h expected retums w o u l d 
be determined b y beta, taxes, l i qu id i t y , d iv idend y ie ld and other feaณres that investors 
care about. Investors care about ethical responsib i l i ty and other value-expressive 
fea toes , so a filณre behavioural asset p r i c ing mode l w o u l d b u i l d on Sharpe's 
extended С А Р М b y inc lud ing value-expressive features together w i t h ut i l i tar ian 
features as determinants o f investment demand and expected retums. 
The analysis o f the managed fimd industry conducted i n this thesis can be 
extended i n several direct ions. One interest ing topic for fiirther research is the past 
re tums on var ious systematic risk factors, such as size or m o m e n t u m , on the 
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behaviour and strategies o f equi ty , ethical and Is lamic fimd investors and managers. 
O n the one hand, investors m a y select fimds not on l y on the basis o f their bel iefs and 
past risk-adjusted per formance, but also the risk characteristics o f their por t fo l ios . For 
example, they may reward funds w i t h h igh exposure to the " h o t " factors w h i c h 
recent ly real ised h igh re tums. I n this thesis, w e prov ide p re l im inary evidence that 
some investors take fund raw per formance into account, and also that fur ther analysis 
is required to iden t i f y separate impact o f d i f ferent systematic risk factor on managed 
fund flows. O n the other hand, fund managers m a y pursue a s imi lar ' s t y le - t im ing ' 
strategy o f increasing the exposure to the we l l - pe r fo rm ing risk factors. Th is strategy 
may help them to m in im ise the gap i n per formance w i t h respect to funds that 
concentrate their investments i n ' ho t ' styles and have h igher raw retums (Barber is and 
Schlei fer, 2000). Such behaviour m a y be more pronounced for managers o f smal l and 
more vo lat i le funds, for w h i c h i t is easier to make s igni f icant changes i n investment 
po l i cy , as w e l l as managers o f underper forming funds w h o are l i ke l y to change the 
fund 's strategy i n order to improve fund performance and decrease the p robab i l i t y o f 
be ing fired. 
Another topic for fur ther study is the ident i f i ca t ion o f the calendar-year 
effects i n the dynamic structure o f the flow-performance relat ionship. The quest ion is 
whether year-to-date performance has a separate impact on fund flows, on the top o f 
the impact o f past per formance measured over a fixed, such as a one-year ro l l i ng 
hor izon. 
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